




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# STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

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## HEARINGS BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION PURSUANT TO **S. Res. 40**

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS TO EMPLOY TEMPORARY ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AND INCREASING THE LIMIT OF EXPENDITURES

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PART 7  
MARCH 5 AND 6, 1953

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations



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# STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

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THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 1953

## SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,

*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, agreed to January 30, 1953, at 10:30 a. m., in room 357 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin, and Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota.

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; Donald Surine, assistant counsel; David Schine, chief consultant; Herbert Hawkins, investigator; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Donald Henderson?

Will counsel identify yourself for the record?

Mr. ROZEN. Weisman, Allen, Spett & Scheinberg; my name is Irving Rozen, R-o-z-e-n.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Henderson, you are reminded that you are still under oath, having been sworn the other day.

## TESTIMONY OF DONALD HENDERSON, BAYSIDE, LONG ISLAND, N. Y. (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, IRVING ROZEN)

Mr. HENDERSON. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have only a few questions to ask of you this morning, Mr. Henderson.

At the time that you were a professor at Columbia University, were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HENDERSON. I must refuse to answer that question on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate me, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been having considerable testimony in regard to a Mr. Reed Harris, who attended Columbia at the time you did. Let me ask you this: At the time Mr. Reed Harris and three others spoke at a meeting objecting to your being removed from the faculty at Columbia, were you then a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HENDERSON. I must refuse to answer that question on the same grounds, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time Mr. Reed Harris addressed that meeting defending your right to teach, was Mr. Reed Harris a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HENDERSON. I must refuse to answer that question on the same grounds, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to you, Mr. Henderson: When you refuse to answer whether he was a member of the Communist Party, you may create the impression in some minds that he was a member. So I think you should exercise your right with great caution in regard to any other individual named here.

Let me ask you this. Do you honestly feel that if you were to tell this committee the truth as to whether Reed Harris was a member of the Communist Party at that time, that might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. HENDERSON. Senator, I have answered the question by stating that I refuse to answer it on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate me. As I understand the fifth amendment, it is a protection for me, and it is not an accusation against anybody else.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. But you understand you are not entitled to that protection unless you tell the committee that you honestly feel that your answer would incriminate you.

Mr. HENDERSON. That is precisely what I am saying. I give you the refusal to answer the question on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate me precisely because I am trying to protect myself.

The CHAIRMAN. And you honestly feel that if you answer that question it might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. HENDERSON. Under the circumstances, and not knowing where you are going, and understanding the setup here, I feel that I must avail myself of my privilege under the fifth amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. You have your rights under the fifth amendment. We intend to accord those to you. Those are rights every American has. Every American can refuse to answer any question if he feels the answer might incriminate him. Before you can avail yourself of that right, however, we must know whether you seriously think that your answer might tend to incriminate you. So I am merely asking you that simple question.

Mr. HENDERSON. That is my answer, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is "Yes."

We have a book written by Mr. Reed Harris during the time or shortly after he appeared and defended you on the platform.

Did you, in any way, collaborate in the writing of this book or help him to write it?

Mr. HENDERSON. I never even read the book. Maybe that is one of the reasons why Mr. Harris yesterday said it was a failure.

The CHAIRMAN. Then your answer is that you did not help him to write the book in any way?

Mr. HENDERSON. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not collaborate in any way in the writing of the book?

Mr. HENDERSON. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Henderson, what is your present place of residence?

Mr. HENDERSON. I beg your pardon?

Senator MUNDT. What is your present place of residence?

Mr. HENDERSON. 211-19 38th Avenue, Bayside, Long Island.

Senator MUNDT. And your present means of livelihood?

Mr. HENDERSON. Well, up until the 1st of July, I was secretary-treasurer of an organization. Food, Tobacco and Agricultural Work-

ers, but because of my bad health, I resigned on July 1, and at the present time I am taking care of my house.

Senator MUNDT. Have you had any past record of employment with the Federal Government in any capacity?

Mr. HENDERSON. Never, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Either on a contract basis or writing articles?

Mr. HENDERSON. On no basis whatsoever. I never worked for the Federal Government or any of its branches.

The CHAIRMAN. You were head of what union for a while?

Mr. HENDERSON. Well, from 1937 until 1949, I was the international president of the Food, Tobacco, and Agricultural Workers Union of America.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a fact that that union was expelled from the CIO on the grounds that it was Communist-controlled?

Mr. HENDERSON. Well, I wouldn't say so. We disagreed on very fundamental policies, and over that disagreement we split.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not general knowledge that your union was expelled from the CIO by the CIO leadership on the grounds that it was Communist-controlled? In other words, wasn't that the reason given by the CIO?

Mr. HENDERSON. I know that the year preceding the expulsion, I read a minority report at the CIO convention disagreeing with the CIO and President Murray on basic policies with reference to rearmament and with reference to taxation, and as a result of that minority report, I rather believe I was slated for the proverbial ax.

Senator MUNDT. Were you in favor of more rearmament or less rearmament?

Mr. HENDERSON. More butter and less guns, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Less defense and more food.

Mr. HENDERSON. Yes, sir; the way it was being handled.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reed Harris, in his book, refers to a Communist professor who he knew very well at Columbia, and says that because of the furore raised over his expulsion, this Communist professor had his contract extended 1 year. He has identified that Communist professor as you. Will you tell us how close a friend you were of Mr. Reed Harris?

Mr. HENDERSON. I must refuse to answer that question on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate me, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know Professor McKnight at Columbia?

Mr. HENDERSON. I must refuse to answer that question on the same grounds, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor McKnight is the man who took the active part in your expulsion from Columbia. Is that correct?

Mr. HENDERSON. I must refuse to answer that question on the same grounds, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Mr. Nathaniel Weyl?

Mr. HENDERSON. I must refuse to answer that question on the same grounds, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Weyl was one of the four people who appeared at that same meeting and, along with Mr. Harris, defended your right to continue on at Columbia. Mr. Weyl has admitted that he was a Communist at that time. Did you meet Mr. Weyl last week in the Senate Office Building?

Mr. HENDERSON. I must refuse to answer that question on the same grounds, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you meet him in the elevator in the presence of my staff and chat with him? You have a right to refuse to answer that question if you care to.

Mr. HENDERSON. I do, sir. I refuse to answer that on the same grounds.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all.

Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Howard Rushmore? Will you raise your right hand?

In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. RUSHMORE. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rushmore, what is your present occupation?

**TESTIMONY OF HOWARD RUSHMORE, REPORTER, NEW YORK JOURNAL-AMERICAN, NEW YORK, N. Y.**

Mr. RUSHMORE. I am a reporter on the staff of the New York Journal-American.

The CHAIRMAN. You attended Columbia University, did you not?

Mr. RUSHMORE. No; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. What college did you graduate from?

Mr. RUSHMORE. I didn't graduate from any.

The CHAIRMAN. You worked for some time on the staff of the Daily Worker?

Mr. RUSHMORE. I did; from the period of 1937 to 1939.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it correct that while you were in college, you did become a rather ardent Communist for a while?

Mr. RUSHMORE. Well, all members of the Daily Worker staff were required to be members of the Communist Party, and while on the Daily Worker and on the Young Worker for a period of 1 year I was a member of the Young Communist League and the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. And you, I understand, were a fairly noted speaker and classified as a very good writer at that time?

Mr. RUSHMORE. Well, I did quite a bit of writing for the Communist magazines, the left-wing publications, and the Daily Worker, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you broke with the Communist Party about when?

Mr. RUSHMORE. 1959.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say at this point that we have had various types of people who have broken with the Communist Party. There have been those who break and give us the names of well-known Communists, Communists who are publicly known as such. We have other men like Louis Budenz who cooperate fully and completely. I think we should point out that you are one of those who have cooperated fully and completely with the FBI and as far as I know with every Member of the Congress since your break with the Communist Party, and I think we should compliment you for that.

Mr. RUSHMORE. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And, in my opinion, I think you are one of our outstanding Americans at this time.

Mr. RUSHMORE. can you tell us anything about the League of American Writers?

Mr. RUSHMORE. Yes. That was a Communist-controlled organization which was formed in April 1935. I attended the first congress, which set up the league, as a delegate from my home State of Missouri.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you were a Communist delegate in 1935 when the League of American Writers was formed?

Mr. RUSHMORE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And is it correct that Earl Browder opened that meeting and spoke at that meeting?

Mr. RUSHMORE. Yes. Earl Browder, who was then secretary of the Communist Party, Clarence Hathaway, editor of the Daily Worker, and a number of well-known Communists were on the platform and spoke the opening night of the congress.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was general knowledge at that time, was it?

Mr. RUSHMORE. It was widely publicized.

The CHAIRMAN. It was widely publicized. So that any other writer would normally know that that was a Communist organization; is that correct?

Mr. RUSHMORE. Well, I assume that any writer is fairly well able to read, and practically every newspaper in the United States and many of the publications, magazines, and radio, gave this League of American Writers congress a great deal of publicity.

The CHAIRMAN. We have testimony that Mr. Reed Harris wrote a book. I am not sure if you read the book or not. He became affiliated with that organization in the year 1936. Barring any unusual circumstances, Mr. Harris would normally know that was a Communist organization that he was becoming affiliated with at that time?

Mr. RUSHMORE. I can only answer it this way, Senator. I did not know Reed Harris. But in the latter part of 1936, and in 1937, I was doing publicity for the League of American Writers. I was assigned that job by the cultural commission of the Communist Party. And the Communist press and the non-Communist press alike gave considerable publicity to the league. But it was very clear, I think, to any literate American that the Communists did control it; although I might add there were non-Communist writers who did join it.

The CHAIRMAN. One final question: Your testimony is that anyone who worked on the staff of the Daily Worker was a Communist. In other words, in order to qualify to write for the Daily Worker you had to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. RUSHMORE. During my period of membership, that is completely correct, and, as I understand it, it still is.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Senator Mundt?

Senator MUNDT. Were you on the Daily Worker at the same time Louis Budenz was editor of the Worker?

Mr. RUSHMORE. He was not editor, Senator. He was labor editor at the time I was on the staff.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be all.

Mr. Barmine? Mr. Alexander Barmine?

May I say to Mr. Harris that this testimony will all concern you. The hearings are being televised; so you will be given an opportunity to answer this evidence while we are still on television, so you will have the same audience that the other witnesses have.

Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Barmine?

In this matter now before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BARMINE. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Barmine, what is your present occupation?

#### TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER BARMINE, CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN BRANCH OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA

Mr. BARMINE. I am Chief of the Russian Branch of the Voice of America.

The CHAIRMAN. And where were you born?

Mr. BARMINE. I was born 53 years ago, in Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. What position did you hold, if any, under the Russian Government?

Mr. BARMINE. I volunteered in the Red army when I was 19. I remained in the military service, active and inactive, until 1935. The service was interrupted by diplomatic assignment. I retired finally in 1935 with the rank of brigadier general, and I was appointed to Greece, as Chargé d'Affaires of the Russian Government in Greece.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask: Do these cameras down here disturb you?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish the photographers would not use flashbulbs.

Mr. BARMINE. I resigned in 1937. I broke with the Russian Government, and I went into exile in Paris.

In January 1940 I arrived in the United States. I worked here in a factory, and then in the National Broadcasting Co. until 1942, when I entered military service in the United States Army in antiaircraft artillery. I received my citizenship in 1943. I worked in the Office of Strategic Services until 1944, and then with the Reader's Digest as an editorial consultant until 1946.

In 1948 I was invited to join the Voice of America, and I since have been there.

The CHAIRMAN. You were a general in the Russian Army, were you?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. Who invited you, General, into the Voice of America in 1948?

Mr. BARMINE. William Lindsey White, the son of William Allen White, recommended me, without my knowledge, to Charles Thayer, Acting Chief of the Voice. Charles Thayer invited me for an interview and then offered me employment.

The CHAIRMAN. You are under sentence of death at the present time; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right, by a Moscow military tribunal.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you feel? Fairly alive?

Mr. BARMINE. I feel fine, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your position in Russian Military Intelligence when you were in Russia?

Mr. BARMINE. I was one of the special assistants to the Chief of Military Intelligence, General Berzin.

The CHAIRMAN. To the Chief of Military Intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. One of several.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Chief of Russian Military Intelligence was General Berzin, B-e-r-z-i-n?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us the occasion of your breaking with communism and your being sentenced to death by the present Russian regime?

Mr. BARMINE. I had my doubts and misgivings about the policy of the Soviet Government for many years before, but I didn't see any other possibility to serve my country. But by 1947, when most of my classmates at General Staff School, generals of the Red army and the General Staff, were shot and liquidated during the purges, I realized that this is the time when anybody who wants to serve the Russian people should break and fight against the Soviet Government and against communism. That is what I did.

I went to Paris, and I remained there.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly speak a little louder, sir?

Mr. BARMINE. I wrote an appeal asking my colleagues in the diplomatic corps in Europe to join me in this fight and abandon the service of the Soviet Government. And then, while working in France, I wrote a book on the same subject, which was published. I was working on this book nights. Then, after the book was published, I went to see, in the New York Times office, Mr. Phillip, and he showed me the agency wire, the press wire, from Moscow, that Alexander Barmine "will be tried and condemned by the Moscow military court next Friday."

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the press report was that you would be tried and condemned and sentenced to death?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. And I was condemned.

The CHAIRMAN. So the decision was made ahead of time that afterward you would be tried and condemned?

Mr. BARMINE. In my free time I was writing on the same subject. I wrote a series of articles for the New York Times for Belgian, Swedish, and French papers.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, General, that when I first learned that a general from the Russian military intelligence was with our information program, I was very much interested. We spent considerable time checking upon your background, what you have done since you have been in the United States, and satisfied ourselves that you have cooperated fully with the FBI, cooperated fully with the real anti-Communist elements in the Voice of America, and have been doing a good job over there. Originally, we could not quite understand how a former general in Russian military intelligence was there.

As assistant head of Russian military intelligence, having been born and having lived in Russia, I assume that you feel rather well qualified to pass upon the type of broadcasts that will appeal to the Russian mind. Right?

MR. BARMINE. Yes, sir. I was also writing when I was in Russia. Then, since 1937, I have been doing a lot of writing. For many years I was writing in American papers, in Canadian papers. I published articles in Harper's and in the Reader's Digest. In 1944 I had an article about infiltration of Communists in the United States Government. I wrote for Saturday Evening Post, and I worked in the National Broadcasting Co., and then in the Office of Strategic Services, also in radio, so I consider myself qualified for the job I am doing.

THE CHAIRMAN. Your title as of today is what, in the Voice?

MR. BARMINE. Chief of the Russian Branch of the Voice.

THE CHAIRMAN. Chief of the Russian Branch of the Voice?

MR. BARMINE. That is right.

THE CHAIRMAN. And you have no vested interest, certainly, in any other desk in the Voice, other than to see them do a good job. Is that correct?

MR. BARMINE. As much as I am interested in effectiveness of the Voice.

THE CHAIRMAN. The reason I ask you that: We had a witness, Dr. Glazer, here yesterday; Dr. Glazer discussed the lack of wisdom of discontinuing Hebrew broadcasts when the Russians became publicly anti-Semitic. One of the other witnesses intimated that we should discredit Dr. Glazer's testimony to some extent, because he had a vested interest in his own desk. Now, you have no such vested interest in the Hebrew desk or any other desk?

MR. BARMINE. No, sir. But I would request to qualify my position.

I am interested in the work of the Voice of America as a whole, because I consider that the Voice of America is the most effective weapon of psychological warfare and propaganda among all the media that are in the possession of the State Department. I consider that this organization is the best that the State Department has. Before, I was very disturbed by the turn that coverage of the hearings took in the American press. I think in their headlines and in some of the reports the American press was rather unfair to the Voice. Because the Voice of America is doing a very effective job.

Next to my Army outfit, in which I served, I consider the men with whom I have worked, the overwhelming majority of the Voice of America, the most selfless, devoted, hardworking people fighting communism.

THE CHAIRMAN. In other words, you feel that there has been some confusion in the minds of the people at this time as to just when we are discussing the Voice and when we are discussing the International Information program. Is that right?

MR. BARMINE. Yes. I must emphasize that we are a separate entity working in New York, the Voice, in 46 languages. We are under the direction of the International Information Administration in Washington. But the head of the Voice, responsible for the Voice, is in New York.

I have seen in the papers and I have seen also statements here about heads of the Voice, assistant heads of the Voice—who are not. They are executives of the International Information Administration. If you would believe the papers, we have more heads of the Voice now than we ever had in the past 6 years. And, of course, there is the difference between the activity of the International Information Administration and ours.

I think that we have 46 languages, and in the overwhelming majority of these languages we are doing an excellent job. We could be also shocked by facts of waste or poor performance of one or another desk, but our output, our effectiveness, should be judged by the finished product, by our broadcasts.

I can say for my branch : We are putting on the air 5 programs a day around the clock. We broadcast about half a million words a month. I can stand with any feature, any word, that our unit puts out, as effective anti-Communist, completely pro-American material. And I can stand any inspection of these scripts by this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say that I agree with you that there are a sizable number of the desks over there that are doing an outstanding job. I think your desk is one of them.

Mr. BARMINE. Now, it was stated here that there is a fantastic situation in the Voice as related to the activity of Mr. Harris or Mr. Johnstone or others. I may say we are rather the object of their activity, but not a part of it in the sense that we could be responsible for these fantastic things which were brought out there.

The CHAIRMAN. When you refer to Mr. Johnstone, I would like to have it clear that you are referring to Mr. William C. Johnstone, and not the Dr. Johnson who has taken over.

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. BARMINE. So when the question of the effectiveness of the Voice is being judged, we must have in mind that the effectiveness and quality of our work should be judged by our output.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you are trying to make clear at this time that Reed Harris, William Johnstone, Stoner, Hewitt, those men, are not part of the Voice?

Mr. BARMINE. No, they are above the Voice.

The CHAIRMAN. They are in the International Information Administration.

Mr. BARMINE. They are people who are writing guidances for us. But we are doing our work in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, there has been some complaint by some of the men in the International Information Administration that the New York office of the Voice has failed to—I believe the word they used was "cooperate." Has the New York branch of the Voice had any difficulty with the heads of the International Information Administration? And if so, describe it.

Mr. BARMINE. I would say that we have constant difficulties, because of differences of view about carrying effective anti-Communist propaganda. When we received directives and guidances during the last several years, very often we were forced to protest violently and disagree and ask to change this directive, because we considered that in many cases these directives impaired the possibility of carrying effective anti-Communist propaganda.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you violently disagreed, you say, with some of the directives, because you thought the directives received from Washington, from the International Information Administration, would impair your ability to put on a real anti-Communist program, counterpropaganda?

Mr. BARMINE. Many of our chiefs of political desks broadcasting specifically to the Iron Curtain countries, and our superior officers, Mr. Puhan, director of all our programs, and Mr. D'Alessandro, many times violently objected to them, because we considered that we could never carry out our work effectively if we would follow them.

Senator MUNDT. Were your disagreements with Mr. Puhan, or with Washington?

Mr. BARMINE. No; Mr. Puhan and Mr. D'Alessandro and many chiefs of desks had often expressed disagreement in our meetings about the directives from Washington.

Senator MUNDT. You would express your disagreements to Mr. Puhan, and he would relay those disagreements to Washington?

Mr. BARMINE. No; we all participated. These meetings were in the presence of all. When we received these directives, we would discuss them, and in these discussions our superiors in the Voice would join us and support us.

Senator MUNDT. You would express your disagreements and send them to Washington, and would Washington overrule your view?

Mr. BARMINE. You see, sometimes the resistance and opposition would back down and soften them a little and change them, but then they might come back again. I might say that in these meetings we often said, "These directives are usually negative directives, 'Don't do this,' 'Don't do that,' 'Be careful about that.'" We practically never received a directive to do something positive.

Senator MUNDT. That was my next question: whether you ever received a directive from Washington spelling out some specific anti-Communist program urging you to project it.

Mr. BARMINE. Very often where there was a question of timing, a necessity of quick response, instead of encouraging us and telling us to proceed quickly on this or that, we were told "Be careful. Wait until developments. Avoid this. Don't emphasize this. Play down this. Wait until new developments"—and so on.

Senator MUNDT. The Washington directives, then, emphasized caution?

Mr. BARMINE. Much too much.

Senator MUNDT. Much too much caution?

Mr. BARMINE. Caution and sometimes inactivity.

Senator MUNDT. Did you receive the rather famous Washington directive to use the Howard Fast book?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; we did.

Senator MUNDT. As an old Communist specialist, what do you think about that?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, I could speak for my Branch, as a matter of fact. We received the Howard Fast directive, but in this case, due to these disagreements that happen usually on these kinds of directives, we, I would say, applied broad interpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, instead of refusing to follow it, you gave it what you would consider a broad interpretation?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, our broad interpretation was the following. For our Russian Branch, I approved two scripts about Howard Fast, and we put them on the air. But those scripts were not quoting Fast

as an authority to support our position, but blasting Fast as a traitor and a contemptible liar.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any of those scripts with you?

Mr. BARMINE. I may quote one last concluding sentence from one of those scripts, which was broadcast in the Russian news.

Here is the conclusion of our broadcast on Howard Fast:

So long as Fast refrains from committing crimes that are punishable under the law, American authorities visit no punishment on him—no matter how monstrous his lies about America may be—for the very reason that America is a free country. For that matter, what would be the point of punishing Fast? As I stated before, the average American is already punishing him, as he is punishing every slanderer and liar, by having only one feeling for him—contempt.

Senator MUNDT. That is a very good way to interpret the Howard Fast directive.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have the feeling that the Washington office was trying to impair your effort to put on a real hard-hitting program of anti-Communist counterpropaganda?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, it was rather periodic, from time to time.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get that.

Mr. BARMINE. It was a chronic disease. It was coming at intervals all the time for several years.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Harris testified yesterday, and he is in the room. In case I misquote him, he will have a chance to correct me. He testified in effect that while the Hebrew-language desk had been attempted to be canceled, they did order that the anti-Semitism of the Soviets be played up on the other language desks. Is that true, or false?

Mr. BARMINE. I regret to say that that is simply not true.

The CHAIRMAN. It is untrue?

Mr. BARMINE. It is contradictory to the truth.

Senator MUNDT. Can you detail that a little bit? Why is it not true?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, Senator, I have no authority to quote the way Mr. Harris did from the official guidances, which are confidential. If I would be able to, I would be able to prove that this statement of Mr. Harris is directly opposite to the truth. In fact, the first guidance was ordering us to play down not only the anti-Semitic, but even the anti-Zionist angle.

The CHAIRMAN. In the Russian language?

Mr. BARMINE. In all languages, including Russian. When I stated my very violent objection, using even the terms that "this is sabotaging the most effective issue that we have"—Mr. Puhan supported me in this meeting, and several other chiefs of desks—this "guidance" was softened a little bit. But I can't go into details. I can only say that the intention of those guidances was in direct opposition to what Mr. Harris states here.

Senator MUNDT. Can you say this, without violating any confidential information? After you made your protest and the guidance was softened, was it softened to the extent of encouraging you to make wide use of this issue?

Mr. BARMINE. Not at all. It was more "weasel-worded," I would say.

Senator MUNDT. More "weasel-worded"?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, with the result that we still would be unable to carry any effective campaign. And so we stated. This argument

was going on for the last month, almost in every meeting where we discussed this thing.

Senator MUNDT. Did the time ever come when your point of view prevailed?

Mr. BARMINE. No, sir; not yet.

Senator MUNDT. In other words, the argument went on for practically a month?

Mr. BARMINE. Since January 14, when the trials of doctors were announced in Moscow.

Senator MUNDT. And your feeling that we should emphasize the anti-Semitic qualities of communism never did prevail in the argument?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, I would say we finally won the decision on the matter so that we could discuss this angle as a secondary issue; although in my opinion this was the most effective weapon given into our hands. We have to remember that a lot of people in Europe and in all areas consider still the Communist movement, even if they disagree with it, as a liberal movement on the left. Here we have an excellent possibility to point out that there is no difference between Hitlerism and Stalinism, that this is only Red fascism. We can prevail on many hesitating neutrals by exploiting this issue to the maximum. So I think it would be very harmful to us to play this issue down.

Senator MUNDT. You were never encouraged, then, to point out the very obvious fact that Hitlerism and Stalinism, nazism and communism, both being anti-Semitic, both being totalitarian, are similar, and equally repugnant.

Mr. BARMINE. Well, I wouldn't state exactly that, Senator, because, as I say, this was a long argument, and we were sometimes gaining a little in position, sometimes losing. We were never told directly not to. Because, after all, I would say even Mr. Connors, with his assumed innocence of the Communist problem, wouldn't say, "Don't speak, because it might hurt them."

Senator MUNDT. Were you ever told in positive terms: "Here is a fine issue. Give it the old college try. Go to work on it"?

Mr. BARMINE. As I say, I couldn't quote exactly. We were told this was a secondary issue, which should be played down.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Barmine, do you have any idea as to how many private radios there are in the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. BARMINE. Recently it was published that only in the Moscow area, according to the Soviet estimate, there are 240,000 shortwave receivers—only in the Moscow area. And there are several million throughout the U. S. S. R.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the situation in Russia today? May anyone buy a shortwave radio set?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone may?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know if they are available in the Russian market?

Mr. BARMINE. They are available, at several hundred rubles, so even a worker with middle income can afford it.

Senator MUNDT. Have you any evidence to indicate that the radios that they buy in Moscow have been plugged so that they cannot receive American broadcasts?

Mr. BARMINE. No, sir. They can. We have definite and positive evidence that they can. I have with me statements and letters proving this fact, that we are widely listened to in Russia.

Senator MUNDT. When there is a shortwave set in Russia, the Russian, then, can hear our broadcast, as far as the technical aspect of it is concerned?

Mr. BARMINE. The Russian in Kazan, in the Volga area, in the Caucasus, in Moscow, in Leningrad, can go to the shop, buy a shortwave set, plug it in, and listen; but if he is caught he might be shot. In Kazan, the military court condemned to death several hundred people for listening to the Voice.

Senator MUNDT. That is right. But I had a radioman call up my office and try to convince me—and I know nothing about electronics from the standpoint of the technical aspects—that these radio sets that are procurable in Russia are plugged so as to keep out American broadcasts. Now, your testimony is that you have positive information that that is not being done, or could not be done.

Mr. BARMINE. May I be allowed to quote from evidence that I have, sir?

Senator MUNDT. Yes. I want to hear something good about the Voice. If you have something good about it, you may quote it.

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; I think it is time to hear something good about the Voice.

Senator MUNDT. I agree.

Mr. BARMINE. Here is the deposition taken from a Soviet Air Force captain who has defected and has now come over to our side.  
[Reading:]

Any person in the U. S. S. R. may own a radio receiver. Most officers own a radio receiver. An estimated 15 to 20 percent of the U. S. S. R. population own radio receivers, and nearly all of these people at some time or another listen to the Voice of America.

The listening to broadcasts of the Voice of America by Soviet communications personnel constitutes a definite security problem in the Soviet Army. Apparently the practice is almost universal, and it continues despite strenuous efforts to stop it. Soviet field and tank radio sets can tune frequencies used by VOA, and operators often turn their sets to listen to these programs. Reception is generally fairly good, and the content of these broadcasts is widely disseminated.

This is a statement by a captain of the Soviet Air Force.

Then we have another statement by a captain of a Soviet Tank Force who defected. During his testimony he was asked:

Do Soviet soldiers listen to radio broadcasts frequently? Do they listen to the Voice of America?

His answer was:

Soviet officers are able to listen to the radio every day in their recreation centers. Officers have access to more private radios and are able to listen to the Voice of America.

Then the next question:

Are the Voice of America broadcasts effective?

The answer:

They have been instrumental in causing the defection of Soviet officers in East Berlin.

Then the next one was an excerpt from a statement by a sergeant of the Soviet Army who defected and is now enlisted in the American

Army—is now at Fort Dix. The sergeant listened frequently to the Voice of America Russian-language program in Austria. The source is convinced that many people listen to the Voice of America in the Soviet Union, even though reception is difficult because of jamming. The sergeant's uncle, who resides in Odessa, is a regular listener to the Voice of America.

May I point out here that the Soviet Union spends 150 million rubles on jamming only Russian broadcasts. That means more than all the Information program of the State Department costs the United States Government. They would certainly not spend so much money if we were not effective. We are attacked all the time in the Soviet press. Throughout the Soviet Union we are slandered by the radio. Since there is a monopoly press in the Soviet Union, they certainly wouldn't give us free publicity like that if we didn't hit them and didn't hurt them.

Senator MUNDT. So, if we say the right thing on the radio, we are getting through, then. Your testimony is that it is an effective anti-Communist device?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. Here is testimony from a German prisoner of war, who testified that while he was in Kazan, a Soviet major and a Russian woman both listened to the Voice of America. The major had his own radio, a new Russian model with three wavelengths. This radio was quite good. It was named Ural, and cost about 600 rubles. They were greatly impressed when they heard figures, especially comparisons between the living standards of the American worker and the Russian worker and the prices of items in the States compared to those of the U. S. S. R. The German prisoner mentioned that such broadcasts had the greatest effect upon those people.

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you another question. You will not have to read any more evidence on that. But, since you have described the hazards which must be undertaken by a listener behind the Iron Curtain, I am curious to know what your interpretation is of what is the proper kind of program to project to people who have to actually risk their lives to listen. Do you think it should be music? Should it be a description of a book about the family life of Texas? Should it be straight news? Should it be answering the slanders of the Russians? Should it stir up dissidence behind the Iron Curtain? What is your considered judgment as to the type of program we should project to these people who listen at such great peril to themselves?

Mr. BARMINE. Senator, my judgment is my practice. That is what I am doing in Russian broadcasts, and I have been working on those broadcasts for 4 years.

Senator MUNDT. What are you doing? We do not hear the broadcasts. I would like to know what you are doing.

Mr. BARMINE. What we are doing? Yes. First of all, we don't use music at all—no jazz music; no music at all—because we consider it is a waste of time to spend it on music when it is dangerous to listen. Our program content is half time news and half time political commentaries. These political commentaries and features, dramatic presentations, are always sharply anti-Communist or are positively pro-American, describing the American way of life and freedom. We have also, by the way, regular religious programs, which we established about 2 years ago. Twice a month, Bishop John of San Francisco is broadcasting himself the religious sermons to Russia.

Senator MUNDT. You are broadcasting a religious program to Russia?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. Twice a month we broadcast regularly. Then on Christmas and Easter time we have special religious broadcasts four times a day. And I might add that, because we have new style and old Russian style [calendars], we are rather ahead of the American stations, because we present Christmas programs twice, on December 25 and January 7; and Easter programs also twice.

Senator MUNDT. Have you had any disagreement with the head of your religious desk in New York about the desirability or the content of these religious programs?

Mr. BARMINE. No, sir. I instituted this program before Mr. Lyons came on the job. But we work in perfect cooperation, and I have no difficulties or disagreement whatsoever.

Senator MUNDT. He has not tried to interfere with you?

Mr. BARMINE. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Has the Washington office tried to interfere with you?

Mr. BARMINE. No, sir. I am just not sure that they are well informed about the content of our religious broadcasts.

If I may be allowed, I will only quote two lines about those religious broadcasts, which I have as an answer from listeners. I have them here. I won't read from these. These are our religious broadcasts for the last year.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not intend to read all of them?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. BARMINE. But here is one letter addressed to Bishop John. [Reading:]

DEAR FATHER: While listening to the radio, I accidentally picked up the wave speaking from America. A radio was presented to me by a family which left for Australia. That radio set is the sole enjoyment of ours, as we can listen to the Russian Voice of America now. I heard you, Father, only twice. When we heard you for the first time, we couldn't restrain our tears, but they were tears of joy. Now we listen to the Voice of America regularly, and we have the feeling that we are not alone.

Then another letter, from Trieste, to Bishop John:

We heard your word, which was broadcast by the Voice of America on the first day of the holidays, and many people gathered around my hut in the camp. Some were even crying. Your sermon gave all those listening to it strength and hope for the future.

And we have this kind of letter from Australia, from Canada, even from Tahiti.

Senator MUNDT. There is quite a religious feeling still in the heart of the average Russian?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. When I was in Moscow in 1945, I was told that the Communists had run a census and that 75 percent of the people of Russia at the time, which was about the time of the Hitler invasion, in answer to the census stated that they were still believers.

Mr. BARMINE. That is true, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. You believe that?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. That is why we carry intensive religious programs.

Senator MUNDT. It would seem to me it would be a very skillful type of broadcast you could give.

When people cannot worship in their own country, and they desire religious programs, you can provide them that service. I am glad to hear that Mr. Lyons has not interfered with you.

Mr. BARMINE. No, sir. He was cooperating.

The CHAIRMAN. Has there been a recent plan advanced by the International Information Office to decentralize the Voice?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir. There has.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you describe that plan and tell whether it has been put into effect, or whether it is going to be put into effect, and what you think the result of it would be?

Mr. BARMINE. This was the plan which was profoundly disturbing to many executives of the Voice. I heard here Mr. Dooher quoting yesterday from Dr. Compton's statement. Now, of course, Dr. Compton's statement about a plan of reorganization of the Voice—would practically tear the Voice apart and bring the liquidation of the most effective, as I said, anti-Communist weapon that the State Department has.

I first learned about it when Mr. William Johnstone came to the Voice of America, and in the meeting of our broadcasting divisions told us about the plan and about the result of his trip with Dr. Compton around Europe. That was the first time in my life I had seen Dr. Johnstone, because I had never seen him or Mr. Harris before. I never was called to Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. Would this plan have affected your desk in any way?

Mr. BARMINE. As it was presented at this time, the plan was not affecting my desk.

The CHAIRMAN. It would not affect your desk?

Mr. BARMINE. No, sir. In this plan, Dr. Johnstone, William Johnstone, explained to us the following. Now, the Congress approves the funds for the Information program—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you some questions, and we will see if we canot make this a bit simpler.

What effect would it have upon, say, the German language desk, this reorganization suggested by Dr. William Johnstone?

Mr. BARMINE. Dr. Johnstone said instead of one plan for a broadcast appropriation approved by Congress, we will have 88 plans at the disposal of every embassy, in particular of every public affairs officer in every embassy. Then he explained to us that that means that the public affairs officer in Paris, Berlin, or New Delhi, decides if he wants that this money would be spent on broadcasts from New York in this language, or on his own project in his country. I would say he was running the risk that the public affairs officer in every country would be more interested in his own baby, the way Mr. Glazer was accused, than in carrying programs from New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Who, for example, would be controlling the German broadcast?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, the decision we should broadcast in German from New York, from the Voice of America, or be replaced by some kind of program in Germany itself, that decision would be in the hands of Mr. Kaghan and Mr. Schechter, I assume, as the public affairs officers.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it would be in the hands of the two men, who, according to the testimony before the committee, were rejected on security grounds?

Mr. BARMINE. Now, I saw Mr. William Johnstone for the first time at this time, and I asked him only one question. I was shocked by this plan, and I asked him: Now, must we understand that he said that the radio programs are not so much effective, often, as meeting the people, or showing them some movies? So I said, "Do you really believe that when we have our programs broadcast on the national networks and are listened to by millions of people, some of your cocktail parties around the embassy and the showing of movies could replace it as a more effective weapon?" I don't think he had an answer on this.

The CHAIRMAN. You said if Johnstone's plan were put into effect, Schechter and Kaghan apparently would be in charge of the German broadcast. Now, I have in my hand a document which I think should be put into the record at this time. I have a letter, dated March 4, 1953, addressed to the Senate permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. This states that:

In compliance with your telephone call this morning to the office of the police commissioner, the following information desired by you has been photostated and airmailed special delivery herein. Ted Kaghan signed a nominating petition for one, Israel Amter, councilman, in 1939.

It goes on to say that the roommate of Kaghan also signed a nominating petition for Israel Amter. It is signed "Yours very truly, George P. Monaghan, Police Commissioner."

That will be made part of the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 39" and will be found in the appendix on p. 567.)

The CHAIRMAN. Then we have the nominating petition for the Communist Party candidate, signed by Ted Kaghan, giving the address 310 West 47th Street, which is the address of Mr. Kaghan. Is that correct? This has been verified as his correct address by the State Department.

(The nominating petition was marked "Exhibit No. 40" and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. So that if Johnstone's plan was carried out, this man, Kaghan, who, incidentally was defended very vigorously by Mr. Harris the other day—I call this to Mr. Harris' attention, so that he may comment on it when he takes the stand.

I have in my hand a play written by Mr. Kaghan. I shall read from page 34. The entire play will be marked and made an exhibit, just to give us an idea of the type of individual we have over in HICOG in charge of this program now.

(The play referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 41" and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. To quote from the play:

The Communist Party wants to unite all workers in a struggle for their rights against a decadent system of capitalism.

Gordon was a worker, and because he was a worker, he was shot, like many other workers will be shot if they don't organize and set up a united front against their enemies, the capitalist class, which is rapidly becoming a Fascist regime.

Would you think that that would be the type of individual we should have in charge of that program?

Mr. BARMINE. On the basis of this evidence, I wouldn't think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say that counsel informs me that his play has received favorable reviews from the Daily Worker.

Mr. Barmine, we want to give Mr. Harris full time to appear and answer some of this testimony, so we may have to speed this up a bit.

Counsel, have you some further questions?

Mr. COHN. Just 1 or 2, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Barmine, we had some testimony down here by a man named Auberjonois, who was the chief of the French service of the Voice of America and is now 1 of the 3 people determining policy up there in the Voice of America. Mr. Auberjonois testified before us about a trip he made to France to talk to some of the French people, and then he told us that he returned to the United States and attended a policy meeting at the Voice of America, in the course of which he expressed his views concerning what type of a product should be sent over the Voice of America to France; and that after he expressed those views you got up and took violent issue with them. I wonder if you could give us your version of just what happened on that occasion. I think that would be of interest, in comparing the extremely effective type of work done by your service and that of many of the other witnesses we have had before us, with the type of work done by the French Service, and their point of view as to what should be projected.

Mr. BARMINE. I must say we were in disagreement on this issue with Mr. Auberjonois, on practice and principle, along the following lines. He thought that we should put more entertainment in the program, in view of the general feeling in France and the strength of neutralism. I lived in France for 8 years, and I contested his opinion about that brand of neutralism in France, and I said we should be more active in trying to put on programs that were more politically sharp, more with political anti-Communist content, over the air.

Mr. COHN. How much of the French programs did he want to devote to entertainment?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, the proportion was not discussed, but the general tendency. Now, I have, in all fairness to Mr. Auberjonois, to say that he had a good argument which he presented, that since we have to be accepted by the French national network, we have to abide by their desire in a way, because they wanted entertainment. Well, we heard that at this time that was the approach of the French network. They were rather skeptical about a big amount of political broadcasting.

I think he had an argument there. The question was that maybe we should put more effort and make our political broadcasts interesting enough that they could match any entertainment program. That was the subject of our discussion and disagreement.

Mr. COHN. How did you feel on the subject of paying for putting entertainment over there? In other words, did you feel that would accomplish anything?

Mr. BARMINE. No, I don't think so. I didn't.

Mr. COHN. And did you get up and press those objections at the meeting?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. We argued rather sharply.

Mr. COHN. And you got up and said, as I think you have testified before, that just putting over entertainment would be a waste of

money and would not accomplish any objectives of the Voice. And what did Mr. Auberjonois say to you?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, I think in the heat of argument there were some exchanges that I don't think are very material to this issue.

Mr. COHN. You would rather not go into that?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you just one further question. Have you had a constant attempt by the New York branch of the international information program, or I should say the head of the international information program, a constant attempt on their part to plant men on you like Schechter and Kaghan and Lewis and Stone?

Mr. BARMINE. I wouldn't be able to bring you any evidence or proof, because personnel was not my part of the activity in the Voice. But as much as I knew about candidates who were being proposed to the Voice, I would say that we had often to resist the appointment of people recommendations for whom were made from the field or from Washington, because we considered them not suitable.

The CHAIRMAN. Not suitable on what grounds?

Mr. BARMINE. On political grounds.

The CHAIRMAN. By "political grounds," you mean they were not anti-Communist?

Mr. BARMINE. There were cases where definitely they would be not suitable, and we were successful in standing our ground and not accepting people of this kind.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you objected to them on political grounds?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. By that, what do you mean? You do not mean because they were Democrats or Republicans, do you?

Mr. BARMINE. No, sir, not because they were Democrats or Republicans. We have an equal amount of both in the Voice, and all are anti-Communists. The question was that some of them would be objectionable on security grounds; some of them not necessarily. But you see, we are carrying on cold war, and we have to have people who are able to do this job effectively. This is not only a job for which we get a salary. We have people dedicated to the cause.

Senator MUNDT. How many people do you have working under you in the Russian desk?

Mr. BARMINE. I have 26 permanent employees, and then I have announcers who are on the assignment, and free-lance writers.

Senator MUNDT. Are you satisfied with the ability and the political point of view of your associates, now?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir; I am. First of all, they are all except one American citizens, among them many veterans of the American Army. They are devoted people, and they are carrying on a satisfactory and good job. They are all cleared for security.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Barmine, you have told us about these policy decisions from Washington that played down this purge issue. Now, are there any other specific examples you know of in Washington, where instructions were issued which you regarded as unsound, particularly dealing with important issues having to do with your service, which interfered with an effective anti-Communist program?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, there were.

Mr. COHN. Can you tell us about any specific examples?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, one of the cases that I consider pretty important was a case of the treatment of possible death or illness of Premier Stalin.

Mr. COHN. When did this issue arise? Just within the last day or so?

Mr. BARMINE. No, this issue arose during the party congress last year.

Mr. COHN. That was last October?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. Our job, and particularly my duty, is to look for the vulnerable spots, attacking those spots, we could make our propaganda the most effective.

Now, in studying the stenographic report of the congress of the party, I noticed an extremely curious thing. Practically every speech by a Russian leader or by every foreign Communist Party leader was ending with phrases like "Long live Stalin," "Stalin must live forever," and so on. If it would be only once or twice, it would be not significant. But practically every speech ended this way.

The secretary of the Greek Communist Party, for instance, finished his speech by saying, "Every woman of Greece is ready to give 1 year of her life for 1 minute of Stalin's life, for prolongation of Stalin's life. Because there are millions of them, Stalin will live forever." The Albanian delegate said, "Let Stalin live as long as the Albanian mountains."

There was a certain pattern there, and after analyzing it, I came to the conclusion that this is a rather pathological fear of mentioning the possibility of Stalin's death. Why? For a very simple reason.

Communist propaganda for almost 30 years has ascribed every success in the Soviet Union personally to Stalin. Anything that goes well—it is because of the personal participation of Stalin. So they put themselves in their own trap. When everything depends on Stalin, that means if Stalin might get sick, or die, everything can go to pieces. They were pathologically afraid to mention the possibility of Stalin's death or illness.

So we decided this was a vulnerable spot and we should hit this spot.

I wrote a memorandum on this subject. I can't quote it, because this memorandum is confidential. I wrote a memorandum to my superiors in the Voice, giving those quotations and offering the possibility of treatment, that we should pound on the question of the possible death of Stalin, and dissension and troubles in case of succession.

My superior in the Voice of America, Mr. Kretzmann, supported my memorandum and addressed his own, with my suggestions, to Washington.

Now, we also offered a script, which was called Stalin's Testament. We had the idea of Stalin dying—these scripts were prepared in October and November—of Stalin dying, writing a testament like Lenin did, and what happened after this testament is read by his successor, with the fight going on.

Those things were presented to the International Information Administration, to Mr. Bradley Connors.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Connors is the top policy adviser, who was under Dr. Compton and Mr. Harris in the International Information Administration. Is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. COHN. By the way, are you familiar with Mr. Connors' testimony before this committee?

Mr. BARMINE. I watched it on television, sir.

Mr. COHN. You heard him say that he had never read any book by Marx, Lenin, Engels, or Stalin, and knew nothing about Communist propaganda or tactics?

Mr. BARMINE. I did.

Mr. COHN. And you say that this was presented to Mr. Connors?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Your plan concerning taking advantage of this obvious weakness as demonstrated by the party congress?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. The Voice officials in New York supported this and tried to put it through the International Information Administration through Mr. Connors' office.

Mr. COHN. We want to make this clear. Because Mr. Connors has no connection with the Voice of America, as such.

Mr. BARMINE. No; he is not a member of the Voice of America. He is a superior policy officer who gives us guidance or decides on these kinds of issues, such as the question of: Should we carry a campaign on the possibility of Stalin's death, or not?

Mr. COHN. So, in other words, you formulated this plan after a study of the party congress. It was approved by the policy adviser to the Voice in New York?

Mr. BARMINE. By Mr. Kretzmann.

Mr. COHN. By Mr. Kretzmann. Of course, it goes without saying that yours is an intimate knowledge of the Russian scene.

By the way, did you know Stalin personally?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, I did.

Mr. COHN. And this plan of yours was endorsed by the chief policy adviser of the Voice, this plan for this weapon, to take advantage of the possibility of Stalin's illness or death, and it was sent to Washington?

Mr. BARMINE. He wrote his own memorandum supporting this and sent it to Mr. Connors.

Mr. COHN. To Mr. Connors in Washington. What happened after that?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, Mr. Connors requested the opinion of his numerous advisers in several divisions of the State Department, in the Office of Intelligence Research, in political desks, about it. Should we or shouldn't we carry this kind of campaign? And he presented them our project of this script, Stalin's Testament.

Now, I, unfortunately, cannot quote and describe the content of memos, because they are confidential. What I can say is that the script was rejected. We were told not to use it. And the campaign on the issue of Stalin's death and succession was not approved. And one of the motives forwarded to us by Mr. Connors with his obvious approval was that "maybe after all the Russians prefer Stalin to his possible successor."

Mr. COHN. And you were not allowed to use that issue, is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. And I am not allowed still. I asked if I can carry this Stalin testament yesterday, because of the sudden news of the

illness of Stalin, and Mr. Kretzmann said that unfortunately we still have not got agreement from Washington, and therefore until he will try and get one we cannot use it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand the directive was that you could not mention the possibility of Stalin's death, that you could not criticize Stalin personally over the Russian-language desk?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, the question of the possibility of criticizing Stalin personally was rather complicated. We discussed it and argued it many times. Because it depends how you interpret this directive, again. I will agree, myself, that this would not do any good if we will try to sneer and criticize a personal defect, if we would talk about Stalin's withered arm or his pockmarks or the color of his eyes—

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you would agree that would not be good propaganda?

Mr. BARMINE. No, that wouldn't be good propaganda. But then I think we can always say that this is the man who is a brutal tyrant and who murdered more people than any other ruler in history.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you banned from doing that sort of thing?

Mr. BARMINE. No, I wasn't.

The CHAIRMAN. The only thing you were forbidden to do was to discuss the possibility that Stalin might die, that he might not live forever?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, the question of carrying a whole campaign on this issue, that Stalin may die, and that that will mean terrible troubles in the Soviet Union, pounding on this—we were prevented from doing that by this directive. I think it has reduced greatly our effectiveness, because this is really a vulnerable point in Soviet propaganda.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you felt that you could build up the possible contest among Stalin's successors and let the Russian people know he was not going to live forever?

Mr. BARMINE. We felt we might build apprehension among those who listened to us by telling them Stalin will not live forever and the whole system will fall to pieces.

Senator MUNDT. Several times this morning you have referred to the fact that suggestions made by the Russian desk were received in Washington. You talked about the attitude toward the Hebrew broadcast. You talked about the attitude toward the anti-Semitic quality of communism. You talked about the instructions to play down the fact that a purge which happened in Czechoslovakia may happen in Russia, and you talk now about this matter of Stalin's death. I want you to listen to this carefully, because I do not want you to mention any names unless you feel you are right.

Washington is a big place. When you say Washington turned this down and Washington turned that down, I know you referred to the State Department, but we would like to know whether, in your opinion, the man who turned that down was Connors or was Acheson or was Compton or was Harris. Who was responsible for turning it down, if you know?

Mr. BARMINE. When I speak of this I mean those in the International Information Administration who were writing those guidances, approving those guidances, sending them down, and making decisions.

Senator MUNDT. How many people were doing that?

Mr. BARMINE. That is difficult for me to say, because I was never invited to sit on any of those conferences in Washington. But I would often ask Mr. Kretzmann, when he would speak of that. Sometimes Mr. Connors was mentioned. I don't know well the setup in the International Information Administration, but I assume that this line and this pattern couldn't go out without the responsibility of the Chief of Policy.

Senator MUNDT. The Chief of Policy at that time was Dr. Compton?

Mr. BARMINE. No, it was Mr. Connors, so far as I know.

Senator MUNDT. And the only name that was ever mentioned to you when you would say "Who are these people who keep turning down our ideas?"—they would mention Mr. Connors?

Mr. BARMINE. We would receive copies of those guidances. Sometimes they would have names under them. But not always we were told who.

Senator MUNDT. Did any other names appear on these directives which urged you to abandon your ideas, except the name of Bradley Connors?

Mr. BARMINE. I can't remember offhand, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. The only name you remember was Mr. Connors?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do have further questions to ask of you, General. However, Mr. Harris has previously claimed that he did not have the same forum to answer the questions which concern him so vitally, he being the Acting Director of the Information program. I understand that this hearing is being televised until 12:30. It is now 10 minutes of 12. That will give us a chance to discuss some of these matters with Mr. Harris for 40 minutes. I want to ask you some other questions.

Let me ask you one other question before you leave. What would you think about the wisdom of having for the Policy Director for the entire Information program a man, Brad Connors, who says: "I never read a single book about the Communist movement. I know nothing about their tactics. I have never read about their objectives. I could not define the objectives and strategy of the Communist Party"?

Do you think he would be the ideal man to act as your Policy Director to determine what the policy should be in fighting international communism?

Mr. BARMINE. I think it was shocking, Senator, to hear that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Will you step down?

Mr. Harris?

Mr. Harris, you may sit down. You are reminded that you are still under oath.

#### FURTHER TESTIMONY OF REED HARRIS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPART- MEN OF STATE

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume that you will want some uninterrupted time to answer the testimony given this morning.

Mr. HARRIS. I will, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But before we start, I have several questions to ask of you.

No. 1, are you still Acting Director of the entire information program?

Mr. HARRIS. I am not, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You are no longer Acting Director?

Mr. HARRIS. I am not. Dr. Robert Johnson is now on duty.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your title at present time?

Mr. HARRIS. Deputy Administrator of the International Information Administration.

The CHAIRMAN. So you are second in charge?

Mr. HARRIS. I am second in charge; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And in the absence of Dr. Johnson, you would be the Acting Director?

Mr. HARRIS. In the absence of Dr. Johnson, I would be the Acting Director.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a matter that I think we would like to comment on. The other day, on pages 11346 and 11347, you had this to say about Kaghan and Schechter. The testimony had been, by Mr. Thompson, that Kaghan and Schechter had been turned down for security reasons, that they were still working in Hicog, the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn, and you took it upon yourself to come before the committee and defend these men in the following language. You said:

\* \* \* I have been specifically authorized by Mr. Jack Tate, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, that in view of Mr. Thompson's incorrect testimony it is only fair to point out that both Messrs. Kaghan and Schechter have been investigated, as required by Public Law 402, and have full clearance as to loyalty and security. The fact that these individuals did have a clean bill of health should be given publicity equal to that of Mr. Thompson's erroneous charges.

We then called Mr. Tate, and he has told us under oath that he had never told you that those men had been cleared.

You were recalled, as you remember, and you said then that you did not intend to imply that Mr. Tate had told you that they had been given clearance, but that someone else had told you that. Now, I am curious to know whether, at the time you came before this committee and defended Mr. Kaghan and Mr. Schechter and accused Mr. Thompson of giving erroneous testimony under oath, which would be perjury, you were aware of the document which I will now hand you. It is a nominating petition for the Communist Party—

Mr. HARRIS. I might say I have never even heard of this document until you produced it today.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that that is in the State Department files of Mr. Kaghan?

Mr. HARRIS. As I testified before, I have never examined the security files of Mr. Kaghan or Mr. Schechter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think before you came before this committee and accused Mr. Thompson of perjury and attempted to give these men a clean bill of health, you should have checked to find out if this sort of thing was in the file of Mr. Kaghan?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not, Mr. Chairman. I checked the matter with the security officer to find out whether all employees on our German program are cleared. He so stated. And I got the authority of Mr.

Tate to so state. I misinterpreted that to the degree of feeling that I could state two names of those people on the German program. Mr. Tate's language was this, sir: "I think you would be at liberty to state that fact, that all the people on your program in Germany have been cleared, but not to go into an individual case." That I interpreted—may I finish, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. You may.

Mr. HARRIS. I interpreted that to mean that we could not go inside the file. In other words, we could not talk about anything, if we knew anything, about the material in the files, but we could mention the names. I still think that in fairness to these men the fact of clearance of all persons on the German program of the International Information Administration should be stated. Every employee there has had appropriate clearance, or they would not be working there. I can say that with assurance.

Senator MUNDT. By whose authority do you make that statement? Not Mr. Tate's.

Mr. HARRIS. No, the authority to make that statement is the security officer of the Department, that is, the security officer at the time that I got the information, Mr. Ford, who was the head of the investigations organization.

The CHAIRMAN. You say Mr. Ford told you that everyone at Hicog had been cleared?

Mr. HARRIS. Everybody on the public-affairs program of Hicog, which is under our supervision, has been cleared. That is the statement, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, are you aware of the fact that under Public Law 402, which originated as a bill introduced by Senator Mundt and that passed the Senate and the House, the people who work on the Voice must have a special clearance, which is not true of those who work in Hicog? In other words, the High Commissioner of Germany?

Mr. HARRIS. I am not so informed at this time. I cannot give you expert testimony on that.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you do not know that you need a different kind of a clearance for the Voice?

Mr. HARRIS. At a previous time it was true, but as soon as we became charged with it, under IIA, it is my understanding that the same procedures applied.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that you do not know, but you think that those working in Hicog had the same clearance as those working on the Voice?

Mr. HARRIS. I did not say that, sir. I said the people working in the Public Affairs Branch of Hicog, I understand, since they came under our supervision in July 1952, have had to have that type of clearance, or leave the program.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to read to you from a play produced by Mr. Kaghan. And his plays, incidentally, for your information, in case you do not know where, as the staff informs me, sponsored by the New Theater League. We are speaking of Kaghan now, the man whose task today is that of Deputy for Public Affairs in the Office of the High Commissioner of Germany, the man whom you defended the other day. His plays, as I am informed by the staff, were spon-

sored by the New Theater League. The House Un-American Activities Committee and the California Committee on Un-American Activities, both of them, have cited the New Theater League as a Communist front.

I am going to now read to you one brief passage from the play, which I think you heard before, and ask you if this is the type of person you think should occupy the position he holds in the Office of the High Commissioner of Germany.

The Communist Party wants to unite all workers in a struggle for their rights against the decadent system of capitalism.

Gordon was a worker, and because he was a worker, he was shot, like many other workers will be shot, if they don't organize and put up a front against their enemies, the capitalist class, which is rapidly becoming a Fascist regime.

Would you agree that that is the Communist line, pure and simple?

Mr. HARRIS. It sounds like it, Mr. Chairman. But as I have testified before, I am not testifying on any personal knowledge of Mr. Kaghan and Mr. Schechter. I am testifying simply that, as employees of the Public Affairs Branch of Hicog, since all people there are cleared—I testified that they were cleared. I found that I was in error in mentioning individual names.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any individual responsibility for Kaghan? Do you have the right to discharge him? Is he in your department?

Mr. HARRIS. It is possible that I would have had the right to discharge him at the time I was in charge. I would have to look into that. I couldn't discharge him on loyalty grounds, because that is up to the security officer of the Department. It would be up to Mr. McLeod to take such action.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you took it upon yourself to come before this committee and accuse Mr. Thompson of perjury, of telling something that was not true. I want to ask you this question. Do you now, after getting this information, which you say you did not have the other day, want to change your testimony and tell us that maybe Mr. Thompson was bringing us information we should have?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Thompson's testimony indicated these men were not cleared. My testimony, based on the official records of the Department, was otherwise. I am not in a position to discuss these individual cases. I am specifically ordered not to do so by the security officer of the Department, and if you desire to go into them, I can only ask, sir, that you call Mr. McLeod.

The CHAIRMAN. You said, the other day, "The fact that these individuals did have a clean bill of health should be given publicity equal to that of Mr. Thompson's erroneous charges." After learning, now, that Kaghan signed the Communist petition, and learning that he writes plays favorably reviewed by the Daily Worker, sponsored by an organization known as the Communist front, in which he sets forth the Communist Party line, do you still think that he deserves a clean bill of health?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would have to know all the facts to know about that. Those two facts by themselves would prove nothing, because there could have been things since then that would change it, and I am not in a position to go into those. I say, sir, the only way that you can discuss security information about personnel is to

go to the security officer of the Department. I am just not at liberty to discuss this type of thing in this manner.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me read a section from another play produced by the same man.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I say this—

The CHAIRMAN. Wait until you answer the question, if you will.

Let me read another section from a play of this man, page 21:

Brothers and sisters of work and struggle, scattered far and wide, swear allegiance to the flag that through sweat and toil is bred. Heaven and earth will hear us, and the stars will be our witness. We avow a vow of tears and blood and vow never to desert our flag until all of the workers of the world are free.

Does that sound to you like the Communist line?

Mr. HARRIS. I should think it would be, at some time in history; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, would you think that is the Communist line as of today?

Mr. HARRIS. It might be. I am not that familiar with the domestic Communist line.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, you have been the headman appointed to fight communism.

Mr. HARRIS. International communism, sir, all over the world, not limited to the United States. We do not engage in domestic public relations or domestic propaganda.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the Communists in this country are not part of the international conspiracy?

Mr. HARRIS. Of course not, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You said "of course not"?

Mr. HARRIS. I said of course they are. I do think they are. I thought you asked it in such a way as: did I not think?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see.

Mr. HARRIS. I do think they are part of the international Communist conspiracy, of course. But, Mr. Chairman, you said early in this hearing that you would give me adequate opportunity to give my side of the case. Also, you have given witnesses this morning great freedom without interruption.

The CHAIRMAN. Your request is that you be uninterrupted, to make a statement now? Is that your request?

Mr. HARRIS. I should like to; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You will be given that privilege. You may proceed.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think we might even be able to save a little time in this inquiry, in the way it has been going this morning, by some things I can say right now and here.

I should say parenthetically, as I have said before, sir, that I do not feel that there is a fair atmosphere where the prosecutor and the judge and the jury are consolidated, in effect, in one person, and where the whole staff, legal staff, is devoted to the prosecution of the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. I must interrupt you, Mr. Harris. I would like to ask you what additional privileges you want. We have been conducting a very unusual hearing, one that you would never get in a court of law because you would not be accorded these privileges.

In a court of law, you would be allowed to come in and refute what has been said, at the end of the hearing. We are allowing you to break in whenever you want to. We have given you the right to have counsel. We have told you you can suggest any witnesses you want to call, that we would call them. We intend to do that. We are trying to find the cause of the unusual and fantastic picture we found in the Voice of America. I think every Senator in this committee agrees that, saying it very, very conservatively, we have a situation bad beyond words in the Voice. And we find you, a witness, coming in and defending men like Kaghan, who, as you say, followed the Communist line, who signed a Communist petition. We find that you wrote a book. I have repeated this over and over, and I will continue to. This is part of your history.

Mr. HARRIS. Twenty-one years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. You wrote a book which you say made you unfit to serve in this job if you hold such views today. We have had you here for 3 days now, waiting to get some proof from you that your ideas have changed. So far, that proof is lacking. You come before the committee, and you say you want time. You spend your time condemning the committee. You have a right to do that. But I wish you would finally get down to giving us some proof that your views have changed since you wrote this book.

You talk about the staff being prosecutors. This staff has instructions to bring any witness whom you suggest before the committee. You have suggested five witnesses up to now. The staff found that one of those witnesses is out of the country and unavailable, and one, whom you suggest as an expert, Colonel Andrews, the man you tried to appoint as chief engineer, has been turned down by the Civil Service Commission as incompetent. He was found incompetent by the Civil Service Commission. I do not know whether you want us to still call him or not.

As to the other three, counsel, will you state what has happened?

Mr. COHN. The other 3 witnesses have been interviewed, and 1 of them, Mr. Weldon, is cited by General Stoner of Mr. Harris' administration, in a report, 1 year ago, as having supported the view taken by this committee in the Bureau of Standards to the effect that this \$10 million transmitter site at Baker West was mislocated by the International Information Administration. He is on public record as to that.

We have interviewed the man at MIT concerned, and he stated over the telephone to three of us who were on the phone with him, that he felt, although a final conclusion had not been reached, it was mislocated and should be moved, and as far as he was concerned, he didn't want to testify. The third one expressed similar sentiments. The fourth was out of the country. The fifth was Mr. Andrews, whom you asked us to call. We then received word of his rejection by the Civil Service Commission within the past few weeks as an engineer of any type, even though he was recommended as chief engineer for the whole program. At that point, you put it up to Mr. Harris as to whether he still wanted us to have him.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say to the counsel that we will reiterate that any witness that Mr. Harris asks us to call will be called, and we will call him even though he is reluctant to appear.

I may say to Mr. Harris that there is no one on trial here. This committee is trying to get to the bottom of this sorry mess. We must get at the facts so that we can properly legislate. And if we find men who are not fit for their job, we must call that to the attention of the proper officials and hope that they will be removed. Some have been removed since we started our hearings. For example, there was removed the man whom you had as chief engineer. When the new administration found that he was not a qualified engineer, that he flunked his 1 year of engineering, as he testified, he was removed. I think, in fairness to you, it should be said that you did not bring him into that job, but you did keep him on.

Mr. HARRIS. However, Mr. Herrick still remains on duty as one of our development engineers, a field in which he has demonstrated great competence. I have high respect for Mr. Herrick, and I think his record has been very much maligned before these hearings.

Now, sir, the reason I have mentioned the procedure of this committee is that I think too few people realize what is involved here. You say I have perhaps more rights than in a court, but as a matter of fact, though you say I might have counsel, if I had counsel, as you have said yourself, he could take no part in the proceedings. He could not object to improper questions. The worst part of this situation is the improper questions, the questions that are loaded with implications that are false, improper. They are constantly used. They are quoted in the press. They are not actually definite charges, but they imply all sorts of things about whoever happens to be sitting in this very hot seat. And they do great injustice to people who serve in the Government of the United States particularly, because they are the people who come up here. It does injustice to them, because they have been investigated with the greatest of care by the most competent investigative staffs in the world, the FBI, the Civil Service Commission, and other elements.

Now, proceeding, sir, to actually save you some time, I heard a mention this morning by Mr. Howard Rushmore. Let's start right out with the Daily Worker, because the Daily Worker is certainly a very hot issue. Mr. Howard Rushmore stated something about "anybody who was on the staff of the Daily Worker must be a Communist." That is very possible. I happen never to have been on the staff of the Daily Worker. I do know why this subject was brought up in the manner that it was, however. When I wrote my book, the book that you keep referring to, which was written 21 years ago and which I have disavowed very strongly in these hearings and elsewhere, the National Student Review, a publication of something called the National Student League, wrote to my publisher, and my publisher asked me whether I might let them use a bit of my book as publicity, as advance publicity to promote sales. The National Student League took that. They ran either a whole chapter or an excerpt from a chapter in an issue of their publication, this National Student Review. And lo and behold, not many days later, we discovered that same material run in the Daily Worker over my byline. There was never any permission given by my publisher or by me that that material be used in the Daily Worker. Never at any time was there permission given by my publisher or by me to run that material in the Daily Worker.

That was an evidence, one of the evidences, as a matter of fact, that helped me understand just how bad the Communists are in their keeping of promises, their lies, and so forth. Because I saw that there must be a Communist type of direction in this National Student League that had pulled this material from their publication and let it go on to a frankly Communist publication, the Daily Worker.

Now, also today you had in here Mr. Donald Henderson. And by the way the testimony went, you might have thought that somehow Mr. Henderson thought there would be some reflection on himself by testifying whether he knew me or whether I was a Communist. Now, you know I have testified under oath that I have never been a Communist Party member; that I never have wanted to be one; that I never will be one. And you also know that I have testified that I had nothing to do with Don Henderson after the time of the meeting which you have brought out here so carefully. I say that there is nothing damning in that situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was wrong for us to bring out the fact that you and two other men who have since admitted they were Communists appeared at a meeting sponsored by an organization that has been listed as a Communist front to defend the rights of a Communist teacher to teach? You think I should not have brought that out?

Mr. HARRIS. I have not said that, Mr. Chairman. If this is the only place it was brought out, I think it would be all right. But all these investigative agencies of the Government have known these things for years. I am sure, if you go back and look at the files of the Civil Service Commission investigation, as far back as 1940 or early 1941, you will find that every bit of that information was given them and they did clear me to serve in the Department, because they saw I was serving loyally; that I had a loyal record beyond that period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, you repeat over and over that you have been cleared to do this job. Now, I am not comparing you to him, but you understand that William Remington was also cleared, that Alger Hiss was also cleared.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is really a fantastic thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. So this clearance that you repeat over and over again—

Mr. HARRIS. Why do you mention a man who has nothing to do with this case today?

The CHAIRMAN. We are concerned beyond the clearances given by the Acheson regime. They have cleared some very unusual people. I am not accusing you of being one of those unusual people. We are trying to get at the bottom of the facts, and I am not impressed by the fact that the Acheson regime cleared you for this top job.

Mr. HARRIS. All right. Now, let's go into that a little bit, sir. Back in the Civil Service Commission, when they made that investigation, there was nothing to do with Mr. Acheson. He wasn't the head of the Civil Service Commission. I wasn't applying for a State Department job. I am sure you know that. When the Office for Emergency Management cleared me, there was nobody there connected with Mr. Acheson.

The CHAIRMAN. The Civil Service Commission did not investigate you from the standpoint of loyalty. That was not their function.

Mr. HARRIS. They investigated me on all counts, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When was this?

Mr. HARRIS. This was in 1940-41.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that in 1941 the Civil Service Commission had the duty of investigating you from the standpoint of loyalty?

Mr. HARRIS. I say that that was part of their consideration. They so informed me.

The CHAIRMAN. You know that is not so, do you not?

Mr. HARRIS. No; I don't know it is not so. I think it is a very important part of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know when the loyalty program was first set up by Congress?

Mr. HARRIS. The specific loyalty program now in effect? I think it came much later than that. But there still was the question of suitability for high jobs. I might add that the investigation conducted by the Office for Emergency Management was for the position of security officer of the Office of War Information, a position that was later held by a rear admiral. And I can prove that, too.

The CHAIRMAN. They investigated you?

Mr. HARRIS. They investigated me.

The CHAIRMAN. As a prospective security officer?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And did you get the job?

Mr. HARRIS. I got the job, and I was cleared. I served in that for a short period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. What year was that?

Mr. HARRIS. That would have been probably somewhere in 1943. I held three titles in the Office of War Information, serving there from 1942 until May of 1944, when I volunteered for service in the Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that you constantly bring up these various clearances, there is another item I should mention. I would not repeat it except that you keep repeating the clearances you got. I think we should mention that in 1942, you applied for a commission in the Navy and you were rejected. You know that, do you not?

Mr. HARRIS. I discussed that with you the other day, Mr. Chairman. You know very well I said I was turned down for physical reasons. You said there was somebody who said otherwise. There is nothing I know otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN. We have your testimony here. You maintain you did not tell us in executive session that you knew that security reasons were involved in your turndown?

Mr. HARRIS. I said I became suspicious that they were, because I heard a report from Columbia that suggested that some very adverse testimony had been given by a gentleman who did not think well of me.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, at the time you were turned down by the Navy, you were suspicious that a matter of security or loyalty was involved?

Mr. HARRIS. I was suspicious that somebody had cast aspersions on my loyalty. I was anxious to get a chance to prove they were wrong. That is why I was very excited about it. But I have not claimed at any time in this hearing that I was cleared by the Office of Naval

Intelligence. I have said I was investigated by Civil Service, OEM, Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, the Security Division of the State Department, and I had two full field FBI investigations. I have said I was cleared by the Civil Service Commission, by the Office for Emergency Management, and by the State Department, and that is the way the statement stands. I have no way of knowing whether I was cleared by Navy or Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us make it perfectly clear that the FBI does not have any authority to clear anyone. The FBI does not have the authority to hire or fire anyone. So many people come in here and say, "I was investigated by the FBI." We have had the FBI investigate each one of these individuals—I am not comparing you to them—each of these individuals who have ultimately been convicted because they are Communists. As I say, I am not trying to make any comparison. I am merely emphasizing this to show that an FBI investigation means nothing, because the FBI can report on a man that he has one of the worst characters in the world, and unless his boss—and your boss was the State Department—decided to take action on that, the investigation is meaningless. So let us not blame the FBI for any—

Mr. HARRIS. Nobody is blaming the FBI. It is far more competent to make investigations than any group who might be in this room at this time.

Now, let's go on for a minute on this clearance business. You have mentioned the Acheson regime. I might remind you, sir, that I served under Secretary of State Byrnes. So I would become, I suppose, in your language, a Byrnes lieutenant. I served under Gen. George Marshall as Secretary of State, a gentleman upon whose reputation you have cast completely unfair aspersions. I served under him loyally. And I did serve under Mr. Acheson.

The CHAIRMAN. On whom did I cast unfair aspersions?

Mr. HARRIS. General Marshall, sir. Gen. George Marshall.

The CHAIRMAN. You say I cast unfair aspersions on him? I think in view of that, in view of the fact that you accuse me on that, I should have the details. What were the unfair aspersions?

Mr. HARRIS. You implied, sir, in statements that you made, that Gen. George Marshall had been favorable to Chinese communism.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that he was not?

Mr. HARRIS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think because I, as you say, inferred that he was favorable to them, that was an unfair aspersion?

Mr. HARRIS. I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. O. K. Go ahead.

Mr. HARRIS. I have tried to dispose of some of these things, actually to save some time.

Now let us go on with another thing Mr. Rushmore was talking about today. He was talking about the League of American Writers, which I voluntarily testified I belonged to for a very few days. And I think instead of 1936, you will find the date was 1938. I resigned from that organization just about as fast as I discovered that I was in it. I think that can be proved by the records.

The CHAIRMAN. What records? We asked you if you had any record of that the other day.

Mr. HARRIS. I said I thought I could prove it, sir, but I have had very little time to myself in these days, believe me. For the last week, I was in charge of this organization of 8,000 people while you had me involved in this a great deal. This week my new superior has just reported to duty. I have a great many things to do in the Department of State. I have been working late hours and early hours and have been before you. I have had very little time to think about my own personal neck, believe me. This is about the only place I can take time to think about it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give you time to present any documents you have to show why you joined that Communist front, why you left it, when you left it, at your convenience.

Mr. HARRIS. I might add that there was no evidence available to me at that time that indicated it was a Communist front. Mr. Rushmore has said that some meeting that had the participation of this league had some Communists in it. Now, if I remember the history of those times, there was something called a Writers Congress called at that time, and it was not clear, at least to me, that that was something run by the League of American Writers. I had the impression, it seems to me, that they were a participant in something, but I was not aware that they were running the thing at all.

But as I pointed out today, as soon as I found out that a gentleman had been so kind as to send a fee for me and get me on the list, I felt that the thing to do was to get it out of there fast, and I did. And very shortly thereafter, as I, I think, at least, proved to some extent with a memorandum I submitted to you, I also got out of the Federal Writers' Project, because I felt that the then head was being far too easy in dealing with Communist-controlled unions which were causing trouble with our New York, Chicago, and St. Louis units.

May I also point out that in going out to St. Louis in 1937, I believe the time was, to stop a Communist-led strike against the Writers Project, I found myself personally picketed at the Hotel Mark Twain by pickets from one of these Communist-dominated unions. And that incident, I am sure, can be shown. We settled that strike, and the people who were responsible were discharged, and people who had been innocently led into it were kept on duty.

I think that the thing that is wrong with this procedure, in dealing with an individual—and we will go on to the agency in a minute, but in dealing with an individual the thing that is wrong with this procedure is that no account is taken of the actual clear-cut loyal service that a man gives to his Government. The fact that you could certainly check with hundreds of people who have worked with me from the date I first got into this Government, and certainly very easily with people who have worked with me for the last 5 years right here in the Department of State—if that kind of information were made available, if you checked on every single action of mine as Chief of Communications of the Department of State, or as Chief of Publications of the Department of State, or in any of the other capacities I have held, you will find nothing that is disloyal. I have the truth on my side, sir. I am going to stand behind it. And I am not afraid of my reputation ultimately, in spite of any aspersions that are cast here before this committee.

Now, sir, may I talk to the point of the International Information Administration?

The CHAIRMAN. You may talk to any point.

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you, sir. This is indeed an unusual opportunity. I do appreciate that. I think it is very fine.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it is an unusual opportunity? Have we not been giving you all the time you want?

Mr. HARRIS. Sometimes, sir, I have felt I was interrupted.

The CHAIRMAN. You can say anything you like. We will give you all the time you want. We will give you complete freedom. Incidentally, I have asked the television stations if they would not consent to keep on the air until you have finished.

Mr. HARRIS. I have no desire to become a TV attraction, believe me.

The CHAIRMAN. You have indicated you wanted the same forum, and I think that is a reasonable request. I think that has been a reasonable request on your part. You say you want the same forum to answer the evidence that has been introduced against you, and we have asked the TV stations to stay on and give you unlimited time. I understand they have agreed.

Is that right, Mr. Schine?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not desire to cut out any important programs with this. But I do desire that the people who listen to this thing shall know both sides as far as I am able to show my particular side of it, at least.

Now, let us talk about the International Information Administration, now headed by Dr. Robert Johnson, a very able person, who I hope you will have a chance to meet and discuss some of these things with, out of this kind of atmosphere, at a later time.

Now, on the question of the directives on anti-Semitic content, as I explained yesterday, we cannot furnish that kind of information to this committee. Therefore, I cannot discuss directives. But I can, sir, produce a few sample scripts that I picked up in a hurry yesterday, Voice of America scripts. These are what they call house scripts. These are scripts used, or that can be used, by every desk. They always are supposed to follow the guidances given from Washington exactly.

Now, I have here as an example six scripts, which I wish to introduce into the record. They are all in this time of controversy. There is one of November 28, No. 1125. There is one of December 31, 1952, known as No. 203.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be marked and received as exhibits.

Would you indicate, as they are marked, what desk they were prepared by, and whether you had occasion to read and approve these scripts or not?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not directly read and approve scripts in advance. They are supposed to be prepared according to the guidances we furnish. Mr. Barmine has suggested that there was no directive suggesting that something be done to expose this anti-Semitic Soviet campaign. These scripts would appear to disprove that quite strongly.

Now, the Central Services Branch, Talks and Features Section, did the first one I mentioned, called Zionism, the New Crime.

Senator MUNDT. May I ask you a question, Mr. Harris, designed to be helpful to you?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Are the directives which you send up there, that Mr. Connors sends up there, considered classified material?

Mr. HARRIS. They are, sir. They are so classified that I cannot testify in detail about them. I can only show you the evidence of what has come out as a result.

Senator MUNDT. It seems to me that if you could make an effort to get them declassified and submit the directives, that would be very simple on this question.

Mr. HARRIS. I have made an effort, and up to now we have not thought it was possible. Mr. Lourie has felt, as other officials have, that the possibility of tipping our hand on broad cold-war strategy is so great that we cannot get into that in this type of situation.

I think, Senator Mundt, that if the committee should desire to go into an executive session at one time we perhaps could arrange to show one or two of those things. I am not sure. We perhaps will be able to. We might be able to take it up if the chairman or Mr. Lourie may desire.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say for the benefit of Senator Mundt that I have taken this matter of classification of the directive up with the proper people at the State Department, and I can see some good reason why certain directives should not be used in public session. I have the assurance, however, that we will have available any information that is needed to get to the bottom of this situation. We will have no difficulty, I believe, with the new people.

Mr. HARRIS. You can be sure, Mr. Chairman, in spite of what you have sometimes described as a sort of a resistant attitude on my part, that we are trying to give you every possible fact that we can. We only object when strange interpretations are put on situations, without all the facts coming forward. We do object to loaded questions, to loaded summaries, to leading questions of witnesses favorable to the thesis being developed here. And we know that, given an opportunity to develop all the facts, we can prove that there isn't the slightest evidence of any pro-Communist conspiracy or any other kind of conspiracy in the International Information Administration.

The chief thing that Mr. Doohier described yesterday—an attempt, as he says, to cut down the service of the Voice to the free world—is really nothing but the effect of the deep budget cuts that we have had to take. That is really all that amounts to. And then General Barnine talked about—

The CHAIRMAN. I dislike interrupting you. I want to give you as much time as possible to develop your point. But when you make statements that I consider untrue, I must interrupt you.

You said that the reason for your cutting certain activities was because the Congress cut your budget. Now, I believe you have agreed with this committee that not the Voice but the International Information Administration program was about to waste millions of dollars on Baker West. It was only when this committee called that to the public's attention that operations on Baker West were canceled.

Now, if you were wasting millions of dollars there, how can you say it was the fault of the Congress that you did not have ten or fifteen thousand to spend on a certain day?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have never had any feeling that we have wasted these millions of dollars that have been charged here.

You remember it started off with something like 31. I think yesterday you got down to 9.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let us keep this clear. Different witnesses may have different ideas as to what the waste was. We cannot censor their testimony. Yesterday we were talking about the figure of \$9 million on one project.

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You know, Mr. Harris, that when the witness was referring to the figure of \$31 million he was talking about a vast number of projects. So I must stop you and not let you get away with a statement like that. Otherwise I would not interrupt you.

You do know now, do you not, and you have known all along, that the \$9 million figure applied to only one project, and that the \$31 million applied to a sizable number of projects?

Mr. HARRIS. I still say the \$31 million would have had to come out of an expenditure of \$27 million, and that would certainly be odd arithmetic, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have to come out, you say?

Mr. HARRIS. Well, our total expenditures in the program described have been \$27 million, and you say, or the headlines at least implied, that \$31 million had been wasted. That was the language, and even a Washington columnist here of good reputation, Mr. Constantine Brown, very shortly thereafter wrote a column in which he said, "This is fine investigation. It has already proved that over \$30 million of the taxpayers' money has gone down the drain." It is not so.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, are you talking about the evidence before the committee? Or what the columnist said?

Mr. HARRIS. I am talking about the effects of it, sir, because I have to. This is something which is done before the public of the United States. It is partly in the press. This is not all right here in this room.

The CHAIRMAN. You understand, Mr. Harris, because I assume you have been following this testimony—

Mr. HARRIS. As far as I could, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You understand that the testimony has been that the \$9 million figure does not represent what was wasted. It represents the ultimate waste had not Baker West been canceled in its present position. You understand that, do you not?

Mr. HARRIS. You mean that \$31 million would have been wasted?

The CHAIRMAN. I am speaking about \$9 million. You understand now, do you not, that the \$9 million figure, as testified to by witnesses—I am not asking you to evaluate their testimony and decide whether you agree with it or not—you understand that was in regard to a proposed waste. You understand that, do you not?

Mr. HARRIS. I understand that that is limited to that project. But I had the impression—

The CHAIRMAN. You understand also, when there is discussion about the roughly \$9 million waste insofar as Baker East is concerned, that that did not refer to money that had been spent but to a waste that would have occurred had the project proceeded.

Mr. HARRIS. I can't accept that word "waste." I have said that that Baker East site is perfectly all right; that we are very satisfied with it; that, in all probability, it will be resumed at that point after further study.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to get you back to this question. You just told us the figure of \$31 million was ridiculous.

Mr. HARRIS. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Because, you said, we have only spent \$27 million.

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I am now asking you if you do not realize that that \$31 million was made up not of money that had been spent but of waste that would have occurred, much of it, if the new administration had not canceled certain projects, such as Baker West. You understand that, do you not?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I understand that you are saying that, sir. I did not follow the testimony because a good deal of it was not available to us. Some of that came out of executive session and was reported to the press.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you now, when you tell us that the figure of \$31 million is ridiculous because you have only spent \$27 million—do you now understand that that argument has no merit, because the testimony had been about proposed waste, waste that would have occurred, had this new administration not canceled certain projects? Do you understand that?

Mr. HARRIS. I will say that it has as much validity as the kind of testimony that was given in support of this alleged waste, sir; yes. I do not think that that has been competent testimony.

May I return to introducing these scripts, which show very clearly that the Voice was going ahead with exposing this anti-Semitic campaign of the Soviet international communistic conspiracy. I have mentioned that of November 28, prepared by the Central Services Branch.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt. We have been just advised by the Voice people from New York that the scripts that you are presenting were produced prior to the directive which was given in January of 1953. Is that correct? In other words, is it correct that you are presenting scripts showing that we were using the anti-Semitic purge as a counterpropaganda weapon, but that those scripts were prepared before the directive in which you said to play that down?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not have the directive here. I don't know its exact date. But I will give you the dates of these scripts right now. I have them going up into January, so I can produce them—going up into January and even February.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you follow me, Mr. Harris?

Mr. HARRIS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. If you produce a script making proper use of this counterpropaganda weapon, which was prepared prior to your directive saying to play it down—

Mr. HARRIS. My directive? No.

The CHAIRMAN. It is meaningless.

Mr. HARRIS. And furthermore, you have been trying to show that because I issued an order confirming an earlier understanding to cut out the Hebrew desk, I at that point started to follow this international Communist line and thereby cut down their propaganda against anti-Semitism. Now, that is in December. If there were that kind of thing, I would assume—

The CHAIRMAN. Will you do this for us in connection with those exhibits? We will receive them now. Will you then find the date of the directive that ordered that this type of broadcast, this propaganda weapon, be played down, and the name of the man who signed it?

Mr. HARRIS. If there is such a directive, sir, I will. I will just say, about these scripts, these dates.

The CHAIRMAN. We gave you the number of the directive yesterday.

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir. I will look it up.

November 28, December 23, December 31, January 13, January 14, and January 19, are the dates of these scripts that I am turning in. They are Central scripts which can be used by all desks and normally are used very heavily.

The one on top there, I see, has the title "Red Fascism," which is a way of pointing out the comparison between what we call Hitlerism and the Soviet kind of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. What desk was that one prepared by?

Mr. HARRIS. That one, I think—I am sorry; it has left my hands at this minute. It is probably the ideological unit specializing in anti-Communist material.

No; I am wrong. It is the Central Services Branch Talks and Features Section, Special Commentary No. 1185, prepared by Peter Whitney. That is probably a pseudonym used for broadcast purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a number of these exhibits? I wonder if you could tell us who prepared each one, if you would do that, and we will identify them by exhibit numbers.

Mr. HARRIS. I would be glad to do that.

The first one, as I have said, is January 13, entitled "Red Fascism," and signed by the name of Peter Whitney, which may be a byline used just simply for Voice purposes, a pseudonym.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 42," and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. HARRIS. Here is one of the things it says:

A sensational announcement from Moscow radio early this morning (January 13) gives the world notice that we are about to witness one of those terrible spasms of madness and cruelty, a Soviet purge. The announcement says that nine doctors have been arrested. \* \* \*

and so on. And this goes on:

The doctors are said to have been acting as tools of a "Jewish terrorist" group. Five of them appear to be of Jewish origin themselves. Their plot was supposed to have been linked to the United States through the well-known Jewish humanitarian organization, the joint distribution committee.

And they go on with that same subject. Now, that is the first one.

The second one is done by Mr. Howard Maier, M-a-i-e-r, a very able man. I know him. The title is "Punish the Shepherd, Not the Goats." It has more to do with the Soviet doctors' arrest, and it is dated January 14. This is also a Central Services Branch. And here is one of the things it starts right out by saying:

Stalin is Hitler, and Hitler is Stalin. \* \* \*

Now, we had some idea developed one time this morning that we do not compare Hitlerism and the Soviet kind of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Who do you say prepared that?

Mr. HARRIS. This was prepared by Mr. Howard Maier, M-a-i-e-r, one of the able writers of the Voice of America, one of our ablest.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 43," and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. HARRIS. Now, another one, also by him, by Howard Maier, dated January 19, is entitled "An Appeal to the Russian People." This does the same sort of thing.

I haven't got quotes here that are particularly useful for this purpose at this minute. But this goes on into the theme of anti-Semitism, the exposure of the theme of anti-Semitism, very heavily.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 44," and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. HARRIS. Then we go on to another one, Special Commentary No. 1125, by Mr. Harry Fleischman, dated November 28, 1952. And that is the one that was headed "Zionism—The New Crime." And it starts out with this quote:

"Stalin will complete Hitler's program. He will finally wipe out the Jews of central and eastern Europe." This was a report smuggled out from behind the Iron Curtain in 1949. But nobody believed it. Just as in 1942, when reports of Nazi terrors in Auschwitz and Warsaw were considered fantastic, the world refused to listen.

But today, the farcical trial of Rudolph Slansky and 13 other top Communists in Prague is making the world listen. Of the 14 former Communist stalwarts, 11 are Jews and the trial has been converted into an anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic chorus.

That was the one of November 28.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 45," and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. HARRIS. We have one here of December 31—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, I want to give you all the time I can. I have been refraining from interrupting you. But it means very little to us if you read a good peace of counterpropaganda unless we know whether this was prepared before the directive in which you ordered that it be played down.

Mr. HARRIS. All right, sir. May I just identify these briefly, then?

The next one is Stalin Takes a Page from Mein Kampf.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 46," and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Barmine, will you step forward?

I think we should have this thing cleared up.

General Barmine, you are reminded that you are still under oath. May I ask, Were these scripts prepared in accordance with the directive from Washington?

#### FURTHER TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER BARMINE, CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN BRANCH OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA—TAKEN CONCURRENTLY WITH THAT OF MR. HARRIS

Mr. BARMINE. A majority of those scripts were prepared before the directive arrived. A couple of them were written during the first days, exactly at the moment when we violently objected to this directive and were protesting, and Mr. Kretzmann carried our protests to Washington. For 1 day or 2 this directive, we were told, was softened. We did it in the same spirit of broadening the directive, in order to be more effective than this directive intended us to be.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you are testifying that the scripts prepared here were prepared before the directive issued by Mr. Harris or in defiance of it?

Mr. BARMINE. Not in defiance, but in broad interpretation, which would permit us to be more effective than it was intended. But after this, again, we received several reminders that we should play it down.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Mr. BARMINE. We certainly tried in our conscience to make our broadcasts the most effective, despite the difficulties brought by those directives. And these scripts are to the credit of the Voice, I would say, mostly if not only.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly agree that these scripts are to the credit of the Voice, but if by any chance they represented somewhere a defiance of a directive, that would not be a proper thing to do, because our directives are based on foreign policy as developed each day, and if they did defy it, obviously they would not be proper, under the rules of the Department.

I will just identify these and not quote from them, sir.

This is Ideological Special No. 203, December 31, and I gave the title, "Stalin Takes a Page from Mein Kampf." And it is by James Rorty.

Now, I think there is one more here, by Mr. Liston Oak, Americans Assail Communist Anti-Semitism, an interview with James B. Carey, done on December 23, 1952, and carrying out this theme very thoroughly.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 47," and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. HARRIS. Those are the six scripts that I happen to have brought up here, because you mentioned this subject yesterday. But I can produce a great many more, going on beyond this date, or before this date. I did not pick any after January 20, because I knew you would say then, "Well, of course, after January 20 they would change." But I would be glad to produce some after January 20 if they are of interest to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Harris.

Mr. HARRIS. That was the total, I think, of the statement that I wish to make at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt, do you have any questions?

Senator MUNDT. I had one question. It seems to me, Mr. Harris, and I am trying to maintain a completely objective point of view as far as you are concerned, as far as your work is concerned—it seems to me that you would be more helpful to yourself and more helpful to the committee if you would spend less time berating the committee, according to the Newbold Morris formula, which did not prove very effective. I think it would be more helpful if you had proceeded more along the line you indicated a moment ago when you said, earlier in your remarks, about this book, that you had disavowed this book, in the hearings and elsewhere. You certainly have disavowed it in the hearings. If you can produce some printed statement that you disavowed that book elsewhere, that is the kind of constructive, positive evidence I would like to see you bring into the hearings, rather than something like a clearance by the Civil Service Commission, which

you yourself know means nothing. It certainly is very fair of the chairman to point out that the Civil Service Commission also cleared Alger Hiss, that they cleared Remington and Judy Coplon and a great many other characters who proved to be very foul balls.

That does not prove that you are in that category at all. But it should be clear to you that when you say, "The Civil Service Commission cleared me," that, to this committee, is meaningless. Because the Civil Service Commission made a lot of mistakes. I am just, in saying that, trying to point out why this committee is not impressed by the fact that the Civil Service Commission has cleared you. What we want is to have you bring in now, as you say you can elsewhere, disavowments of this book and some of the other statements which you made; I think a little more emphasis on the positive feature, a little less on trying to support people like these two individuals over in Germany, about whom apparently neither you nor the committee know very much, because you have not seen the files and neither have we.

Mr. HARRIS. I am just trying to keep the record straight, sir.

Senator MUNDT. We want to get down to the facts of this case.

Mr. HARRIS. All I gave you was the fact that the people in Germany were cleared. I did not go into the cases. And in the matter of the Civil Service Commission, may I just say this, sir? The reason I mention that is because I remember it quite distinctly. It was the first Government investigation that I had experienced. And because I did get some queries from them, I did everything I could to bring out to them everything, I think every single thing, that has ever been mentioned in this hearing, except the things in the IIA, that would have a bearing on my loyalty and security. I gave them a copy of my book. I went up and dug up another book of mine, called Traveler's Windfall, which has no political content, and gave it to the investigator. I specifically suggested that he go up and look at the Columbia Spectator and go all the way through it. I suggested names for him to see, including names who would feel not inclined to give me too good a bill of health at that time. I have made an honest effort, and I think I could prove it if we could find that particular investigator. He might even remember it. He developed a report almost this thick [indicating]. And I think if there had been anything startling to him at that time or to the Board that reviewed it, there certainly would have been some repercussions.

Senator MUNDT. I am not questioning that the Civil Service Commission made a lot of fine investigations, but because they made so many poor ones, this committee is not impressed.

From Carl Manzani, all the way down the line, we have seen too many Civil Service Commission clearances wind up in the Federal penitentiary because they were Communists.

Mr. HARRIS. Please let me assure this committee that you are not going to see this case wind up in any Federal penitentiary, because I am telling the truth.

Senator MUNDT. I am simply pointing out that as far as this committee is concerned, we can no longer rely on a Civil Service Commission investigation that has missed in as many cases as it has over the years. Today, there are a number of people who are wearing Federal penitentiary numbers, and they have them solely because congressional committees investigated the facts, produced the evidence, the grand juries indicted, and the Federal courts convicted.

Mr. HARRIS. So far as the congressional committees have done that, they, of course, have done a service for the country. I do not think it is done by implications in questions, however. I think it is done by fairly open charges and a chance to produce the evidence and a chance to carry it out.

For instance, the time factor right now is a very serious one. You brought me up here for the first time a week ago Monday for an executive session, in a week when I was in charge of this entire organization, under great pressure. My chief had just resigned. The new man had not shown himself. I have had no time during that week to do anything about it, nor this week, either. If it is a question of protecting myself by giving evidence, I am prepared to do it, but I have to have some reasonable amount of time to do it.

Senator MUNDT. I am sure you will find the committee and the chairman and all concerned are perfectly willing to have you submit evidence as it comes into your possession.

Mr. HARRIS. I am glad to hear that, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. I do repeat that I do not think you help your case, and I do not think you help the State Department, and I do not think you have hurt the committee particularly by castigating the committee over and over again.

Let me give you a case in point. We bring into testimony here a Mr. Henderson, because when you knew Mr. Henderson he had befriended you and you had befriended him, 21 years ago. We brought him in to ask him a simple question. We said, among other things, we wanted to get his background, and under the fifth amendment, he refused to give it, as to whether or not he was a Communist. So because you had befriended him, we gave him a wonderful opportunity this morning to befriend you. We said, "Do you know whether or not Mr. Harris is a Communist?" How easy it would have been for him to say "No." Because he did not say "No," it does not mean that you are. When he comes before the committee with that kind of thing and says, "I refuse to testify, because to indicate whether I knew him might incriminate me," I would say at best he is a pretty shabby sort of friend as far as you are concerned.

Mr. HARRIS. I do not consider him a friend, and I do not think he really ever has been a friend of mine.

Senator MUNDT. I quite agree with you as far as his activities in this committee are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, Senator Mundt, I am not here to defend Henderson, but in connection with whether or not he is a shabby sort of friend, in the executive session he was pressed by Senator Symington, and I think rightly so. Senator Symington pointed out to him that it would be very unfair to leave the implication that Harris had been a Communist when Henderson knew him, back in the early thirties. And Senator Symington pointed out, I may say, very rightly, "If you refuse to answer this question on the grounds that it may incriminate you, that will be the impression that will be left." And he pressed Henderson to give an answer. And on page 5062, here is his answer. He says:

I think perjury is a bum beef. And I won't finger anybody. It is just that simple. And I am not going to incriminate myself if I can help it.

I do not know whether Henderson did not have a good reason for refusing to answer that question, but I do not think we should indict him for not answering it.

Senator MUNDT. The point I am bringing out is that that was a legitimate witness to call. It was not a loaded question. If he is a Communist and served the Communist cause, he might well try to cast implications against you, as far as that is concerned. But I did want to point out that you should not be condemning the committee for the fact that a man that you had befriended and that had defended you sat down there in public before the television audience and said, "If I were to indicate any knowledge about Mr. Harris' political convictions it might incriminate me."

Mr. HARRIS. I agree that he was a proper witness to call. I did not intend to imply that he was not a proper witness to call.

Senator MUNDT. You meant no criticism of the committee because of the questions that were asked?

Mr. HARRIS. The particular way it was put—because I knew you already had that information in executive session, and as you had told me you knew, apparently, what his answer would be, and you brought him here again to give the same answer, which you knew would have unfortunate implications to me.

Senator MUNDT. I might point out to you, Mr. Harris, that in the case of Alger Hiss, it was because they took his executive session testimony and asked questions over again in public session that we were able to send him to the penitentiary. Witnesses do sometimes change their testimony in public.

Mr. HARRIS. Of course they do. And I certainly object to being put in the same class with anyone who has been put in the Federal penitentiary.

Senator MUNDT. We are not putting you in that class at all. I am just pointing out that these questions are very important. We are trying to get down to the facts. I have no conclusions in my mind concerning you whatsoever. As far as I am concerned, you may turn out to be one of our very top Federal officials, and you may not. I am trying to do the best I can to help you bring in some positive evidence in your own behalf, and I point out that in 14 years, a large part of which I have sat in committees like this, I have yet to see the first witness who convinces the public he is innocent by simply castigating the committee.

And I do not object to it. I expect it. And I am rather lonesome when a witness does not do that.

Mr. HARRIS. It was not my desire to defend myself by castigating the committee at all. I have, however, felt that the Federal employees involved in this sort of thing, particularly those of the State Department, have been very unfairly maligned by the loaded questions, by the implications that have been cast here, by the preselection of witnesses without letting a great deal of favorable material get in, and I do not think that the American public could possibly feel that the Federal people who have been up here have had a fair shake up to now, generally speaking.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say, Mr. Harris, that apparently many people disagree with you. We have been getting a great flood of mail from the television audience, and almost down to the last letter they

applaud the committee for giving the unlimited chance we have given witnesses to testify, and some of them have marveled at the patience we have had with you.

Now let me ask you a question. You said the National Student League had your permission to use your book.

Mr. HARRIS. Use a piece of it for publicity purposes, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you know that that National Student League has been cited six times as un-American, as a front for and doing the work of the Communist Party?

Mr. HARRIS. I just pointed out, sir, that there was obviously something Communist about it because of the fact that it passed those things on over to the Daily Worker, without anybody's permission and without even legal authority.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you agree, then, that they thought this was pretty good Communist propaganda?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not agree to that, but the implication is pretty obvious.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you said the implication is.

Mr. HARRIS. I say that other publications also asked for permission to take pieces of it. That is the usual thing when you have a book out. Some people take a few paragraphs. Some people do certain kinds of reviews.

The CHAIRMAN. You know, I wrote a book myself, a short time ago, entitled "McCarthyism." Neither the Daily Worker nor any of these Communist fronts asked to reproduce any of it, strangely enough.

Let me ask you this. And again I realize that I am talking about something that happened 20 years ago. But we find you wrote this book. We find it was used by the Daily Worker, used by this National Student League, which has been cited by the Attorney General, by the Un-American Activities Committee, the California committee, the Massachusetts committee, by the Wisconsin committee, too, by the Rapp-Coudert committee, as "a well-known Communist front"; "a mass revolutionary student organization"; "a Communist-student front"; "a front organization of the Communist Party"; "a Communist-front organization for students, about which Earl Browder, former general secretary of the Communist Party, said, 'From the beginning it has been clearly revolutionary in its program and activities'."

If you found that they selected your book, and that the Daily Worker did, would you think it would be an unreasonable assumption, if we did not know you, if we had never met you, to think that this may have been written by someone completely acceptable to the Communist Party at that time?

Mr. HARRIS. I find that an unreasonable assumption, because a great many people have had their writings used to the advantage of Communists when they had no desire to help the Communists, believe me. They took an excerpt out of that book. They wouldn't have taken it all, because there are many parts in there they certainly wouldn't have agreed with.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked you to take this book and mark the parts.

Mr. HARRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to give you all the time you want to do that. I am going to ask counsel to have inserted in the record all

the portions I have marked. I will ask them to give you a copy of that, Mr. Harris, and then before that is made a part of the public record, you will have the opportunity to insert any additional material, in case you think that the quotes that I put in are taken out of context. You can add any additional quotes from the book that you care to.

Now, what other books have you written besides King Football?

Mr. HARRIS. The only other book that I was author of, with my name on it, was Traveler's Windfall, which I wrote with—

The CHAIRMAN. Traveler's Windfall. And what publishing house published that?

Mr. HARRIS. Robbins Travel House. It had to do with places to eat, sleep, and play in the United States. It was later republished under the title "Where to Eat, Sleep, and Play in the USA."

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a copy of that book?

Mr. HARRIS. Not with me, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you find a copy?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, I could find a copy and furnish it to the committee. I would be glad to. There was certainly no political content in that one.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that is the only other one you wrote that had your name on it?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. What other books did you either ghost-write or collaborate in having written?

Mr. HARRIS. I wrote a book about which the publication is somewhat obscure, called Travels Through Czechoslovakia by Mally Wild DeVillareal, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you produce a copy of that?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't think I could. I have never seen it in final printed form.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have it in rough form, rough manuscript?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't think I have retained it in manuscript. It was a revision of a lady's comments on her wanderings around the mud baths of eastern Europe. It was a very dull book, believe me.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you an expert on the mud baths of eastern Europe?

Mr. HARRIS. I was for a short period, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What other books did you help write?

Mr. HARRIS. I didn't really help write a book that I will mention now. I did provide some of the research for Concerning Government Benefits, by Jacob Baker, published about 1935, I guess.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a time when you were, you say, anti-Communist. Did you read the book and approve the content of that book by Jacob Baker?

Mr. HARRIS. You asked me about that book in executive session, and, as I pointed out at that time, I hadn't read the whole book. I have read a few pieces of it. I have since dug out a copy of the whole book and have almost finished reading it. I don't find anything pro-Communist in it.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not, not in a quick reading. I would have to read it pretty carefully to find these deep implications, if they are there.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean a quick reading does not show you that? Mr. HARRIS. Not a quick reading; no.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to ask the staff to present certain quotes of that to you.

Mr. HARRIS. I do not think that is a proper way to do that, because the quotes from a book on economics, unless they are fitted into their full context, couldn't possibly help you much. I couldn't comment at this stage.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you read it again?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes; I will be glad to read it again.

The CHAIRMAN. You seemed to indicate that there is something unfair about it when you are asked a question in executive session and then asked the question again in public session. I pointed out 2 days ago that you wrote me and said you wanted to change some of the testimony you gave in executive session. I do not know what changes you want to make.

Mr. HARRIS. There are exactly seven typographical errors that were sent in, and about two longer statements that were simply longer use of adjectives to describe an individual. There is no change of the intent, or any change in the factual material, and I am sure I could prove that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you think it is unfair to ask you questions in public session that we asked you in executive session?

Mr. HARRIS. No; not unfair, but we all waste all our time when we do things over that have been well done before.

The CHAIRMAN. Did we not explain to you that the reason we had you in executive session was to give you a clear picture of the line the inquiry would follow and give you a chance to prepare any defense you had to, so that this would not first hit you in public session without your being properly prepared?

Did you not indicate you were very happy to hear about that?

Mr. HARRIS. I was happy to hear about some of these things before I appeared in public, but a good many, of course, I did not hear about in the executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us the rest of the books that you helped write, if any?

Mr. HARRIS. Those are the only books that I have done in private capacity; and Concerning Government Benefits, as a matter of fact, was done in a semiofficial capacity, because I was instructed to do it by my superior in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and carried it out as part of my work.

The CHAIRMAN. I know it may be difficult for you to dig into your memory now and give us a list of all the books and magazine articles you wrote. Will you go back when you have time and prepare that list for us?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes; I can give you such a list. It will take time however. I do have to have time to do these things.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give you all the time you need. That, I think, is extremely important, because we would like to know whether you have ever repudiated this book, King Football, before you came before the committee, and if you have done a lot of writing, we would like to have an occasion to see it.

Mr. HARRIS. I have done no political writing since that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you one further question. Did you have anything to do with the appointment of Bradley Connors as Policy Director of the International Information Administration?

Mr. HARRIS. I was one of the people consulted as to whether or not he would be a suitable person, by Dr. Compton. He asked me whether I thought Mr. Bradley Connors was an able officer. I said he was, because he had performed excellently as the public affairs adviser of the Far Eastern Regional Bureau in the Department of State, that he was a very able man.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you still think that he is the proper man for that job of Policy Director for the International Information program?

Mr. HARRIS. On the basis of observed performance, I certainly do, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you aware of his testimony to the effect that he, as I recall his testimony, never read any of the works of Marx, Lenin, Engels, or Stalin; that he could not define the objectives or the methods used by the Communist Party in arriving at those objectives, and that he did not consider himself an authority upon the Communist movement? In view of that, I wonder if you would not agree that perhaps he should either bone up upon it, or you should have some man who knows something about the movement, something about their tactics and methods of operation?

Mr. HARRIS. He has daily access to the detailed information furnished by the intelligence area of the Department on Communist activity, the best background studies that are available anywhere on Communist methods and attitudes. He has all those things available and uses them very skillfully. His work certainly demonstrates a firm anti-Soviet, anti-Communist line. There is no question about it whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. You say he had available all these reports on the methods of Communist operation. If he had, do you not think that that would have taught him something about communism? You understand he came before the committee and said, "I can't define the objectives of the Communist Party."

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think he was being rather modest. I think he has far more knowledge of the international Communist situation, because of his fighting of it, than he has admitted to.

The CHAIRMAN. But let me read his testimony to you so that we do not misquote him. That is page 10749. The question:

Mr. Connors, how much of an authority are you on the Communist movement?

Mr. CONNORS. I am not.

The question:

You are not an authority. Have you ever read any of the works of Marx or Lenin, Engels?

Mr. CONNORS. No, sir.

Any of the works of Stalin?

No, sir.

Have you ever studied a history of the Communist movement, their methods of operation?

I have never studied them.

In other words, as far as you are concerned, your mind is pretty much a blank as far as the workings of the Communist Party is concerned?

No, sir, that is not true, because I depend on research and intelligence prepared by the Department on these things. They provide me with the propaganda lines and the actions that the Communist Party is planning.

Do you not think, instead of someone else providing him with the Communist Party line, he should be enough of an authority so that he could recognize the Communist line?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is a reasonable statement to make, and if at the time I hired him I only had available the transcript you have there I wouldn't feel he knew his job as well as he does. But I have seen him perform. I know he knows how to fight Communists, has done it very well, and is still doing it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen a cable that Mr. Connors sent from Hong Kong to the Voice saying the Voice should not accuse the Chinese Reds of using germs or a contemplation of the use of germs in their warfare because it would injure the finer sensibilities of the Chinese people? Did you see that?

Mr. HARRIS. I have not heard of any such cable, and if there is such a cable, I would like to examine it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you look in the files and examine it?

Mr. HARRIS. I will look for such a cable.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think that would indicate great competence as a policy director?

Mr. HARRIS. May I respectfully decline to comment on that until I have seen the cable, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. You certainly may.

And further questions, Senator Mundt?

Mr. Counsel?

Do you have anything further to say, Mr. Harris?

Mr. HARRIS. Not at this time, Mr. Chairman, until I can have some time to develop additional rebuttal material.

The CHAIRMAN. At such time as you want to appear again, you will be allowed to appear, in either executive session or public session, whichever you prefer. O. K.?

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And we will adjourn now, and we will announce later in the afternoon when the next hearing will be held.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p. m., the committee recessed to the call of the Chair.)

# STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

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FRIDAY, MARCH 6, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,

*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, agreed to January 30, 1953, at 10:30 a. m. in room 357, of the Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; and Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington.

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; Donald Surine, assistant counsel; David Schine, chief consultant; Herbert Hawkins, investigator; and Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

All witnesses who have requested the right to testify before the committee have been notified that they will be heard starting this morning. I do not know if we can dispose of all of those witnesses today or not. We have contacted the new head of the International Information Administration and asked him if he wanted any additional witnesses called. I understand that Mr. Crosby has checked with Mr. Harris to see if he wants any more witnesses called. Is that correct?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Information Administration tells us they have no desire to have any further witnesses called at this time.

Of course, when either the new Administrator of IA, or Mr. Harris, or anyone else, desires to have witnesses called, they will have that opportunity. I want to make it clear that as of today neither Mr. Harris nor the new Director have asked that any witnesses be called. The only individuals who have requested the right to appear, I understand, Mr. Counsel, are Mr. Bauer, Mr. Goldman, and Mr. Taylor. Is that correct?

Mr. COHN. The only ones we have not heard as yet. We have heard some from prior days who have asked to be called. These are the only remaining ones that have asked to be called that have not appeared yet.

The CHAIRMAN. And do I understand that Mr. Bauer, Mr. Goldman, and Mr. Taylor are here, and Mr. Berman is not, that he said he was ill and could not appear?

Mr. COHN. That is correct, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We will hear Mr. Berman when he recovers from his illness.

Which witness should we call first?

Mr. COHN. Mr. Bauer, if that is agreeable, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bauer?

Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Bauer? In this matter now on hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BAUER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel?

Mr. COHN. Mr. Bauer, would you identify yourself by giving us your full name, first of all?

**TESTIMONY OF ROBERT A. BAUER, ACTING CHIEF, FIELD PROGRAMMING SERVICES DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICE, VOICE OF AMERICA**

Mr. BAUER. My name is Robert A. Bauer, B-a-u-e-r.

Mr. COHN. Are you with the Voice of America now, Mr. Bauer?

Mr. BAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COHN. And in what capacity?

Mr. BAUER. I am Acting Chief of the Field Program Services Division of the International Broadcasting Service in New York.

Mr. COHN. And what does that Division do? What are its responsibilities?

Mr. BAUER. This Division is in charge of the so-called platter program for overseas. That means we are the coordinating and stimulating agency in the Voice of America in New York to produce material which is not broadcast shortwave from New York but is plattered or taped and sent overseas to our American missions, who in turn try to place it over local radio outlets.

In addition to that, my Division runs the Television Development Branch of the Voice of America, the Music Branch, and the promotion and audience mail activities of the Voice of America. I am also in charge of administering the private enterprise cooperation clause of the present appropriation act, which allotted \$100,000 for international private licences to broadcast over their own facilities.

Mr. COHN. All right. Now, Mr. Bauer, you have been referred to, and I assume the reason for your request that you be heard was the reference to you made in the course of the testimony of Stuart Ayers, Assistant Chief of the Latin American Service of the Voice of America.

Mr. Ayers testified, Mr. Chairman, as you undoubtedly recall, to the effect that a program known as the Eye of the Eagle had been suggested to his service by Mr. Bauer's division; that at the time it was suggested there was objection to it on the ground that it offered no opportunity for anti-Communist material, and that a political commentary with some more anti-Communist weight should be used instead; that that objection was withdrawn only on the assurance by Mr. Bauer's division to the Latin American Division that, No. 1, the Latin American Division could review each script and make sure that there was anti-Communist material in it, and, No. 2, on the assurance from Mr. Bauer's division that this Eye of the Eagle program would

consume only a relatively small portion of the total platter budget for the year for the Latin American Division, so that the great majority of funds for the platter program could be used for straight anti-Communist counterpropaganda. And then the testimony of Mr. Ayers concluded on the note that these scripts of the Eye of the Eagle did not contain anti-Communist material of any substance, that they were not shown to him, as they should have been, until he complained very bitterly, that all the changes he suggested were not made, and that then finally, when this series was about to be concluded, it was discovered that their entire budget with the exception of a small amount, I think \$2,000, which was used on special anniversary shows, had been consumed in this one series, which was negligible from the standpoint of counterpropaganda; and that Mr. Bauer's division bore the responsibility for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go into the question of this "superman thriller" they produced, I assume there has been considerable confusion as to who was boss, what the administrative setup was over there. Mr. Bauer's outfit, I understand, started out as a packaging unit, packaging and wrapping material, and ended up doing the ordering and reviewing part.

Will you find out from Mr. Bauer whence his authority sprang, and the administrative setup?

Mr. COHN. Would you tell us a little about that, briefly, in answer to the chairman's question? Just what is the relationship between you and the Latin American Division, for instance, and the top directorship of the Voice of America? What are your responsibilities, and what are theirs?

Mr. BAUER. Yes, sir. I wish to state first that when I was assigned to my present position, on December 7, 1951, the Overseas Services Branch, as it was then—it is now the Field Services Division—was not a shipping unit. It consisted of the Radio Development Branch, and Television Development Branch, and the Music Branch, and it had a shipping unit for the technical process of shipping material out to the field. But it was, at the time when I got in, not a shipping branch.

I should also point out that the existence of the branch, now division, goes back to Public Law 402, also referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act, which established the principle that the Secretary of State should, whenever feasible and practicable, draw on the resources of American private enterprise; and to that purpose the Department should contract with private American enterprise for the production of programs. This law went into effect in 1948, and shortly afterward, the International Broadcasting Service set up, first, a small unit to administer that section, under 1005 of Public Law 402; and out of this package program, this small unit, then grew the Overseas Services Branch, with all the other things added to it, including, last December, the promotion and public-relations activities.

Now, the function of our division is clearly defined, and the responsibilities between our division and the area division are established in IBD Memorandum No. 17.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the witness want this marked as an exhibit?

Mr. COHN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. Go ahead, Mr. Bauer.

Mr. BAUER. Yes, sir. This means that my division is the coordinating, planning, and budget agency for overseas programming. But the language divisions, be it Latin America, Far East, Near East, or Europe, have to approve of every single program before we can undertake the production.

It is furthermore to be noted that my division does not service the language divisions in the Voice of America. It services the American missions in the field, so that they can receive material which they can, in turn, place over local radio outlets. Thus, I would say, Mr. Chairman, it is, so to speak, a three-cornered proposition. It is the field, my division, and the area division, whatever it might be; in that case, the Latin American Division.

It is very important to know that there is no contract and no single purchase order signed by my division without the countersignature of the area division involved.

I have here, Mr. Chairman, photostats of the contracts pertaining to the Eye of the Eagle.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want those marked, Mr. Bauer?

Mr. BAUER. Yes, please, sir.

(The photostats referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 48," and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. BAUER. May I continue, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; go ahead.

Mr. BAUER. The requisition for the contracts will show that, as is true in every single contract, this particular contract was countersigned by the Latin American Division, of which Mr. Baldanza is the Chief and Mr. Ayers the Assistant Chief.

Mr. COHN. They told us that; yes.

Mr. BAUER. Now, the program was first contracted only for two times, as a platter program. After the platter program proved to be satisfactory to us and the Latin American Division, we engaged in further contracting with that particular package firm.

Mr. COHN. Excuse me. Could I interrupt you at that point? Which firm was this?

Mr. BAUER. This is the firm which is a subsidiary to Gotham Recording, and for that purpose established itself as the Eagle Productions, Inc. In parentheses, Mr. Counsel, I would say that Gotham Recording is established in this field, has done a lot of work for Radio Free Europe, and the producer of this program, Mr. Stephen Price, was for 1 year Chief of Production for Radio Free Europe, and prior to that producer of CBS.

Mr. COHN. You say this was a subsidiary firm. What was the name of the firm that produced the Eye of the Eagle?

Mr. BAUER. Eagle Productions, Inc.

Mr. COHN. Was this a firm that was formed just for the purpose of producing this one program?

Mr. BAUER. It was formed as a subsidiary for that particular purpose.

Mr. COHN. And as far as you know, this firm did no work other than producing this one particular program for the Voice of America?

Mr. BAUER. That is all I know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? I missed one of your answers. Do I understand that the firm that produced this Eye of the Eagle

did no other work except this one production, that it was formed for the purpose of producing that show, and then it has gone out of existence, since the show is no longer produced?

Mr. BAUER. No, sir. It works this way. It is the Gotham Recording Co., which is still in existence. For reasons which I cannot explain, they notified us that for that particular type of program they are establishing a legal firm or corporation called the Eagle Productions, Inc. The firm is still in existence as Gotham Recording, and the same people are still working there.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you go into that in some detail, Counsel? I do not quite understand that.

Mr. COHN. I think I understand.

With whom did you contract? Who was the contracting party, the Eye of the Eagle Corp., or Gotham Recording Co.?

Mr. BAUER. We first were approached by and contracted with Gotham, and then they informed us that they had formed that subsidiary called the Eagle Productions, Inc.

Mr. COHN. You contracted, I can see right here from the contract, with something called Eagle Productions, Inc., the Eye of the Eagle?

Mr. BAUER. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Now, what was the financial responsibility of this firm, Eagle Productions?

Mr. BAUER. The same financial responsibility as Gotham Recording.

Mr. COHN. You mean it is your opinion that if something had gone wrong, if there had been a breach of contract, you would have been able to proceed against Gotham Recording?

Mr. BAUER. I would have proceeded against Eagle Productions, which is the same thing.

Mr. COHN. I don't understand you when you say it is the same thing. It is not. As a matter of fact, it is so different that originally, when you contracted with Gotham and they came back and told you to change it and change the terms of it and change the name of the vendor to Eye of the Eagle—

Mr. BAUER. But the same people were involved.

Mr. COHN. Who are the people involved?

Mr. BAUER. Mr. Herbert Moss—

Mr. COHN. Did Norman Corwin have any connection with this particular series?

Mr. BAUER. With that series? Not at all.

Mr. COHN. Is this the same Herbert Moss who has been associated with Norman Corwin?

Mr. BAUER. I don't know, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. COHN. Have you ever heard that?

Mr. BAUER. Never heard it before.

Mr. COHN. This is the first you heard of it.

Mr. BAUER. Correct, sir.

Mr. COHN. Could you tell us where this man is?

Mr. BAUER. In New York City. I think in the Great Northern Hotel. I could not give you the exact address.

Mr. COHN. Now, what were Mr. Moss' qualifications to produce a program for Latin America?

Mr. BAUER. Mr. Moss' qualifications were that he has done a lot of foreign language programing for Radio Free Europe before, and also for other commercial American companies.

Mr. COHN. Did he speak Spanish?

Mr. BAUER. No; he did not speak Spanish.

Mr. COHN. Did he know anything about the Latin-American situation?

Mr. BAUER. Well, that I do not know, sir. That, in my opinion, was not his job.

Mr. COHN. Well, what was his job?

Mr. BAUER. His job was to give us a first-rate production of a program which was strictly under our supervision, and the contract contains the specific proviso that at any time the Department of State was in a position to cancel the contract within 24 hours, and payment for each single program would only be received upon final approval of the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cohn, may I suggest that at your earliest convenience you decide whether this is the same Mr. Moss who was involved with Norman Corvin in the grand-jury proceedings?

Mr. COHN. We will check that.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the name the same?

Mr. COHN. The name is the same.

The CHAIRMAN. The first name?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cohn, will you find the names of the board of directors of this new corporation, and, if you can, how much capital they had, how much responsibility this corporation had, whether it was a corporation or a partnership?

Mr. COHN. We will check on that.

You told us Mr. Moss did not speak Spanish.

Mr. BAUER. To the best of my knowledge he doesn't.

Mr. COHN. Who wrote the scripts for this program?

Mr. BAUER. The scripts were written in English.

Mr. COHN. By whom?

Mr. BAUER. By his writer, whose name I don't have now, at this point. I just met him once.

Mr. COHN. Did this writer speak Spanish?

Mr. BAUER. No; he only wrote it in English.

Mr. COHN. Were these programs all broadcast in English?

Mr. BAUER. Not at all. The original script is written in English, and upon approval of the English language script, the translations into Spanish and Portuguese were undertaken.

Mr. COHN. Has it not been your experience, No. 1, that it might have been cheaper and more sensible to have the script originally written in Spanish? You might have saved one script. And, No. 2, if that were not done, if the person who writes the English script is conversant with the Spanish tongue, it might be better in the long run. The difficulties in translation might not be so great. He may have a feeling for both languages. Has that not been your general experience?

Mr. BAUER. No, that has not been our general experience, because in many cases we have requested English scripts to be written. And I wish to state that this was part and parcel of the overall contract and

did not burden the United States Government with any more money. The writing of the script and the adaptation are in the same parcel.

I would like to say this, Mr. Chairman: American commercial companies have had great experience with Latin American productions. J. Walter Thompson and other great agencies, such as McCann-Erickson, have their offices down there. This is not a field which is, let us say, as difficult as Burma, for instance, or Pakistan. This is a field in which American private enterprise has considerable experience.

Mr. COHN. I see. Now, where was the translating from English to Spanish done?

Mr. BAUER. The translating from English to Spanish was done by a translator and adapter.

Mr. COHN. Working for Mr. Moss?

Mr. BAUER. Working for Mr. Moss. Moss is the name, M-o-s-s.

Mr. COHN. Yes, I know the name. Herbert Moss.

Mr. BAUER. Correct.

Mr. COHN. And they would translate it and submit it. To whom would the script be submitted? The Latin American Division?

Mr. BAUER. The scripts were first submitted to us. Then we submitted them to the Latin American Division. At a later stage in the production, in order to cut corners, the scripts were immediately submitted to the Latin American Division.

Mr. COHN. All right. Now, at the beginning, I believe Mr. Ayers' testimony was that his Division did not see the first, I believe, four scripts before they were finally produced. Is that true, or not?

Mr. BAUER. This is not true, sir. Because every single script, first in English, then in Spanish, in Portuguese, and the final transcription, has the written approval of the office of the Latin American Division. Otherwise, they would not proceed.

Mr. COHN. So, in other words, your testimony is that as the first script was prepared in English, before it ever went into production or even came close to that, before it even came close, you submitted it to Mr. Ayers' Division for approval. Is that right?

Mr. BAUER. That is right.

May I make this statement there? May I make this statement? It is very important.

Mr. COHN. I want to let you do that, but first, this is a very important point. You say in the case of the first script, the second script, the third script, and the fourth script, when they came out in English, when they were first translated, and before they ever went into production, they were first submitted to the Latin American Division. Is that correct?

Mr. BAUER. I can only testify secondhand, Mr. Cohn, and that is what I would like to explain.

Mr. COHN. Well, I think you had better explain it.

Mr. BAUER. I am not in the actual proceedings on each program. I, together with the Chief of the Latin American Division, approved a program idea. From then on, the mechanics of each particular program are handled by my staff and the Latin American Division staff. In other words, I can only testify that in checking with everyone concerned, and, checking the record, I have been given the assurance, from my Radio Development Branch, that at all times this procedure was followed.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt, Mr. Cohn? Do you intend to go back to this corporate setup, or are you through with that? If so, I would like to go into that further.

Mr. Bauer, I do not understand yet the reason for setting up a corporation solely for the purpose of producing this Eye of the Eagle. Do you know anything about the names of the board of directors, who they were, who the stockholders were, who made a profit on this deal?

Mr. BAUER. I don't know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything about how much capital had been put into the corporation?

Mr. BAUER. I couldn't testify to that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Normally when the Government assumes an obligation, as under this contract, you would determine whether the corporation also was financially responsible, would you not?

I am wondering why that was not done in this case.

Mr. BAUER. Well, the procedure is this, sir: First of all, we have a clear-cut rule, which says that we are not going into the security angle of an organization, and I have the documents here to prove it. And the basic underlying theory is this—

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you say you have an order not to go into this corporation angle—

Mr. BAUER. No, Mr. Chairman. I didn't say "an order." But we raised the question, sir. We raised the question whether we should go into the matter of security of contractors with whom we contract, and the administrative office ruling, which I assume was a security ruling, was that inasmuch as the contractor does not have access to classified material, and inasmuch as the final product is subject to approval on the part of the Department before payment to the contractor, no security investigation has to take place unless we have good reason to believe, out of our own knowledge, that there are certain people involved who might be questionable. And, Mr. Chairman, on that score I have here a classified document which pertains to the particular case of a certain phase of the Eye of the Eagle.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask there: In other words, your testimony is that you were not concerning yourself about the individuals producing the type of programs from the standpoint of loyalty or security; that you had examined the package itself and determined whether that was acceptable?

Mr. BAUER. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not care whether the producer happened to be a fellow traveler, a Communist. That did not concern you?

Mr. BAUER. It did concern me if I knew it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you knew it. But there was no security check under which you found out?

Mr. BAUER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say that was according to orders from what branch? The Policy Director?

Mr. BAUER. I have also photostats of that.

The CHAIRMAN. I would just like to know who issued that order.

Mr. BAUER. Here you are.

The CHAIRMAN. You have now handed me what you described as the policy directives?

Mr. BAUER. I didn't say "the policy directives," sir. I have said it is an administrative or security ruling.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not classified material, what you hand to us now?

Mr. BAUER. No; not this one, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your testimony is that, if this individual was working full time for the Voice producing scripts, he needed a loyalty and security clearance, but where you hired an individual on a contract basis, no security clearance was given?

Mr. BAUER. Not an individual, sir. I was talking about contracting terms. There is a definite ruling on individuals with whom we contract, and the ruling is that if they are used more than five times, I believe, in a period of 1 month or 2 months, a Public Law 402 security check has to be run.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, see if I have the ruling correctly. If it is a corporation or a company, there is no security clearance of the management, regardless of the scripts or packages that are produced. If it is an individual, then, if he produces more than a certain number of packages, you say 4 or 5 per month, he must get security clearance.

Mr. BAUER. Correct.

Mr. Chairman, I add to that again, and repeat: Unless we would have knowledge that somebody that would be working for this firm would be objectionable, in which case it would be our duty to proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel, may I ask: Do you have witnesses to show, or does this witness have any information at this point to show, that where individuals were turned down on the basis of loyalty or security they were then hired on a package basis?

Mr. COHN. We have had some testimony to that effect, Mr. Chairman, and there is a good deal more available.

Senator MUNDT. The document, Mr. Chairman, confirms what Mr. Bauer said. It says:

As you know, at the present time IBD requests security clearance on talent which is used more than 10 times in 2 months.

And they are supposed to make a check on the package producers, as I understand it.

Mr. BAUER. Pardon me, sir?

Senator MUNDT. They are supposed to make a check on the package producers. It says:

In view of IBD's proposed package programs for the fiscal year 1952, you are requested to initiate a name check on the following contractors.

Mr. BAUER. That was our request. And the answer to that, sir, is there.

The CHAIRMAN. The answer was "No"?

Mr. BAUER. The answer was "No."

Senator MUNDT. That was your request.

Mr. BAUER. That is right, sir. And you will also see, Mr. Chairman, in the file I handed you, that we repeated this request in connection with another firm this year.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to have these marked as exhibits?

Mr. BAUER. Please, sir.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 49," and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your testimony is that there should at least be a name check on the package producers, but that was vetoed?

Senator MUNDT. Can you tell us who vetoed your suggestion? It is a little difficult, looking at it, to know who they are from and who they are to.

Mr. BAUER. Senator, may I say this? First, I don't think the word "veto" is really the word to apply here.

Senator MUNDT. It may be the wrong word.

Mr. BAUER. I would say that we raised the question, and received a ruling on it. I would put it that way.

Senator MUNDT. Who made the ruling?

Mr. BAUER. This was before my time, but, as the file will show, the ruling in one case was made, I think, by Mr. Spence, the security officer of the Department in New York. And then there is an additional memorandum here on a buck slip, which shows Mr. Robert C. Benedict, at that time administrative officer of the programming operations of the Voice of America—

The CHAIRMAN. I notice that on September 25, 1951, there is a note here to Mr. Meyers from Mr. Kohler, in which he says:

The question you raised about the possibility of security checks on contractors and their employees is one that in the opinion of IBD should be instituted.

In other words, the head of the Voice apparently agreed that such security checks should be made. I do not find from the documents who decided against those security checks.

Mr. BAUER. Those are all the documents I have, Mr. Chairman. And I repeat, I think you will find in one case the name of Mr. Spence and in the other case the name of Mr. Benedict.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; here is one I have from Mr. Spence. Who is Mr. J. A. Spence?

Mr. BAUER. Whether he is the chief security officer—no; I think the chief security officer is Mr. Moran. I think he is under Mr. Moran, security officer, and I think at that time was acting security officer for the IBS in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you refer to the chief security officer, you are not referring to the security officer of IIA, but rather of the Voice?

Mr. BAUER. The Voice in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice this note from Mr. Spence to Mr. Puhan, in which he turns down the request that there be a security check. May I ask you this: And it perhaps is rather superfluous, in view of your own memorandum here. But just to make it clear, I understand your position was that if it was necessary to give security checks to individuals working for the Voice, it should be likewise necessary to give security and loyalty checks to producing the same type of scripts, but on a contract with the Voice.

Mr. BAUER. I should say that was our position.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say this. Counsel informs me that they have considerable testimony to the effect that where certain individuals were turned down on either loyalty or security grounds they were later hired under the so-called package program to avoid the necessity of a loyalty-security clearance. Are you personally aware of any of those situations?

Mr. BAUER. I am not aware of any of those situations.

The CHAIRMAN. I would suggest to counsel that we have the evidence along that line produced.

Mr. COHN. Now, there is a very important point here, Mr. Bauer. You say that those scripts, one by one, were submitted in the form of the original English script to the Latin American Division for their approval in each case?

Mr. BAUER. Correct, sir.

Mr. COHN. Now, at page 10653, Mr. Ayers testified as follows:

Question. Now, you told us that they were supposed to submit the first script to your division to see whether or not it did contain this anti-Communist material. Did they ever submit that first script to you?

Mr. AYERS. No; they did not. One day Mr. Ries happened to be in their office—

meaning the office of your branch.

about other matters, and he discovered a fifth script.

Question. In other words, they had gone through the first four, and had not submitted them to your division; is that right?

Mr. AYERS. They had gone ahead with production without submitting the first script for his approval, which approval, of course, would have started the entire series.

and so on and so forth.

Now, when I questioned you before about that, you said you don't know of your own knowledge that these scripts were submitted, but you were relying on the fact that it was the usual practice. Now, are you in the position to contradict Mr. Ayers' testimony on the ground that you had a usual practice to the contrary?

Mr. BAUER. I read Mr. Ayers' testimony, Mr. Counsel, and immediately checked it with the members of my staff, Mr. Carrajal and Mr. Crodo.

Mr. COHN. Those are the two people who initiated this whole series?

Mr. BAUER. Those are not the two people who did, sir. The series was initiated—and I must repeat this for the record, and I cannot be emphatic enough—the series was initiated jointly by my division and Mr. Baldanza's division.

Mr. COHN. Very good, sir. Now, is it your testimony that the idea of having a program called the Eye of the Eagle was as much Mr. Baldanza's as yours?

Mr. BAUER. I shall testify to that, sir, if you give me the chance to do so now.

Mr. COHN. Well, that is exactly the point we were on. Now, why don't you just go ahead, and I won't interrupt you at all, and you tell us exactly how the idea of having this program came up, and just what Mr. Baldanza said, and when, and who was present, about having a program known as the Eye of the Eagle.

Mr. BAUER. Yes, sir.

We had a series prior to the Eye of the Eagle, called Lobo Del Mar, or The Sea Wolf, which, in turn, was the successor to a very successful series run in World War II in Latin America, Counterspy. It is the reaction from the field and the usage reports and the experience of the IBS, and every American source, that this is the most desirable type of program. The Sea Wolf series was terminated because of certain difficulties we had with the contractor. When this was terminated, we looked for a substitute for this series. At the time the first

two contracts were signed, which was in April and May, I was on a mission overseas, thus cannot testify now, out of my own knowledge, to the exact sequence of events. I have been informed by the man who acted for me, Mr. Jack Gaines, and by the radio development officers, that the joint program was jointly discussed to have a successor to the Sea Wolf with Mr. Baldanza's Division. Then the first program, those on sample programs, two of them, were signed out of fiscal year 1952 funds. And the reason why we did it, thought I repeat I was not here at that time, but I approve of the idea wholeheartedly, is that this was the logical sequence to a program which had excellent success in Latin America.

Mr. COHN. All I asked you was: Who initiated the idea of the Eye of the Eagle? Now, we have had sworn testimony under oath, not hearsay testimony but testimony within the direct knowledge of the person who was present, that the program was initiated in your branch and not in the Latin American branch, that wanted no part of it. You have told us here under oath that it was jointly initiated by Mr. Baldanza and by your section. I would like you to tell us whether or not you know if Mr. Baldanza initiated either individually or jointly with your section the idea of this program, the Eye of the Eagle?

Mr. BAUER. I cannot say which individual, whether it was Mr. Baldanza, Mr. Ayers, Mr. Michael Ries, or Mr. Carrajal, or anyone else, was the first one as to this series. But you just said that the testimony was given here that it was over the opposition of the Latin American Division.

May I, please, Mr. Counsel, refer you to the photostats given you, which show the concurrence of the Latin American Division?

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? I am very interested in overall setup. We had Mr. Barmine on the stand yesterday, and he said that his desk felt that broadcasting music and that sort of thing was more or less of a waste of time and money; that they broadcast half the time news and analysis of the news. The man in charge of the French desk testified that at least two-thirds of the time was taken up in broadcasting high-class music, and he said it was the sort of thing the French people want to hear. Your desk produces a thriller program. Now, without trying to indicate how the committee or how I feel on which would be the most effective way to carry out your objective, it seems unusual to me that each desk would have this complete autonomy, that one desk would say, "We will have solely news and analysis of the news," and the other desk says, "We will concentrate on music," and the other desk said, "We will concentrate on thriller programs." Was there not any overall supervision? Did not anyone say to you, "Mr. Bauer, here is the program. This is the type of program we want in this Voice of America"? Or did each desk determine what they should do, what type of programs they should broadcast?

Mr. BAUER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Barmine is Chief of the Russian Branch.

The CHAIRMAN. No. Did you hear my question?

Mr. BAUER. Yes; I get the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any overall supervision over all of the desks? I find one desk adopting one line of attack, another desk a completely different line, completely contradictory.

Mr. BAUER. No; there is an overall direction, under Mr. Puhan, and the policy adviser, Mr. Kretzman. But the difference is between broadcasting to Iron Curtain countries and broadcasting to the free world. Mr. Barmine was absolutely correct to state that it would be more than foolish to broadcast behind the Iron Curtain music or entertainment, where people listen at the risk of their lives. There you have news, commentaries, political features, in order to hit your target best. In the free world—May I continue, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. You continue too long. When you do, I would like to get the answer to the question. We have many other witnesses who have asked to appear here today.

Mr. BAUER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us compare two of the free-world nations to whom you are broadcasting, the French and South America. In your French desk you say, "We will broadcast almost entirely music." And in South America, substantially the same type of people I assume, you say, "We will broadcast thrillers." Who makes the decisions? Is each desk responsible for making its own decision as to what type of broadcast?

Mr. BAUER. Each desk is responsible to do its own type of broadcasting, under the general supervision of the Division Chief, and then finally Mr. Puhan, and policywise, Mr. Kretzman.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you and Mr. Ayers got into this argument of whether you should broadcast what he called anti-Communist counterpropaganda and your idea of using the Eye of the Eagle, who was boss? Who decided that? Or was it ever decided?

Mr. BAUER. Pardon me. I didn't get that. Who decided what, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I understand from Mr. Ayers' testimony that he very vigorously disagreed with the idea of using most of the budget to produce the Eye of the Eagle. He felt that different types of programs should be broadcast, what he called anti-Communist programs. Now, who was the boss? Who made the decision as to whether Mr. Ayers would have his way or you would have your way?

Mr. BAUER. There was no reason to have a boss to make a decision, because the decision was made jointly, sir. I have memoranda here of conversations which I could read.

The CHAIRMAN. You said a decision was made jointly. You mean Mr. Ayers agreed with this?

Mr. BAUER. Let me put it this way; Mr. Chairman: First, I wish to state that I never had any personal disagreement with Mr. Ayers. I never discussed with him the Eye of the Eagle series.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us put it this way: If there had been a disagreement, and let us assume there had been a disagreement, and that you wanted to produce the Eye of the Eagle and Ayers wanted to produce a different program: Who was the boss?

Mr. BAUER. If Mr. Baldanza and I finally, as the two responsible division chiefs, could not have any agreement on that, the boss was Mr. Puhan, and Mr. Puhan would have had to make the decision. It was never brought to Mr. Puhan.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.  
Go ahead, Counsel.

Mr. COHN. I want to cover this quickly. As the chairman said, there are other witnesses. You are down here, and you started contradicting some of the things Mr. Ayers has said. I want to go over them point by point and see whether you can say Mr. Ayers, No. 1, was telling the truth, or whether he was not telling the truth, or whether you do not know.

First of all, you do know, of your own knowledge, whether the idea of this program, the Eye of the Eagle, was initiated in your branch or in the Latin American Division?

Mr. BAUER. I don't know who the individual was who initiated that.

Mr. COHN. All right. Now, the next question was: Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not the first script was submitted in English to the Latin American Division?

Mr. BAUER. I do not know it of my own knowledge.

Mr. COHN. All right, sir. Do you know whether the second script was submitted, or the third, or the fourth?

Mr. BAUER. No, sir.

Mr. COHN. Then you cannot tell us Mr. Ayers was not telling the truth here?

Mr. BAUER. I didn't say Mr. Ayers was not telling the truth.

Mr. COHN. You came in here and you made a statement to the effect that these four scripts were submitted to the Latin American Division.

Mr. BAUER. They were finally submitted, because they have the approval of the Latin American Division.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Ayers said that at the time this was discovered, some one happened to walk into the office and by accident happened to come across not script No. 1 but script No. 4, and then they found that the other scripts had already gone out.

Mr. BAUER. Mr. Ries did not walk in by accident.

Mr. COHN. I did not say he walked in by accident. I say he came across this fourth script by accident.

Mr. BAUER. I don't know, sir.

Mr. COHN. All right. Do you know whether requests were made to your branch by the Latin American Division to find out what their total budget was going to be?

Mr. BAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COHN. Did you tell them the first time they asked?

Mr. BAUER. Pardon me, sir. I will get it out of here. The situation is the following one—

Mr. COHN. I would appreciate an answer to the question. You see, Mr. Ayers testified that they made repeated requests starting in the spring, when this series started, as to what their total budget was going to be, because your branch had said, "Go along with us on the Eye of the Eagle. It is only going to be a small part of your budget." They said, "Well, what is our total budget?" They said they weren't told.

Were they told?

Mr. BAUER. They were told at the time we knew what our total budget was.

Mr. COHN. Were they told when they asked?

Mr. BAUER. Yes, I think the memorandum from Mr. Baldanza to me, asking me to produce the budget figures, was dated September 26, and I answered it on October 1.

Mr. COHN. No, sir. The testimony was that as far back as the spring, and July, they had made repeated requests by telephone and otherwise to your branch and had been told, "We cannot tell you what your total budget is going to be." Is that testimony true?

Mr. BAUER. That is true, because the Congress had not passed the budget yet.

Mr. COHN. All right. That is fine. In other words, you say the reason you could not tell them was that you did not know.

Mr. BAUER. Well, sure enough, I didn't know.

Mr. COHN. All right. Fine. Now, will you tell us this? Who has the responsibility for making up the budget?

Mr. BAUER. The budget is made up by the International Information Administration in Washington and submitted to Congress and then passed by Congress.

Mr. COHN. Does Congress pass specifically on how much money is going to be devoted to the Latin American Division?

Mr. BAUER. No, sir; not to my knowledge. The Congress gives an overall budget to the IIA.

Mr. COHN. Who decides how much is going to be allocated to the platter program of the Latin American Division? Who makes that decision?

Mr. BAUER. The decision? On the platter program for the Latin American Division? After I get the budget, I make the decision.

Mr. COHN. You make the decision?

Mr. BAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COHN. When did you make that decision?

Mr. BAUER. That decision I made in September, after I received my final budget figures.

Mr. COHN. All right. And when was the Eye of the Eagle put into production the first time?

Mr. BAUER. In April and May of '52.

Mr. COHN. All right. Now, at that time, had you made up a tentative budget?

Mr. BAUER. No, sir. How could I make up a tentative budget, if I didn't know what the Congress would give me?

Mr. COHN. All right. That is fine. Did you think, not knowing what the Congress was going to give you or how much money you would have—did you think it was a wise thing to commit such a large amount, what turned out to be almost the entire budget for the platters—to this program which contained no anti-Communist material?

Mr. BAUER. The first amount was allocated out of funds of fiscal '52 and not '53. The largest part of the budget was '52. It was obligated in April and May. That was it. And please, Mr. Counsel, would you now give me the very important chance—because you mentioned that the program is not anti-Communist, which is the crux of the situation.

Mr. COHN. We will give you that chance. Mr. Ayers testified, of course, that it was not anti-Communist until the Latin American Division insisted on enforcing its right to look at every script; that in every single script they found it necessary to make changes and insert

anti-Communist material and anti-Communist counterpropaganda, and that then the scripts ended up with some anti-Communist material in it. Now, if you would address yourself to the point of whether or not the scripts as prepared by the people you contracted with and submitted to the Latin American Division did contain substantial anti-Communist material, I think that would be of great interest, and please go ahead and do that.

Mr. BAUER. Yes, sir; they did.

Mr. COHN. All right. Now go ahead and tell us.

Mr. BAUER. Now may I consider the program, which I consider the crux of the situation? The program is a one-half hour dramatic show which attacks and exposes the aims and the subversive techniques of communism, using a scientist, the Eagle, as its central figure. These programs document the characteristic activities and operations of Communists, the subterfuge and duplicity they practice in infiltrating prodemocratic organizations. The Eye of the Eagle is a clear-cut anti-Communist program deliberately presented in an entertaining form to attract and hold the listener.

And to your specific point, sir, there were changes suggested by the Latin-American Division. Those changes were inserted. But right from the beginning, the committee has the power to subpoena the original English scripts. And the program was an anti-Communist script, sir.

Mr. COHN. Do you have those scripts with you?

Mr. BAUER. No, sir.

Mr. COHN. Why do you not have them?

Mr. BAUER. It is quite a lot of scripts, but I can send them up to you [indicating].

Mr. COHN. I don't think it is amusing, Mr. Bauer.

Mr. BAUER. I don't think it is amusing, either.

Mr. COHN. Don't you think it would be more helpful to the committee if you could have some actual quotations from the scripts?

Mr. BAUER. Yes, sir; I have them here.

Mr. COHN. I think that would be very helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, may I suggest it is 11:30 now. We told four different witnesses who came down from New York they would most likely get on the stand. General Van Fleet is testifying before the Appropriations Committee at 2:30. My thought was that we would run right straight through the noon hour. I would like to finish before 12:30, so that we could get to the appropriations hearing. It might be well to let the three witnesses tell the story they came down to tell, and then, after they have completed that, we can go into the examination.

Just proceed and give us the information you wanted to give us.

Senator MUNDT. You were about to give us English quotations from the script. I am very much interested in hearing that.

Mr. BAUER. May I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BAUER. Script No. 1, in Portuguese for Brazil: On pages 8 and 14 it is revealed that the real name of the man who calls himself Gomez, but is a Communist agent, is Saroff, a Russian name.

On page 16, the Eagle asks the local chief of police if the name "Saroff" means anything to him and the chief answers that Saroff is suspected of being a top level foreign agent.

On page 19, Saroff flies toward the steamer, bearing the name "Marianova," a Russian name.

The name of Saroff appears 23 times and Marianova 3 times throughout the script.

Under program No. 3, the opening paragraph follows:

Our story begins in a small country of central Europe that lost its independence and lives today under a brutal tyranny of an aggressor nation that tries to dominate the world with its absurd political doctrine.

There is also the language "totalitarian, aggressor, and enemy of the most beautiful spiritual values that humanity accumulated through its civilization."

The chief of the secret police is Rostov, a Russian name.

The plot is about a group that steals the jewels of the Virgin. The invaders try to sell the jewels in the free world to finance their activities. However, they are trapped by the Eagle, who retrieves the treasure and states:

The diamonds are now in a safe place where they shall remain until the day the country of birth of Karel Dochek recovers its freedom and can again offer its prayers to their Virgin.

The word "Communist" appears twice in this script.

The gangster is named Krilov, again a Russian name.

On page 13, the woman says:

She convinced me that the Cominform would some day take over our Government and dominate our country.

Krilov tries to get the Eagle to work for him saying:

We need men of science and have our ways to get them. At first we try buying them.

On page 16, the word "Communist" is mentioned twice.

The kidnap, in script 5, is named Bukoff. Krilov's goons are named Ivan and Sergei.

The saboteur is named Voronov, and the name is repeated frequently in the script. The plot is about sabotage of an oil refinery. The engineer of the refinery had joined the Communist Party, but when he saw what their rotten aims were he quit the party, calling them extortionists. Although 10 years have elapsed, the Communist Party is trying to force him to be their tool.

The subversive agents, in program No. 7, are named Denisov and Mihail, Russian names. The Eagle says: "The steamer *Red Star* is registered under the flag of a Communist country." The spies are on the steamer *Red Star* out of territorial waters.

The CHAIRMAN. What type of audience was this supposed to appeal to?

Mr. BAUER. This appeals to an adult audience—I mean an adolescent audience, and a lot of adult people in Latin America. I would like to say I could read on for a long way now in Spanish and Portuguese. And I wish to state this emphatically, that this program is anti-Communist. My whole record in the Voice of America shows that I have never produced anything but programs which further the interests of the United States in the fight against world communism in whatever assignment I was. This is such a program.

I wish also to state to the committee that after we sent 6 sample programs to the field, not less than 23 American missions in Latin

America have requested 123 complete sets of the program. And if the committee please, I have here some of the excerpts which give their reactions to this type of program after they had heard it. We only sent out the samples.

The Dominican Republic—I mean, our American mission—reports:

Dramatic programs are, far and away, the most popular type here. Please continue sending us this type of program.

Salvador:

Eye of the Eagle is especially desired as replacement for The Sea Wolf which is regarded by station managers here as the best dramatic program ever made available in this country.

Honduras:

Approximately four series of dramatic programs of The Sea Wolf or Eye of the Eagle type could be placed to advantage each year.

Costa Rica:

The Sea Wolf is being broadcast daily by two stations. The Embassy is awaiting eagerly the Eye of the Eagle. The supply of these dramatizations in Spanish is far below the post's need.

Uruguay:

Of the dramatic programs listed, the Embassy is requesting only one, Eye of the Eagle, of which it needs three sets.

Chile:

The Embassy would like to request that Eye of the Eagle be supplied after February 15 in quantities of 15 copies each.

Peru:

Eye of the Eagle is definitely required at this post.

Cuba:

USIS requests that no new programs of a dramatic nature be shipped with the exception of one copy each of the complete series Eye of the Eagle to the Embassy.

Venezuela:

The Embassy considers IBS's transcription service to be the most effective phase of the VOA-USIS operation in Venezuela. The Embassy has reported so frequently on the success of these programs that it is unnecessary to repeat the praise. The Embassy requests among others eight sets of the Eye of the Eagle and replacements for episodes of The Sea Wolf which have been lost.

I could go on, Mr. Chairman, but I might, in fairness, say that two posts, to my knowledge, have not requested the program.

Senator MUNDT. I am inclined to believe that Mr. Bauer is making a very effective presentation, and there is some question in my mind but what we are wasting a lot of our committee time trying to arbitrate an argument between dramatic critics, which happens all over the country.

Let me say that I have pursued this situation a little bit privately with Mr. Puhan, and I find that in a letter to me he verifies everything that Mr. Bauer has now told us. There is no question but what there is a difference of opinion between Mr. Ayers and Mr. Bauer. The difference of opinion grows out of what is the kind of program to have in South America. Frankly, I am not qualified to say. I will say this, in all candor, that I am one of those who have been pretty close to the Voice of America program and have been urging

somewhat the development of dramatic programs, the development of special movies, to be used in certain areas of the world, on the theory that you cannot always put propaganda in pitchfork form, that it has to be somewhat subtle. I have seen something from one member of the committee rather disturbing about a conflict in testimony as to what kind of drama to give to a certain kind of audience in South America, and I would ask leave to insert in the record at this point a letter received from Mr. Puhan under date of February 24, going into this whole matter in detail, in which it seems he pretty adequately summarizes the situation by two statements. The first is that in the final analysis both Mr. Baldanza and the office of Mr. Ayers attached their signatures to these scripts in a group, after the argument was all over. Then I would like to have our counsel find out whether that statement is correct or not. If it is correct, it seems to me it pretty well dissipates the controversy.

Before I get under cross-examination—I will be your witness in a minute, I think—I would like to bring out another point. In addition to the very long list of recommendations read by Mr. Bauer, I have quotations here from Paraguay, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Nicaragua, all from our American embassies, saying this is good stuff for South America. I do not know. If they are wrong, we had better get some new embassy officials. But I would not put the blame on Mr. Bauer.

In a concluding line, he says:

As I stated during my testimony, I consider Mr. Bauer, Mr. Baldanza, and Mr. Ayers to be good public servants who have all contributed a valuable share in making the Voice of America an effective instrument in carrying out United States foreign policy. I should add that Mr. Ayers, in my opinion, has misunderstood the functions of Mr. Bauer's Division.

While I think that may indicate loose administration, and that Mr. Puhan has been somewhat faulty in not making each of them understand the respective authority of the other, it seems to me that for the \$50,000 involved we are not in a position to indicate that it was wasted, and on the evidence submitted thus far, we are not in a position to doubt the loyalty of either Mr. Ayers or Mr. Baldanza or Mr. Bauer, and until we can get something more specific in the record, I would like to lay this one on ice and see if we cannot find something a little bit more important.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt, neither the Chairman nor, as far as I know, any members of the staff, have any information to indicate that Mr. Bauer is in any way pro-Communist. I do not think we have any information to indicate that Mr. Ayers is in any way pro-Communist. Mr. Ayers testified there was a great waste of money in South America by using up the entire budget on a thriller program. Mr. Bauer wanted the opportunity to refute that, and he has been given that opportunity. I think it would be unfair not to give him that opportunity. When you say "lay it on ice," I would like to do that. I have not been questioning him at all. I hope we can get through with this witness.

I do not think the committee is going to try and resolve the question at this time as to whether we should put out thriller programs or music or news and analysis. That is something we will have to form an opinion on before we hear all the testimony. I think it is a very im-

portant point. I note that Mr. Compton, the retiring head of the IIA, if I can refer to him as the retiring head, has made a suggestion that nothing but hard news and analysis be used on any of the programs. Others say no, and they seem to think that we can carry out our foreign policy by putting on thriller programs. I think we should hear all the witnesses. We are spending hundreds of millions of dollars on this program, and I think the Senators can afford to sit through some testimony that may, on the surface, appear to be a bit boring, but may be very important.

I wish, Mr. Bauer, you would try and end up your testimony as quickly as you can, but give all the things you think are of importance to the committee. Instead of reading scripts, if you will present them and mark them as exhibits and put them in the record, I think that would be more helpful.

Mr. BAUER. May I do that, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. You understand that no one here has accused you of being pro-Communist or un-American or anything of that kind. You understand that, do you not?

Mr. BAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Is there anything further, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bauer you will be ordered to consider yourself still under subpena. I think you will be recalled for further testimony.

Mr. BAUER. Thank you.

(The correspondence referred to by Senator Mundt was marked "Exhibit 50" and will be found in the appendix on p. 567.)

The CHAIRMAN. Donald Taylor? Mr. Taylor, will you raise your right hand? In this matter in hearing now before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. TAYLOR. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor, you have requested the right to appear before the committee. You may proceed to make any statement you care to.

#### TESTIMONY OF DONALD K. TAYLOR, NEWS EDITOR, NEWS DESK, VOICE OF AMERICA

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I appreciate this opportunity to come down here and refute statements made about me.

On February 20, Mr. Virgil Fulling of the Voice news desk expressed the opinion that I was a Communist sympathizer, and that in my editing—

The CHAIRMAN. First, what is your title?

Mr. TAYLOR. I am news editor, slotman, on the Voice of America news desk.

The CHAIRMAN. News editor?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir; central news desk.

The CHAIRMAN. And give us your first name.

Mr. TAYLOR. Donald.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you spell the last name?

Mr. TAYLOR. T-a-y-l-o-r.

The CHAIRMAN. And how long have you been with the Voice?

Mr. TAYLOR. Over 4 years. I came on October 1, 1948.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is your immediate superior?

Mr. TAYLOR. Harold Berman.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say you are a news editor—you say a news editor, or the news editor?

Mr. TAYLOR. I have been the news editor on the central news desk, across which all the copy comes.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the function of the central news desk?

Mr. TAYLOR. We move on the teletype wire to the language desks, news, news reports, roundups, comment, and opinion. They were running a file on the teletype wire for the language desks.

The CHAIRMAN. And you requested to appear because of certain statements regarding your desk and you. Is that right?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed to make your statement without interruption.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

Mr. Fulling came down to express the opinion that I was a Communist sympathizer and in my editing had softened news dispatches. I resent and reject that opinion. I am not, nor have I ever been, a Communist or a Communist sympathizer. I have neither tried to favor communism nor to impart any slant along that line in my work or in my personal life. I have had no direct or indirect ties with communism, and I welcome any inspection of my record.

Mr. Fulling here 2 weeks ago cited 1 dispatch—from Guatemala on January 19—and the editing of 2 words in that dispatch, to support his view. The central news desk, over which I had operational supervision, produces or approves from forty to fifty thousand words a day. It was part of that file which came to me from Mr. Fulling. I wish to state what happened, and will show Mr. Fulling's conclusions unwarranted.

The point of the dispatch was that President Eisenhower's inauguration had been hailed in Guatemala—

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, sir. I missed the last line.

Mr. TAYLOR. The point of the dispatch in question here was that President Eisenhower's inauguration had been hailed in Guatemala as "another blow against world communism." This precise language was in the story and remained in it from first to last, but that was not mentioned by Mr. Fulling, as far as I can see from reports of his testimony.

Senator MUNDT. Will you talk a little louder; it is a little hard to hear you.

Mr. TAYLOR. The precise language that the President's inauguration was "another blow against world communism," was in the story and remained in it from first to last, and from what I have seen of Mr. Fulling's testimony I don't think this was pointed out when he was down.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to interrupt you unnecessarily, but, as I recall, Mr. Fulling objected to your taking out the word "anti-Communist" groups and inserting the word "democratic" groups. His statement was that in South America every Communist movement is hailed by the Communists and the leftwingers as a "democratic movement." His testimony was that when you insisted on taking out the

phrase "anti-Communist" and inserting "democratic groups," that made the script rather meaningless. I wish you would comment on that as you proceed.

Mr. TAYLOR. I will, sir.

Mr. Fulling, in his original story, had anti-Communists applauding this blow against world communism. The change suggested at the central desk was to make it "citizens" and "democratic organizations." The effort was to achieve the effect of a spontaneous reaction by the Guatemalan people to the inauguration of the President. We wanted a positive, all-inclusive picture to show the Guatemalans hailing the inauguration as a blow against world communism.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Taylor, regardless of the picture, what were the facts in Guatemala? Where did you get your facts, and what were the facts?

Mr. TAYLOR. The facts I think came in an International News Service dispatch.

Senator MUNDT. Do you have that dispatch?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir; I think it is in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. We have here the dispatch. The dispatch refers to a demonstration of anti-Communist groups. I may say in that connection that I have before me a copy of the U. S. News and World Report. This is page 15 of the last issue. It refers to a Government coalition in Guatemala called the Democratic Electoral Front. The statement reads:

The Government coalition, called the Democratic Electoral Front, consists of 4 parties—the Revolutionary Action Party, the Party of the Guatemalan Revolution, the Party of National Renewal, and the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party.

So that it would seem that Mr. Fulling was to some extent correct when he said that the Communist movements in South America have been labeled as "democratic" movements. For that reason, we are curious to know why you would take the INS news story and re-do it and eliminate the words "anti-Communist groups" and insert "democratic groups"?

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, the sentence in which the word "democratic" was used read as follows:

Last night leaders of democratic organizations speaking at a mass meeting of their followers hailed Mr. Eisenhower's inauguration as "another blow against world communism."

I did not think in that context of leaders of democratic organizations hailing the President's inauguration that it could be interpreted in any other sense than the sense in which we use the word "democracy" or "democrat."

The CHAIRMAN. I still do not know why you changed the INS story.

Senator McCLELLAN. What was your objection to using the term "anti-Communist"? I do not quite understand why you first objected to the use of the term "anti-Communists."

Mr. TAYLOR. I had no specific objection, as I will go on to say, but my feeling was, when I made the change, that we wanted to get it more constructive, a bigger picture. We use the term, as many people do, "the free world," rather than the "anti-Communist world."

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you not want to give us the exact news? The story that came from there was that it was anti-Communist groups

of paraders. You say you wanted a bigger picture? Why did you not want to give the correct picture?

Mr. TAYLOR. I had not seen the INS dispatch. It was not submitted to me along with Mr. Fulling's copy.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was: Was not this called to your attention, when Mr. Fulling objected to your use of these words, that he was quoting the INS dispatch?

Mr. TAYLOR. He did explain the reasons, and I told him to restore it to his original version, which I believe he did. I also asked that he put the correction on the record for the teletypewriter. This he did not do, as far as I know.

Senator MUNDT. Here is the dispatch. It is from Guatemala City, January 21, INS:

Anti-Communist Guatemalans carrying United States and Guatemalan flags paraded before the United States Embassy in Guatemala City today in celebrating the inauguration of President Eisenhower.

Placards carried by the Guatemalans included these statements:

"The hatred of the enemies of the United States is more intense the more unjust it is."

"God save America and President Eisenhower."

Now, it says pretty specifically here that those are anti-Communist Guatemalans. And as I understand the testimony of—I have forgotten the man's name—Fulling or Folling—when he prepared his release he quoted exactly the language "anti-Communist," and his objection was to the fact that you used "democratic organizations." Because I think you will concur in his analysis that down in the South American countries and in most of the world where Communist propaganda prevails, they seek to employ and embrace the word "democratic" as a Communist device. Would you argue with that point?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. So I was wondering, then, what reason you had to change it, and this is the first that I have known that your changes did not prevail. You say your changes did not prevail?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir. I believe the story went out. I asked Mr. Fulling to make the correction, and I am informed that he did do it by telephone. And this, to me, was a professional and editorial difference of opinion, which I didn't regard as significant at the time. He explained to me the Latin-American regional policy meeting had wanted it the way he had prepared it, and we are a service organization, and we are supposed to give them what they want, so, after explaining my reasoning, and he explaining his, I asked Mr. Fulling to make the change.

Senator MUNDT. Change it back to his version?

Mr. TAYLOR. Back to his version.

The CHAIRMAN. It was after it had gone out over the air, sir?

Mr. TAYLOR. No; after it had gone out over the teletype wire, sir, not over the air.

Senator JACKSON. How did it actually go out over the air?

Mr. TAYLOR. I believe it went out over the air leading off with "anti-Communist organizations." "Numerous members of anti-Communist organizations paraded before the Embassy \* \* \*."

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor, Mr. Fulling testified that this was only one example of the attempts to water down the dispatches prepared by him, and that this happened time after time. What is your comment on that? You say this is the only time you ever tried to do this?

Mr. TAYLOR. I never tried to water down any dispatch, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, doing the same type of thing you did here. Maybe you did not call it watering down.

Mr. TAYLOR. I am the slot man on the desk. We have made many changes. But our pattern is to keep the thing as sharply and effectively anti-Communist as we can. I do not know what other examples Mr. Fulling may have had in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this correct, that in South America every Communist movement is labeled by the term "democratic movement"?

Mr. TAYLOR. The Communists have tried to take the word "democratic" over.

The CHAIRMAN. And they have taken it over rather effectively in South America, have they not? I am not talking about the United States.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir; they have.

The CHAIRMAN. So that in South America when you refer to a democratic movement, that is normally understood as a Communist or left-wing movement?

Mr. TAYLOR. I couldn't say, sir, the extent of their effectiveness in taking this over.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when you were doctoring this up—I should not say that, but when you were removing the word "anti-Communist" and inserting the word "democratic," do you not think that you should know what the word "democratic" means in South America?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir; but I, as I said before, thought that in this context of democratic leaders of democratic organizations hailing Mr. Eisenhower's inauguration as "another blow against world communism," I could not see how it could be understood in any other sense but the sense we use it in. And I might say I am a little opposed to giving this word up to them. I think we might try to keep it.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed. Have you any further statement?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Our aim, as I have said, was to get a more constructive and more positive picture, but I did not then and do not now regard the difference as a matter of tremendous importance.

Mr. Goldmann, at the Central News desk, suggested the change; I assented to it and called it to Mr. Fulling's attention. He objected, saying that a policy meeting of Latin American editors had requested the story as prepared by him. I then told him to restore the dispatch to the original version, to his version, that is. This fact does not appear to have been mentioned by him at all. He apparently did make the correction by telephone, but did not, as I requested, make the change in writing for transmission on the teletype wire.

The CHAIRMAN. You understand, of course, that Mr. Fulling's objection was that if, as apparently you both agree, the word "democratic" had been taken over by the Communists in South America, and then if you say a democratic group paraded celebrating Eisenhower's election, it would be understood by your listeners that the Communists considered Eisenhower's election as a victory, which, of course, they did not. Do you follow me? You both apparently agree that the term "democratic" in South America refers to every Communist movement. So if you change the phrase from "anti-Communist" to "democratic," and you say that democratic groups celebrated Eisen-

hower's election, to your listening audience in South America that would mean that your "democratic groups," that is, your Communist groups, considered Eisenhower's election a victory, which, of course, they did not, and which would be giving an incorrect impression. Did that enter your mind?

Mr. TAYLOR. It seemed to me that is so remote that I do not see how anyone could infer that Communists could possibly hail the inauguration of President Eisenhower.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think they could, but when you changed the phrase "anti-Communist," which came in the INS dispatch, and you inserted "democratic," which you said had been taken over by the Communists in South America—

Mr. TAYLOR. I say they use it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it would read "democratic groups," meaning Communist groups, were hailing his election. You say you could not conceive of their hailing his election. I agree with you. Then why would you insist on putting that type of dispatch out?

Mr. TAYLOR. I couldn't conceive, sir, of anybody else understanding it as the Communists hailing the inauguration.

Senator MUNDT. What is the definition of a "slot man"? In South Dakota, he is the fellow who keeps the one-arm bandits in operation.

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, I sit at the main desk. All the incoming wire copy goes across my desk. I distribute it through the regional editors, and they prepare it for their various areas, and I have it prepared, or my staff redo the Washington stuff on the Washington desk. It is prepared. It comes back to the Central desk, where it is copy read and put out on the teletype wire.

Senator MUNDT. It seems to me the whole argument here is whether or not the changes which you make tend to be favorable or unfavorable to communism. But you have not got much of a case on this exhibit. I cannot see much justification for the change you made, and you yourself admit you altered it back to the original text. I wonder if you could supply for the files of the committee changes which you have made in the course of your business, where perhaps you tighten up the language and make it more anti-Communist?

Mr. TAYLOR. I have here, sir, an exhibit of many stories that have been approved by me and have gone over the desk, which I would give if you would care to have it. I have no record of the changes there, sir, but that is the copy in its final form as I approved it, or asked that it be written.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want this marked as an exhibit and received?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 51," and will be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Fulling suggested here that the word "anti-Communist" was not used by us, but the fact is that in the 2 days before this incident, that term "anti-Communist" was used 14 times in output to Latin America, all of it approved by Mr. Fulling and by my desk. Most of these stories were in connection with the Guatemalan election, which came about at that time.

We put out about 40,000 to 50,000 words a day, sir, and I am sure that any examination of the file will show a strong anti-Communist orientation. On any news operation you will find as many views on choice of words as you do writers and editors. I do not resent someone liking one word or limiting his vocabulary to one word. But I do resent Mr. Fulling's taking two words out of context and giving them a sinister significance which a reading of the balance of the sentence refutes. I also resent failure to disclose that I specifically asked him to restore the story to the form originally proposed. In short, I resent the distortion of the facts by nondisclosure and half truths, and I most strongly resent any aspersion upon my loyalty.

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Taylor, as I understand it, when the script was first presented to you, you did modify it, or make these changes, thinking at the time that that would serve to better get the story across. After Mr. Fulling raised a question with you, you readily agreed that he might change it back and use it in the original term "anti-Communist."

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir, I agreed to that.

Senator McCLELLAN. You do not know now whether the change was actually made?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, I believe it was corrected, so that it went out on the air in the fashion Mr. Fulling wanted.

Senator McCLELLAN. You believe it was?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. You believe it was?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, at any rate, the discussion about it all took place at the time and before it was broadcast, and after he called it to your attention, called this change to your attention, and objected to it, you readily agreed that it might be changed?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that your testimony?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. I was only trying, Mr. Chairman, to get, just briefly, his testimony before the committee, a summation of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me read Mr. Fulling's testimony, which is a direct contradiction of Mr. Taylor's. It is page 10802.

In this particular case, remembering those warnings, I proceeded very amiably. I was not indignant. I just said that this had been discussed at the policy meeting, that these words had been decided on, that they should use the dispatches exactly as they were, and I saw absolutely no reason for changing them, that it would change the entire tenor of the story. And I tried to get him—

meaning Mr. Taylor—

to change it, or put it back in the form in which it should be. He would not do so. And I continued to suggest that this be done, but very amiably. Finally, he became very indignant, and said, "Well, if you insist on this, we will go and see Mr. Berman"—Mr. Harold Berman, who is the Assistant Chief of the News Branch.

We also have an order in there that on questions involving policy, such as this, where there is any disagreement on it, the Assistant Chief, or the Chief, who happens to be there is the final judge on what shall be used, and how.

Mr. Taylor suggested that we see Mr. Berman.

So we went into Mr. Berman's office and stated our cases to him, and I showed him where the changes had been made, as I recall, which was not at all the way they were written or not the intention.

Is that correct?

Mr. TAYLOR. We did see Mr. Berman, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you did not agree. You said, "Let us go and see Berman and let him settle that"?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir. I think before we saw Berman I asked him to correct it.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would you go and see Mr. Berman, if you and Fulling had already agreed before?

Mr. TAYLOR. I just wanted to get his view on it. And, as I recollect it, he said we should fix it up among ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me read the rest of this:

\* \* \* I showed him where the changes had been made, as I recall, which was not at all the way they were written or not the intention. And he looked—

Senator MUNDR. Will you talk a little more loudly, please? Perhaps you should have the mikes up closer to you.

Mr. FULLING. Probably that is the reason. I thought I was talking very loud.

Senator MUNDR. They have enough mechanical equipment around there for a Hollywood studio. You might as well use some of it.

Mr. FULLING. He looked at the item which had been changed, and said, in effect, that that was all right, that there was nothing wrong with that. And so I told him about my stand on it, and he said, "No; that that item as written was all right." And he gave me the reason for upholding Mr. Taylor in his stand that as originally written, as originally written by me, the item was not clear: it was fuzzy.

Is that correct?

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, sir, my recollection is that Mr. Berman, in effect, told us to take it out and fix it among ourselves, to agree on it.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you say Mr. Berman did not make the decision?

Mr. TAYLOR. I have no recollection. We were only in his office for a very few minutes. I don't believe he made the decision that it should be left as it was, one way or another.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor, answering Senator McClellan's question, you said that once this was called to your attention, you readily agreed that a change should be made?

Mr. TAYLOR. I did agree.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you find you went to Mr. Berman, Mr. Fulling says, and Mr. Berman upheld you. You say he did not uphold either Mr. Fulling or you and he said, "Go out and decide it among yourselves." Is that right?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. What I did: I have a recollection of asking Mr. Fulling twice to make the corrections, to restore the story. I believe once was before we saw Berman and once was after.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us why, if you agreed with Mr. Fulling, you should ask him to go in and see Mr. Berman? In other words, if there was no argument, why take up Berman's time?

Mr. TAYLOR. I just wanted to show him the story and get his opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. In other words, there was still a question in your mind after you talked to Fulling about it?

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Fulling had explained that at the regional meeting they said they wanted it the way he had written it, and I agreed it should be restored to his version.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, Mr. Taylor, one of the jobs that this committee has to do is to pass upon the credibility of a witness when two witnesses contradict each other. Now, you tell us that after you had

agreed with Mr. Fulling, after you had told him to make the change and send out the material as changed, you then said, "Let us go down and see Berman and get his idea on this." Was there a question in your mind at that time? Did you think you had issued the wrong order to Mr. Fulling, when you said, "Change it and put back in the words used by INS"?

Mr. TAYLOR. I believed, after he explained why he wanted it that way, it should be given in that way to the people who have to do the broadcasting, the way they had requested it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you got no satisfaction from Mr. Berman either; is that right?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, I got no satisfaction from Mr. Berman. He left, after handing down what I interpreted as his ruling, and he did not order any changes made.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not order that it be corrected or revised to the original way it was written. Is that correct?

Mr. TAYLOR. I don't believe Mr. Berman ordered any revision.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether Mr. Berman is actually sick today or not?

Mr. TAYLOR. I understand he is, sir. I haven't talked to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how long he has been sick?

Mr. TAYLOR. He was in the office yesterday and went home early in the afternoon, I believe. I have not talked to him since yesterday around noon.

The CHAIRMAN. John, I just wanted you to hear this contradictory testimony.

Senator McCLELLAN. I just make this comment to the witness. In the part where you said you agreed, the record does not indicate that you readily agreed for that part to be changed. Apparently you did not agree to the change, if you did agree to it, until after the conference with Berman.

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir; I think it was before.

Senator McCLELLAN. I can see no reason for your going to see him if you had already agreed to it. There was no longer any controversy. There was nothing for him to settle. There was no controversy, because you had agreed that the record be restored. Why would you go to see him?

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, it had not been, as far as I knew, restored at the time I went to see Berman.

Senator McCLELLAN. It would just take a remark to restore it; would it not?

Mr. TAYLOR. I asked Mr. Fulling to do that.

Senator McCLELLAN. You asked Mr. Fulling to do that. That is what he had been asking to have done. So there was no controversy to go to Mr. Berman about; was there?

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I still had the feeling that I wanted to get Berman's opinion.

Senator McCLELLAN. You were still contending that your position was correct?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir; I wanted to show him what I had done.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask Senator Jackson to take over the chairmanship? I will be back at 12:30.

Senator JACKSON. Who actually broadcast this script?

Mr. TAYLOR. The Latin American Division did the translation into Spanish and Portuguese, and they broadcast it.

Senator JACKSON. There is a question here in my mind, Mr. Taylor, whether the words "anti-Communist" were used in the broadcast. Who would know about that?

Mr. TAYLOR. My understanding is that they were used.

Senator JACKSON. Well, but who was the individual who actually made the broadcast?

Mr. TAYLOR. I do not know that, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Would that not be the answer? How would we know, unless—

Mr. TAYLOR. I don't know who the individual was, sir. But the story as broadcast, the version I got, read as follows:

In Guatemala City, numerous members of anti-Communist organizations paraded before—

Senator JACKSON. Will you read that again? I am sorry. This is as broadcast?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes; this is what I am informed was broadcast, retranslated from Spanish.

In Guatemala City, numerous members of anti-Communist organizations paraded before the Embassy of the United States, celebrating the inauguration of President Eisenhower. Leaders of the democratic organizations spoke at a gigantic meeting of their followers and said that the inauguration of Mr. Eisenhower signifies "another hard blow against world communism."

According to this, the word "democratic" was left in; I don't know how. Fulling, I assumed, was going to change it back in toto to the way he had it.

Senator JACKSON. You say what you read from was from the broadcast script?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes; that is the way I was informed it went out over the air.

Senator JACKSON. That would indicate that the word "democratic" was used instead of "the anti-Communists."

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I don't know why. When the correction was made, when he corrected the first phrase, I don't know why the second one wasn't corrected, too.

Senator JACKSON. But what you have read now was from the actual script used in the broadcast. So that would indicate then, that your earlier statement was probably incorrect. You assumed that he was going to use "anti-Communist."

Mr. TAYLOR. I had assumed that he would restore it wholly to the way that he had prepared it.

Senator JACKSON. But your opinion now is that it went out like this.

Mr. TAYLOR. This is the way I am informed it went out from the air.

Senator JACKSON. You are modifying that part of your testimony?

Mr. TAYLOR. I was only trying to testify in reference to what I told Mr. Fulling, not what actually went out on the air. This is the way I am informed it went out, in any event. Why the second change wasn't made, I don't know. I asked that he restore it, and it apparently wasn't fully restored.

Senator JACKSON. Have you talked to Mr. Fulling about this? Because this changes the whole business, you see. I understood your

earlier testimony to be that you had told Mr. Fulling to restore his earlier version, using the words "anti-Communist organizations."

Mr. TAYLOR. I did, sir. I did ask him to.

Senator JACKSON. And what did he tell you he was going to do about it?

Mr. TAYLOR. I got no response from him. I just assumed, after I asked him, that he would do it.

Senator JACKSON. So it did go out, then, using the words "democratic organizations"?

Mr. TAYLOR. As far as I know, sir, yes. I haven't seen the original script since it was broadcast.

Senator JACKSON. Would this help you any? I believe this was the original script.

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir. This is not the script as broadcast. This is the script as it went out over the teletype wire.

Senator JACKSON. Now, look at the other page. You have the INS story.

Mr. TAYLOR. This first white sheet is our teletype wire. The second white sheet is Mr. Fulling's original typewritten copy, or a carbon of it, as submitted to the Central News desk. I don't see here the Spanish version.

Senator JACKSON. Well, now, from that they made the script for the broadcast.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir; from this top copy here.

Senator JACKSON. And the script for the broadcast, the second page, conforms to what you read to the committee here a moment ago as being the script used on the broadcast?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir. This is the script that went on the teletype wire. I asked Mr. Fulling to make the changes in the two places indicated. Now, according to what I have, he did change the first sentence, the lead, but there was, according to this, no change made in the second instance, "democratic."

Senator JACKSON. There is one thing I want to get clear in my mind. Was this a telephone conversation with Mr. Fulling?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. It was face to face?

Mr. TAYLOR. Face to face; yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Did you suggest the restoration, then, of the words "anti-Communist" before you saw Mr. Berman?

Mr. TAYLOR. I believe I did, sir.

Senator JACKSON. You believe. Can you say for sure?

Mr. TAYLOR. I wouldn't want to say for sure, but I have a recollection of asking him twice. I am sure I did it after we saw Berman.

Senator JACKSON. After you saw Berman?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. I thought that it should be restored, in view of the fact that this was what the regional desk wanted.

Senator JACKSON. Where does Berman come into this picture? I am not a newspaperman. You are the slot man?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir; the editor in charge.

Senator JACKSON. You do the final editing?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, or it is done on my desk. I don't always do it myself.

Senator JACKSON. You are in charge. I mean, you have assistants that aid. But the final editing, the revising, and what not, is done at your desk, with the aid of your assistants?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Then where does Berman come into the picture?

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Berman is in an overall supervisory capacity. He is not actually in the hour-to-hour operation. He checks the wire.

Senator JACKSON. What is his title?

Mr. TAYLOR. He is Chief of the Central News Service.

Senator JACKSON. Chief of the Central News Service?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. So he is over you. Is it normal to confer with him from time to time?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I go either to Mr. Berman or to Mr. Zorthian, who is Chief of the News Branch.

Senator JACKSON. And when there is a question relating to policy?

Mr. TAYLOR. On policy, I would go to Mr. Zorthian or Mr. Berman or Mr. Kretzmann, any one of the three.

Senator JACKSON. And this you deem a policy matter?

Mr. TAYLOR. No; I didn't think this was a policy matter. I mean, it was a matter of style, or a matter of a purely operational question, and I thought that I would just discuss it with Berman.

Senator JACKSON. Would it be operational, or would it be policy?

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, it is a kind of a hard line to draw. It might be deemed to be policy, but it was, I should say, the kind of decision I think should be made on the news desk without going to the Policy Adviser. A change of words we don't usually—

Senator JACKSON. What would be an operational sort of thing? I mean, is this not an ordinary—

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Well, would you not do that at your desk? I do not understand. I must say I am a bit confused on that point. This is a matter more of choice of words, if you say it is not policy. Is it not a simple matter? You would not go to a superior over a deletion of three words, would you, unless it is going to change the whole policy of the program?

Mr. TAYLOR. I didn't have a policy in mind. The discussion had come up with Mr. Fulling over the story, and I merely went to Berman to get his opinion. That is all. It was a difference of opinion.

Senator MUNDT. You are getting me entirely confused now, because you have changed your testimony so many times. First you said that you agreed with Mr. Fulling before you went to see Mr. Berman. Now you say you agreed with him after you went to see Mr. Berman.

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir, when Fulling at the outset explained to me the decision made by the regional policy people, I then said, "Well, Virgil, you restore your original version. Put out a correction." Then later I brought the thing up to Berman and merely showed it to him to get his judgment.

Senator MUNDT. Were you with Fulling? Were you together?

Mr. TAYLOR. He came there during the discussion.

Senator MUNDT. I cannot see any reason to have an arbitrator negotiate an agreement when you have agreed beforehand.

Mr. TAYLOR. All I can say, sir, is that I merely wanted to get Berman's opinion. I did not regard it as—

Senator MUNDT. You said first of all: "Go ahead and make the changes. Send out the corrections. We agree." Now you say: "We will go and see whether Berman agrees."

Mr. TAYLOR. I don't believe I put it that way, that "We will go and see what Berman says." I showed it to Berman merely to get his idea on the thing.

Senator MUNDT. And then we have the testimony of Mr. Fulling, that you got no satisfaction from that conference, and that as a result of that conference it went back to this "democratic" phraseology against.

Mr. TAYLOR. I don't recollect, sir, Berman ordering him to adopt the changes.

Senator MUNDT. The script as it went out contained what language?

Mr. TAYLOR. As it went out on our teletype wire, it contained the changes that were made on the Central desk. As it went out on the air, the way I have gotten it, is that the word "anti-Communist" was inserted in the first sentence, and in the second sentence it was left "leaders of democratic organizations." Why that was left that way, sir, I don't know. I wasn't in on Mr. Fulling's actual telephone call.

Senator MUNDT. Do you remember any discussion of such terms as the word "fuzzy," and the words "not easily understandable," while you were having this tripartite conference with Mr. Berman?

Mr. TAYLOR. I recollect only Berman saying, "Try to sharpen it up a little bit." But I don't recollect much of the conversation. It was very brief. Whether he actually used the word "fuzzy," I don't remember. I don't know.

Senator MUNDT. Was Berman inclined to agree with the original position of Mr. Fulling, or the original position that Mr. Fulling had taken?

Mr. TAYLOR. In the conversation, sir? The impression I got was that he said, in effect, "You people fix it up between you."

Senator MUNDT. I do not understand.

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, he was more or less putting it in our hands. He may have objected to the prose style, but there was no suggestion at any time that the story be softened or that we do anything of that nature.

Senator MUNDT. Well, all I can say is that you have got me pretty badly confused.

Mr. TAYLOR. May I say that I have never tried in any way to water down any copy. My approach has been for 4 years quite the opposite. This story I regard as a difference of editorial opinion.

Senator MUNDT. You had some other differences of opinion with Mr. Fulling, besides this one script? I think there was mentioned a Bolivian matter.

Mr. TAYLOR. I was not in the office the day of the Bolivian story.

Senator MUNDT. Do you have any other statement you care to make?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Goldmann? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I do, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Will you give your name and position for the record, please?

**TESTIMONY OF ROBERT B. GOLDMANN, COPY EDITOR, CENTRAL NEWS DESK, VOICE OF AMERICA**

Mr. GOLDMANN. My name is Robert B. Goldmann. My official title is radio news writer for the central news desk. My actual function is copy editing, most of the time.

Senator MUNDT. You asked to appear here?

Mr. GOLDMANN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. We would appreciate it if you would not repeat anything Mr. Taylor has said. If you want to embody his testimony in yours, I think that would be helpful. And then if there is anything additional you want to add—because we are pressed for time. We want to give you an opportunity to add anything new you think the committee does not already have.

Mr. GOLDMANN. Yes. I think I can give the committee an exact chronological and causal reason why this change was made.

I want to thank the committee, first, for its courtesy in letting me come down here today to answer the charges that have been made against me.

On Friday, February 20, 1953, Mr. Virgil Fulling accused me, along with two of my superiors, of watering down one news story he wrote in such a way that—in Mr. Fulling's view—the story catered to the Communist cause.

This charge I deny as false. I so informed the committee by telegram on the day the charge was made.

The story in question dealt with a popular demonstration in Guatemala City on January 21, hailing the inauguration of President Eisenhower.

In the first place, Mr. Fulling did not read the whole paragraph to you. The phrase following the one he complains about—the very next phrase in the story—contained the main point of the whole paragraph. I now quote that sentence;

Last night, leaders of democratic organizations, speaking at a mass meeting of their followers, hailed Mr. Eisenhower's inauguration as "another blow against world communism."

Mr. COHN. We did have that.

Mr. GOLDMANN. I am sorry. I just want to mention that I approved that sentence and passed it, that contained the phrase "another blow against world communism."

I edited the story the way I did for two main reasons. First; by using the word "citizens" instead of "members of anti-Communist organizations," I was trying to give the picture of a big demonstration—Involving the people of Guatemala City—and not just a faction or a group. Also, by bringing the citizens, that is, the people of the city, into it, I made it more consistent with the reports from the other countries that we had, such as Chile, Cuba, and Mexico, where the people and their feelings favoring President Eisenhower were mentioned every time.

Written that way, the story seemed to me a lot stronger and more positive, and I have copies of the story here if any members of the committee would like to see it, the whole story, of which the Guatemala dispatch was a paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. You understand, sir, if it were merely the one example, we would not be so deeply concerned with it, but the other witnesses testified that this was not the exception but the rule, and if this sort of thing was done constantly, it would indicate there was something wrong with that news desk. And that is why we are spending so much time on this particular item.

Mr. GOLDMANN. I understand that, sir. I would like to tell the committee what my reasoning was behind the word "democratic."

The CHAIRMAN. Good.

Mr. GOLDMAN. As to my use of the word "democratic," in place of "anti-Communist," Mr. Fulling clearly implied that the word "democratic" should not be used in our copy, because of possible confusion in Latin America. I think that is wrong. I think we should never let the Communists steal that word from us and use it for their own big lie campaigns—which is exactly what they do.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think they have already stolen that word in South America?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I don't think we should give it up, no. For instance, in one instance, Mr. Chairman, the Chilean law, which forbids and outlaws the Communist Party, is called and referred to commonly as "the law of the defense of democracy," which is a law outlawing the Communist Party. To my knowledge—and I have spent a year in Latin America, or almost a year, in 1949—it is not general usage among the citizens of the Latin American countries to regard the word "democratic" as Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: Regardless of whether they have completely taken over this term or not, I believe you mentioned the fact that there at least is confusion on the part of many people in South America who identify the word "democratic" with Communist causes. If that is true, why do you not make your stories clear? When you refer to "anti-Communist," say "anti-Communist."

Mr. GOLDMANN. Well, sir, I believe that we should, whenever the opportunity arises—and here was a clear opportunity, because the people were demonstrating in favor of President Eisenhower—we should use that word in order to combat the Communist distortion and theft of that word.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you think that part of your function is to keep the Communists in South America from taking over the term "democratic"?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I believe that is the function that we should fulfill. I believe it is the function for us to keep them from using—

Senator MUNDT. How are you going to keep that objective by changing an INS news story, when it says "anti-Communists demonstrate," and you say "No, citizens demonstrate"?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I thought this was a perfect place to do it, because nobody in Latin America or anywhere else, I am quite certain, would confuse the facts so as to think that Communists would hail the election of the world leader of the fight against communism. Therefore, here, I thought, was the perfect place to nail down the real meaning of the word "democratic."

The CHAIRMAN. Good. Now, let us stop right there. Here is the change you made:

Members of anti-Communist organizations in Guatemala paraded before the United States Embassy \* \* \*."

that is the way the INS story came out.

Mr. GOLDMANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As you correct, it reads:

In Guatemala City, citizens paraded before the United States Embassy \* \* \*.

You did not say the word "democratic."

Mr. GOLDMANN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You want to identify "city citizens" for some reason.

Mr. GOLDMANN. I think, sir, you were not present when I testified on that point. I said I used the word "citizens" in order to tell the story that the people of Guatemala were with us, rather than any particular faction or group. It seemed to me to make the story more positive, that the whole people of the city, rather than a faction or a group—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, sir, if the whole people of the city did not parade, why do you want to lie to the people down there? You are beaming the story back to them. Do you not want to tell them the truth? The story as reported by INS is that members of anti-Communist organizations paraded. Now, why do you say "city citizens paraded"? Why are you afraid to use the term "anti-Communist organizations"?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I am not. And I have passed many stories which contained that word, and much stronger words, condemning the Communist cause, and if the committee permits me, I would like to quote some of the phrases, just as examples of the work I have done, as a commentary writer, previous to my present position, where I have used it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will let you do that, but I would like to get the background of this. What is your name, incidentally?

Mr. GOLDMANN. My name is Robert B. Goldmann, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Goldmann, in one instance, you strike out the word "anti-Communist," and you insert "democratic." You say the reason for doing that is that you do not want to let the Communists take over the term "democratic."

Mr. GOLDMANN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. In the other case, you strike out the phrase "members of anti-Communist organizations," and you say "city citizens paraded."

Mr. GOLDMANN. "Citizens." That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You say "city citizens."

Mr. GOLDMANN. No; I think the story reads: "citizens." "Guatemala City" was the date line, and then it says "citizens."

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the comma should be before "City" and not after it?

Mr. GOLDMANN. The colon should be after the word "City," which represents the date line.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not punctuated that way in your script. But let us assume that is correct. You say the reason for changing "anti-

Communist organizations" to "citizens" is to create the impression that the entire population was behind you, and not merely the anti-Communists?

Mr. GOLDMANN. It is to create the impression of a positive story involving the citizens of Guatemala City, and not just a faction or a group. And certainly the members of the anti-Communist organizations were citizens of Guatemala City. I don't think we were lying to them. At the same time, I think we were positive and not restricting it to a particular faction.

The CHAIRMAN. How many other times have you tried to insert the word "democratic" instead of "anti-Communist," so as to keep them from taking over the word "democratic"?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I don't recall a single instance in which I have done it.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have that in mind, that you should do that.

Mr. GOLDMANN. I had in mind, in this instance, to keep the story directed in a positive way, and to nail down—because here was the perfect place—the word "democratic" as our term.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your thought that in the future when UP or AP or INS dispatches come through describing what anti-Communist groups are doing, you should do the same thing, substitute the word "democratic," so as to keep the Communists from taking over the word "democratic"?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I think that would depend on the nature of the dispatch in question. Wherever there is any doubt what the word means, I believe I should stick to the word "anti-Communist" and keep it in there. I believe whenever there is no doubt, that would depend on the story in question, and where we can nail down the word "democratic" as describing our system we should try and do that and combat the Communist theft of that word.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree with the story in the U. S. News & World Report of February 20, that the "Democratic Electoral Front consists of four parties—the Revolutionary Action Party, the Party of the Guatemalan Revolution, the Party of National Renewal, and the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party"?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I do not have special knowledge on this particular subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you change a story being beamed to Guatemala, do you not think you should know what the word "democratic" means down there? If that is the title of the Communist Party and three other parties, do you not think you should know that?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I think I should, sir. But I also think that regardless of what the Communists are trying to do with that word, when there is an opportunity to nail it down, describing it as our system, it is a way of combating their distortion of the term.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the government coalition is called the Democratic Electoral Front.

Mr. GOLDMANN. It is a pro-Communist government.

The CHAIRMAN. You understand that.

Mr. GOLDMANN. I understand it now. I did not have the special knowledge at the time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, before you start censoring news stories to Guatemala, should you not have that information?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I suppose I should, but I did not have it at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, do you know now that if you refer to a democratic front or democratic organizations in Guatemala you are referring to the Communist Party?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I know that now.

The CHAIRMAN. So that when that dispatch was changed, so that you referred to the democratic front, actually you were telling the people of Guatemala that the Communist Party was parading, showing their approval of Eisenhower's election.

Mr. GOLDMANN. This was not my intention of doing.

The CHAIRMAN. But you realize now that is what you did?

Mr. GOLDMANN. That may be mistaken by some people; yes. Some people may assume it to be that way. But it was not my intention. And the word as used in this story, sir, is a title. The word as used in the story I edited is an adjective with a small "d".

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, sir.

Mr. GOLDMANN. For several years, I have been fighting communism as a staff member of the Voice of America. I have written and edited hundreds of thousands of words for the Voice, and everyone of them is a matter of public record.

As commentary writer and editor for the worldwide English Service, I originated scores of propaganda ideas and carried them out in the form of commentaries to all parts of the world. These commentaries were broadcast, and typical phrases and sentences in them read like this. These are words originated and written by me:

The power-hungry Soviet leaders, who impose slavery at home and aggression abroad.

One year ago, the Communist rulers of China completed preparations for a reign of terror which has no parallel in history.

Senator JACKSON. Do you have the dates on these stories?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I have the stories from which these quotes are taken, with the dates.

Senator JACKSON. As you refer to the quotes, could you mention the dates?

Mr. GOLDMANN. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. If it is convenient.

Mr. GOLDMANN. Yes. I have the material here. I would just have to look up the story.

Senator JACKSON. Suppose you put the dates on your quotes and then give it to the stenographer.

Mr. GOLDMANN. Do you want me to do it now, sir?

Senator JACKSON. No; do it afterward, so that the record will show the dates.

Mr. GOLDMANN. Yes, sir. I was going to hand in the full story from which the quotes were taken, and the stories have the dates on them.

Senator JACKSON. Were these quotes a year or so ago or recently? Or how far do they go?

Mr. GOLDMANN. These quotes are from a period starting March 15, 1951, up to February 16, 1952.

Senator JACKSON. When did you go to work for the Voice?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I went on this present tour of duty in January 1951.

Senator JACKSON. So this ties in with your last employment?

Mr. GOLDMANN. That is right. But as commentary writer, I was working for the World Wide English Service. Later I was transferred to the Central News desk.

Another quote:

The key facts of Communist rule are terror, cruelty, the ruthless smashing of the dignity of the individual, the oppressive hand of the tyrant.

To burn into their minds—

that is, the Czechoslovak people's minds—

undying hate and contempt of the cynical murderers of their young freedom.

These are my words. I wrote these, and they were broadcast. The scripts are right here, and I hope they will be made part of the record of the investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think merely name calling is good propaganda?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I do not, sir. But I am forced to defend myself against a false charge.

The CHAIRMAN. You try to prove you are anti-Communist by showing that you called the Communists some awfully dirty names.

Mr. GOLDMANN. Well, I have written very many other commentaries that do not use name calling, that show a positive approach. I have written commentaries of all kinds. But these are quotes that I have not just edited but written, and for which the ideas were originated by me, that I think prove beyond any shadow of a doubt my hate and contempt for communism.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, when you get into the question of effective propaganda, I think I have been called every name in the world. I do not think that is the most effective propaganda against McCarthy, though. People get sick of that after awhile. During this anti-Communist fight, I have been accused of everything except murdering my great-great-grandmother. I just wonder if you think you are proving your anticommunism when you refer to the power-hungry leaders of Russia. Is that, in your mind, good propaganda? Do you not think it would be better, if you really want to have effective propaganda, to document your charges against them, that they are guilty of certain acts?

I would like to see some of the scripts in which you give convincing arguments against international communism, if you can produce some of those.

Mr. GOLDMANN. All right, sir. These are quotes taken from scripts, and I believe that the excerpts which I give—

The CHAIRMAN. Will you read the quotes in which you cuss out communism again?

Mr. GOLDMANN. All right, sir.

The power-hungry Soviet leaders, who impose slavery at home and aggression abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about the Soviet leaders. I am asking you now to give us some phrases where you condemn communism. There seems to be some thinking over on the Voice that we should not fight communism; that we should fight Soviet totalitarianism, that there is a big difference. Now, read some of those in which you attack communism.

Mr. GOLDMANN. Here I have a phrase which I read to the committee:

The key facts of Communist rule are terror, cruelty, the ruthless smashing of the dignity of the individual, the oppressive hand of the tyrant.

That is about the nature of communism. And this was contained in a commentary.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a fairly good statement.

Mr. GOLDMANN. Thank you, sir. This was contained in a commentary on the rule of the Peiping regime in China, which was based on a story in the Saturday Evening Post by Mrs. Peggy Durdine. And I have, if you wish to hear it, a longer excerpt, from which this quote was taken.

The CHAIRMAN. You can read anything you care to into the record. Otherwise we will mark it as an exhibit.

Mr. GOLDMANN. I was wondering if the chairman wanted to hear this.

The CHAIRMAN. We wanted to hear Van Fleet this afternoon, and we have another witness, so I wish you would make it as short as you can. If you will cut down the reading as much as possible, we will mark it and put it in the record.

Mr. GOLDMANN. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you mark some of the full scripts, too?

Mr. GOLDMANN. These are the excerpts from the scripts. You want me to file the full scripts?

The CHAIRMAN. File the excerpts and later if you can get the full scripts, I think it would be good to have, to go with this.

Mr. GOLDMANN. Yes, sir. But I would have to have those retyped.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. You can file that later. Just send it to the committee.

Mr. GOLDMANN. I understand, sir.

As a newswriter for the English Language Service of the Voice, I volunteered beyond the regular call of duty to put a more powerful anti-Communist content into commentaries beamed to Latin America. In my spare time I searched for new material and wrote commentaries to expose and make clear the Communist threat to the people of Latin America.

In my work as commentary editor and writer for the English Section, I made special efforts to sharpen the anti-Communist content of broadcasts to Latin America.

For instance, I tried to get across, in direct and personal terms, what the fight against the Red aggressors in Korea means. So I dug up and rebroadcast a letter from an American soldier to his father in Cuba. It was a powerful letter, addressed not only to the GI's father, but to the Cuban people—to open their eyes to the Communists in their midst. To secure the widest possible audience for this and similar broadcasts, I notified the American embassies in the countries concerned. I did this well in advance of the broadcasts, so that they could get out publicity in the local press. This was achieved. Clippings from the Cuban press reprinting and commenting on the broadcast about the soldier in Korea are on file and available for inspection in the Voice, New York office.

Now, since last April, I have been a newswriter and editor of the Central News desk. I edit hundreds of stories a month—thousands of words—and they are all available for inspection. I have again here

typical phrases either written or approved by me as a newswriter and editor:

The battle against the Communist aggressors—

The CHAIRMAN. How many did you want to read into the record?

Mr. GOLDMANN. I have just about finished.

The CHAIRMAN. How many more pages?

Mr. GOLDMANN. About half a page more.

The battle against the Communist aggressors.

Communist religious persecution.

It is up to the Communists to show whether they want an armistice.

Upholding the United Nations fight against aggression.

In the view of Peking a good labor union in Communist China is one which helps management exploit labor.

Recent Soviet and satellite purges—acts of religious persecution.

The French Communist Party has found two more scapegoats for the party's declining power and prestige.

The church of silence—the Roman Catholic Church in Eastern Europe.

Resistance to Communist aggression in Korea has done more to improve the chances of world peace than anything else.

Widespread food and consumer goods shortages resulting from Communist bungling—

The CHAIRMAN. Are you reading titles?

Mr. GOLDMANN. These are quotes from news stories I edited or wrote. These are words written or approved by me.

Here, again, are the scripts from which they are taken, for the record. I can cite hundreds of other examples of my work to prove that Mr. Fulling's charge is false. My record is absolutely clear, and I would be very glad to furnish any further information on it to this committee or any other body that is concerned with making the fight against communism as effective and hard-hitting as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, sir?

Mr. GOLDMANN. That is all I have to say, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(The material supplied by Mr. Goldmann was marked "Exhibit No. 52," and will be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. COHN. May I make it clear that this next witness is not one against whom any charges have been made, but, quite the contrary, one of his scripts was read yesterday by Mr. Reed Harris in connection with the Communist purges.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to testify, or is he?

Mr. COHN. This is Mr. Howard Maier.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Maier, in this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MAIER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. As counsel has made it clear, you have not requested the right to appear, and as far as we know, there have been no charges of any kind that have been made about you before this committee.

#### TESTIMONY OF HOWARD MAIER, POLITICAL COMMENTATOR, AND ADVISER, CENTRAL SERVICES DIVISION, VOICE OF AMERICA

Mr. MAIER. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Maier, you are with the Voice of America in New York?

Mr. MAIER. I am.

Mr. COHN. And what position do you hold?

Mr. MAIER. I am political commentator and adviser to the Central Services Division.

Mr. COHN. Has it been your belief and policy, as long as you have held that position, that the Voice of America should put out effective anti-Communist propaganda, counterpropaganda?

Mr. MAIER. That is my belief and the belief of the Voice.

Mr. COHN. All right, sir. Now, you are referring to the Voice in New York now? Is that correct?

Mr. MAIER. I am referring to the Voice of New York, yes, sir.

Mr. COHN. Now, in connection with that program, did you have occasion to prepare some scripts attacking the Communist government of Czechoslovakia for its treatment of William Oatis?

Mr. MAIER. I did.

Mr. COHN. How many of those scripts did you prepare?

Mr. MAIER. It was a series of three.

Mr. COHN. And could you in just 1 or 2 sentences summarize for us what those scripts contain?

Mr. MAIER. Well, I would like to first state the peculiar position that I hold. I am as close, in the Voice, as you can come in an era of peace, to being a psychological warfare commentator. And these scripts are made for this thing, and they are quite esoteric in the complexity of their approach to the Czechoslovak people.

Now, the three scripts, as everybody in this room knows—when Bill Oatis was snatched, we were faced with a tremendous problem on an international plane. It was impossible for us to jeopardise our status quo. To get Bill Oatis out would have meant war. At the same time, the snatching of an American newspaperman meant to the people of the satellite nations the very fact that little Czechoslovakia could spit in the face of the United States and get away with it. Therefore, the three scripts were designed to show and to prove to the Czech regime that the United States of America was there, would always be there, and I think one of the scripts promises that if he touches a hair of Bill Oatis' head, he will hang from the highest tree in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. COHN. That was referring to Gottwald?

Mr. MAIER. Gottwald.

Mr. COHN. The Communist dictator of Czechoslovakia; is that right?

Mr. MAIER. Correct.

Mr. COHN. Now, did you receive, after these good, effective anti-Communist scripts went out, any words of approval from the State Department?

Mr. MAIER. I did not.

Mr. COHN. Was there forwarded to you by Mr. Kretzmann, the policy director of the Voice—

Mr. MAIER. Let me state first that this is my daily task, and it is not usual for the State Department to approve each and every act. They are all supposed to be good.

Mr. COHN. All right. Now, did you receive, in the form of a memorandum with reference to these Oatis broadcasts, any comment from the State Department?

Mr. MAIER. No; I had at a much later date, after the third broadcast in this set—I received a clipping with a buck slip, and I guess everybody knows what a buck slip is, attached to it.

Mr. COHN. Was the buck slip in the form of a comment by an official of the State Department?

Mr. MAIER. That is difficult to say.

Mr. COHN. Well, did the buck slip say on its face, "From the State Department in Washington"?

Mr. MAIER. May I have it, please?

Mr. COHN. Is that the one to which you are referring?

Mr. MAIER. This is the one to which I am referring.

Mr. COHN. Would you look at the top and see whether you see on the buck slip the words "Department of State"?

Mr. MAIER. Yes; I do.

Mr. COHN. All right. Now, was this buck slip forwarded to you by the policy director of the Voice of America, Mr. Kretzmann?

Mr. MAIER. It was.

Mr. COHN. And did you have occasion to discuss it with Mr. Kretzmann at any time?

Mr. MAIER. Sir; I blew my top.

Mr. COHN. And is the reason that you blew your top the fact that this buck slip was a comment from an official of the State Department disapproving your broadcast on the Oatis case and citing as authority and enclosing an article from a Communist-dominated newspaper in New York?

Mr. MAIER. Yes; it could be stated that way.

Mr. COHN. I wish you would give us the details.

The CHAIRMAN. First, will you read us what is written on the front of that buck slip?

Mr. MAIER. "Kretzmann Exhibit No. 1."

The CHAIRMAN. No; the longhand material. Maybe I can help you. I am used to reading the writing of my staff here.

Mr. MAIER. Maybe I can see it if I put on my glasses here:

This is the article to which I referred in our telephone conversation. A lot of us share this feeling about this particular broadcast.

Signed with the initials H. C. V.

The CHAIRMAN. And attached to it is an article—

Mr. MAIER. Attached to it is an article that is a column from the Daily Compass by Jennings Perry.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Daily Compass is known as a Communist-controlled publication generally, is it not?

Mr. MAIER. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, there is no question, as far as you know, in the minds of the general public, that the Compass is a Communist-controlled publication?

Mr. MAIER. I don't know about the general public. There is no question in my mind or in that of anyone who works in this field, I would say.

The CHAIRMAN. And this article in the Compass is highly critical of our getting tough with the Czechs over the Oatis case. Is that correct?

Mr. MAIER. No; it is not quite. You see, there is a reference in here to a telephone conversation, which is beyond my knowledge. I work on the very breaking of the actual news. I don't hold in my hand all the time all the checkers. I don't know all the answers. Right now, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eisenhower might possibly know something that

would throw all my line of approach out. But what I do object to, the reason I blew my top, was that I should be presented with this, which is a distortion of the script, out of a paper that I know is a Communist-dominated organ.

The CHAIRMAN. And sent to you with the approval of the State Department?

Mr. MAIER. No; it was passed to me by Mr. Kretzmann, I assume, for my information.

The CHAIRMAN. May I have that? Can you identify the person who signed the State Department memorandum or buck slip?

Mr. MAIER. From the initials I cannot. I went to Kretzmann, and I asked, "Who is H. C. V.?" And he said, "Aw, forget about it."

I blew up all over the passageways and everything. I am not a very quiet guy. And the point of the thing was, I never did know until a few days ago who H. C. V. is. I have nothing against the man. I don't know him from Adam. My only business of being upset and shouting my head off was that it should come in this way, when I really poured it on for Oatis, you see.

It is a difficult situation to date. As I said before, I don't understand about the telephone conversation. I don't hold all the keys. I might have been crossing some line. I might not have been crossing some line. But no one was stopping me at the Voice. We were going out with the dynamite.

The CHAIRMAN. At any event, H. C. V. is Harold C. Vedeler? Is that right?

Mr. MAIER. I can't testify to that. It is not within my knowledge. All they are is a set of initials to me.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask the counsel:

Have you determined that H. C. V. is Harold C. Vedeler?

Mr. COHN. Yes, Mr. Chairman; of the Eastern European Policy Division of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure that this is clear in the record. No. 1, there was a column in the Daily Compass written by Jennings Perry, which criticizes your broadcast demanding release of Oatis. And No. 2, you get this from the State Department through Mr. Kretzmann, signed by the initials "H. C. V.," in which he says:

This is the article to which I referred in our telephone conversation. A lot of us share this feeling about this particular broadcast.

You resented having an article from a Communist paper which was critical of it handed to you as a comment on your own broadcast?

Mr. MAIER. Yes. May I state something on this?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MAIER. My broadcasts, operating in the field in which they do, are often very controversial not only in the Voice but much more often, I have heard, in Washington. They must of necessity be, because they must always be in there shooting, and you can't always shoot right every time. You can't always have all of the circumstances in your hand or all of the knowledge of your chiefs. But it is the fact that the Daily Compass distortion of this attempt on our part came on the third. The first was much tougher. But the third—I am now speaking on assumption—because by that time it had begun to hurt. And that is why it was done. That is about why I think the Compass did it, anyway. This is not legal testimony. That is my assumption.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that this will be introduced into the record, I think we should have it clear that that is a distorted version of your broadcast. That is not what you would call a correct description of your broadcast.

Mr. MAIER. May I present the document?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the three scripts with you?

Mr. MAIER. I have.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is any particular portion you want to read, you may read it. Otherwise we will file all three scripts.

Mr. MAIER. Well, I would like to show you that here is an American newspaper, the Washington News, carrying as a banner head the same script, and the undistorted story.

Would you like me to read the closing part from that actual script?

The CHAIRMAN. I think it might be well.

Mr. MAIER (reading) :

Therefore, the request, Mr. Gottwald, bring William Oatis to Radio Prague every night.

This request I make against all the claptrap and redtape of your bureaucracy, for this request I make out of my full heart and my firm belief that there is such a thing as humaneness and decency even in the most evil of men. I know what it means to you, Mr. Gottwald—the trumped-up charge, the spreading of the spy net, the big chance to claim that every western hand is against Czechoslovakia. I know all that. But what I am requesting now is something larger than the political stakes for which small men play. One hundred and fifty million men and women of America, and hundreds of millions elsewhere in the free world, want to know whether one man held in jeopardy in your country is all right or not. Let's see you be big, Mr. Gottwald, let's see you do one decent thing in a lifetime of indecent acts. Bring William Oatis to the Prague Radio every night. Bring him drugged, if you must. Bring him mouthing anti-American propaganda if you must. But bring him! \* \* \* And now, this is Howard Maier saying goodbye. Heads up, Oatis, and see you again. \* \* \*

That is the script.

Mr. COHN. Now, let me ask you this, Mr. Maier. A script of yours was cited here in testimony by Mr. Reed Harris as an example of the effective use of the anti-Semitic purge issue by the Voice of America. You are familiar with that and other scripts along those lines that you wrote, are you not?

Mr. MAIER. Yes. But may I interrupt you here?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MAIER. I have not seen Mr. Reed Harris' testimony. I don't know what was read. We do not get transcripts of these hearings. I have no knowledge, nothing of my own knowledge, of anything that transpired here yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt, before you leave the matter of this article? I would like to read something into the record.

Bill Oatis is an American newspaperman, and the last we heard of him he was convicted under Czech law for spying and locked up. Our State Department has told us and the world that the charges and the trial were fraudulent. Oatis' employer, the Associated Press, has made the more probable explanation that Oatis had done nothing that violates accepted news-gathering practice in the United States. Presumably Oatis' own confession of spying related to the laws of the country in which he was working.

This would seem to carry the clear implication that while Oatis was not violating American newspaper practice, the writer of this article felt that he was violating the espionage laws of Czechoslovakia, would it not?

**Mr. MAIER.** Well, the implication there, as far as I am an expert on Communist tactics, is quite clear: that there are two or three reasons, perhaps, within a Communist regime, by which it would be legal to place Mr. Oatis in jail—when there isn't one single legal reason why he is in jail this minute.

The CHAIRMAN. This would seem to be especially significant, in view of the comment "a lot of us share this feeling about this particular broadcast," and especially if you add the other item to it, that "you do not ask a favor" of this Communist dictator in the same broadcast "in which you accuse him of congenital indecency." I assume you would not agree that we were asking a favor of Czechoslovakia; that you would believe we were asking for justice.

**Mr. MAIER.** Here is where the esoteric, complex nature of psychological warfare comes into it. I know that Gottwald isn't going to concede to this. I don't have the slightest idea that he would concede to it. But I am broadcasting across Gottwald to the Czech people, and it is the Czech people whom we wish to reach, separate, and keep separated from the Czech regime, and hammer home to them that the regime is evil. And this does it.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not get my question.

Do you agree or disagree with this article in this Communist-controlled paper?

**Mr. MAIER.** I disagree in toto.

The CHAIRMAN. That the release of Oatis would be a favor? Or do you not consider that the release of Oatis would be just the natural justice to which he was entitled?

**Mr. MAIER.** Sure. That is what the script was about.

**Mr. COHN.** Now, I have the testimony of Mr. Harris for you. The script to which he was referring, Mr. Maier, is the script beginning, "Stalin is Hitler and Hitler is Stalin." I believe we talked about that before.

**Mr. MAIER.** I remember that very well.

**Mr. COHN.** Now, my question here is this: Does the credit in your opinion for this good script which you wrote go to the directives received from the International Information Administration in Washington, or does it go to the policy adopted on these purges at the Voice of America in spite of these directives? Or, to put it another way, in interpreting these directives?

**Mr. MAIER.** Well, I can't answer that question directly. I will have to go into this little statement that I made before. When you work in psychological warfare or political warfare on the breaking point of events, Washington has always lagged far behind the Voice. But we have Washington's representative there, sitting at his desk. Whatever I do goes through that desk, that one man. And then it goes out over the wire to all of the language desks for translation, and over the wire back to Washington.

**Mr. COHN.** Now, my question is this: Mr. Harris testified that the policy as set forth by the International Information Administration was that these purge issues should be played up. General Barmine testified that that was not the fact; that if anything those directives from Washington indicated that the purge issues should be played down, that the anti-Semitic issue should be played down. Whose testimony do you support?

Mr. MAIER. I want to set that thing straight. I do three things for the Voice, my own commentary, my "Political Cabaret," and "Shirttails." I held the fort on this breaking news with a "Shirt-tail" called "The Maier Shirttail," through the news room, and before any directive came from Washington I hammered out this script, and it went to Washington's representative on the Voice, Mr. Edwin J. Kretzmann, our policy adviser.

Mr. COHN. He is the Policy Director of the Voice?

Mr. MAIER. He is the Policy Director of the Voice.

Mr. COHN. I gather he supported these scripts. Is that right?

Mr. MAIER. They are initialed in the corner with "E. J. K." And that is when they go out. I don't go out by myself onto the air in 30 or 40 languages.

Mr. COHN. This was supported by Mr. Kretzman, who was the Policy Director of the Voice in New York. Is that right?

Mr. MAIER. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Now, what we want to know is: Did you write this script as a result of directives received from the International Information Administration in Washington in writing, instructing you to play up the anti-Semitic purge issue?

Mr. MAIER. I have already answered that question. There was no directive.

Mr. COHN. There was no directive to that effect?

Mr. MAIER. No. It was breaking. I wrote it before there was any directive. I have written hundreds of scripts before there were any directives.

(The documents presented in Mr. Maier's testimony were marked "Exhibit No. 53" and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, unless you have something of great importance, I think we will have to adjourn now.

We will adjourn until such time as the committee announces. I think it may be Monday at 10:30, although I am not certain at this time.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p. m., a recess was taken subject to the call of the Chair.)

## APPENDIX

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### EXHIBIT No. 39

POLICE DEPARTMENT,

CITY OF NEW YORK,

New York, N. Y., March 4, 1953.

SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,

*Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

(Attention Senator Herbert Hawkins.)

GENTLEMEN: In compliance with your telephone call this morning to the office of the police commissioner, the following information desired by you has been photostated and air mailed, special delivery, herein:

"Ted Kaghan, signed nominating petition for one Israel Amter, councilman in 1939. Name can be found on page 1414.

"Ben Irwin, signed nominating petition for one Israel Amter, councilman in 1939. Name can be found on page 2004."

The names of other persons appearing on these petitions have been blocked out.

Very truly yours,

GEORGE P. MONAGHAN, Police Commissioner.

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### EXHIBIT No. 50

FEBRUARY 24, 1953.

The Honorable JOSEPH McCARTHY,

*Chairman, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,  
Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: At the request of a member of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, Senator Stuart Symington, and with your concurrence, I am here-with furnishing you with an explanation of the program operation of the Voice of America, as well as my observations on the Stuart Ayers' testimony before the subcommittee on Wednesday, February 18, 1953. I appreciate your courtesy in allowing me to supply this to the committee.

The program manager, the position which it is my privilege to hold, reports directly to the Director of the Voice of America, Mr. Alfred H. Morton. I, as program manager, plan, guide, and coordinate the activities of the divisions in the program area and of the overseas and domestic program centers. This refers strictly to the broadcasts, emanating in New York and Munich or broadcasts prepared on transcription or tape which are placed with friendly radio stations overseas. To accomplish this task I have six divisions under my immediate supervision. Four of them are divisions concerned directly with broadcasts short waved from New York to the rest of the world. They are the Near East, South Asia, and Africa Division; the Far East Division; the European Division; and the Latin American Division. A fifth division, called the Field Program Services Division, is not concerned with direct broadcasts but rather with the preparation of radio programs in various languages for placement by United States radio officers stationed abroad with radio stations and networks abroad. Still a sixth division is called the Central Program Services Division, which supplies news, talks, features, and research material in English to all of the five other divisions.

The Latin American Division, headed by Stephen Baldanza as Chief, and Stuart Ayers as Assistant Chief, is 1 of the 4 broadcasting divisions cited in the paragraph above. I am quoting now from the memorandum, dated December 18, 1952, and signed by Mr. Alfred H. Morton, which describes the functions of the

various divisions. Messrs. Baldanza and Ayers' Division "develops, with the advice of appropriate areas of the Department as to content, radio programing plans to achieve immediate and long-range information program objectives. Prepares and produces news, features, special events, and other types of radio programs in Spanish and Portuguese for broadcast to the American Republics area." This Division, headed by Messrs. Baldanza and Ayers, prepares and broadcasts daily 3 hours and 10 minutes of programs in Spanish and Portuguese to the Latin American nations. Messrs. Baldanza and Ayers have their own budget for preparation of these broadcasts. May I point out quickly that the sum of money devoted to direct broadcasting to Latin America from New York is not, I repeat, not under the supervision in any manner whatsoever of Mr. Robert Bauer.

The Division of Field Program Services, headed by Mr. Robert Bauer, is described in the same memorandum cited above as follows: "With advice and assistance of IIA (International Information Administration) field offices and IBS (International Broadcasting Service) language services, develops in script and recorded form radio and television programs in various languages for placement by field radio officers with radio stations and networks abroad. Collaborates with IIA (International Information Administration) field officers in analyzing and determining field programing needs. Prepares broadcast schedules for overseas distribution and develops and carries out television development and other projects and activities designed to build listening audiences. Provides advice and support to radio and television activities at field posts. Screens incoming audience mail and supervises its processing for statistical, answering, and other purposes. Provides central music service for all programing activities."

Mr. Bauer's Division, the Division of Field Program Services, is an outgrowth of primarily two things. One is section 1005 of Public Law 402—80th Congress. Section 1005 reads: "In carrying out the provisions of this Act it shall be the duty of the Secretary to utilize, to the maximum extent practicable, the services and facilities of private agencies, including existing American press, publishing, radio, motion picture, and other agencies, through contractual arrangements or otherwise. It is the intent of Congress that the Secretary shall encourage participation in carrying out the purposes of this Act by the maximum number of different private agencies in each field consistent with the present or potential market for their services in each country."

The second reason for the origin of Mr. Bauer's Division is the fact that unquestionably the most effective type of broadcasting is that which the listener can hear with the same clarity with which he hears his domestic radio stations. Thus, in countries friendly to the United States efforts have been made to place broadcasts, recorded in New York and shipped to the countries involved, on stations either controlled by the government of those countries or by private investors. United States officers of the information program, stationed abroad, have consistently encouraged this practice. It guarantees clarity of reception to the listener. It has, however, certain drawbacks, of which I have been consistently aware. One of these is that the United States Government is obviously not in a position to reciprocate for these services by granting equal air time on United States domestic radio stations and thereby being in a stronger position to dictate to those foreign stations what type of programs the United States might place. The second is that programs thus placed abroad, often free of charge to the United States, cannot, unfortunately, always be what might be called hard-hitting, outspoken propaganda broadcasts. The pill has to be sugar-coated. Like the commercial on United States domestic programs, the propaganda message has to be slipped into what might be called an entertainment program. Or the program must be devised in a way that the message contained therein, which always must be that the enemy is communism, will be clear to the audience, even though the program may superficially appear as an entertainment program.

I should bring one other point to your attention. The placing of this type of program results in good will between friendly foreign broadcasters and the United States and frequently makes it possible to obtain a relay or rebroadcast of our New York originated propaganda programs.

This is Mr. Bauer's Division. It should be clear that it is not simply a shipping office. It should, however, be made equally clear that Mr. Bauer, the Chief of the Division of Field Program Services, operates under instructions from me that he must not send to the field broadcast material which has not been requested or approved by the various radio and public-affairs officers stationed in countries

friendly to the United States. Mr. Bauer has further been instructed by me in running his Division that he must obtain clearance on broadcast material to be sent abroad from the particular division chief or his designated representative concerned with broadcasting to that area. In other words, Mr. Bauer must clear materials developed by him for Latin America with Mr. Baldanza, of the Latin-American Division, or his designated representative. For operating purposes, the clearance is obtained by Mr. Bauer's Division from the transcription officer in the Latin-American Division. This transcription officer reports directly to Mr. Baldanza or Mr. Ayers, and has, according to my understanding, the authority vested in him by Mr. Baldanza and Mr. Ayers to either approve or disapprove the plans as well as the prepared material for shipment. The transcription officer in the Baldanza-Ayers Division is Mr. Joseph Ries.

Just as Messrs. Baldanza and Ayers of the Latin American Division have a budget for their broadcast operation, so Mr. Robert Bauer, the Chief of the Field Services Division, has his budget. The total contracting budget for the first two quarters for Mr. Bauer's Division was \$91,248.11. It is Mr. Bauer's responsibility to apportion his allotment in four ways, in order to cover transcriptions to be sent to the four geographical areas, namely, Europe, Near East, Far East, and Latin America. His apportionment is based on the requests received from the officers stationed in the field and on the ability to produce programs requested. Suggestions for such programs are also made by the broadcasting divisions. All the division chiefs including Mr. Baldanza and his deputy, Mr. Ayers, are consulted because of their specialized area knowledge.

So much for a brief picture of my particular operation, the actual programing operation of the Voice of America broadcasts. If more detailed knowledge is wanted, I shall be happy to supply it.

I shall now make observations on the testimony of Mr. Stuart Ayers presented before you on Wednesday, February 18, 1953. I base my observations on the stenographic transcript of hearings before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Washington, D. C., February 18, 1953, volume 88.

In order to be as brief as possible, I have divided Mr. Ayers' testimony into the following categories: Budget; the Eye of the Eagle; were changes made in the programs or not; my action as program manager; loyalty of the persons concerned, and finally Mr. Bauer's and Mr. Ayers' promotions.

#### I. THE BUDGET

Let me make it clear that Mr. Bauer did not have responsibility for nor did he have any say in the planning of the budget for Messrs. Baldanza and Ayers' Latin American Broadcasting Division. The budget for Messrs. Baldanza and Ayers and their Latin American Division came from the central administrative office of the International Broadcasting Service. As Mr. Bauer, with a separate budget for his Division, which has nothing to do with Messrs. Baldanza and Ayers' budget, allotted a portion of his budget for the preparation of Latin American platter programs. It is this portion of Mr. Bauer's budget that is under discussion.

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Bauer received a temporary allocation of contractual funds from the central administrative office on July 16, 1952, totaling \$498,655 for the entire year, covering all platter programs for all areas of the world. In August of 1952 the Program Allocation Board in Washington cut approximately \$150,000 from Mr. Bauer's platter budget. On September 17, 1952, Mr. Bauer was given a new figure of \$352,386 for his platter operation by the central administrative office. On September 26, 1952, Mr. Baldanza addressed a memorandum to Mr. Bauer, with carbon copy to me, requesting "word as to what funds are to be allocated to the Inter American Service for platters." Mr. Baldanza also added that he had requested this knowledge "almost a month ago." Mr. Bauer, who had received his final figure for the total Field Services Division on September 17, replied in a memorandum to Mr. Baldanza dated October 1, 1952, carbon copy of which went to me, informing Mr. Baldanza that "allocations for package programs in Spanish and Portuguese, made on the basis of the budget now confirmed for the Field Services Division for [through] the second quarter, total \$30,942.70." Mr. Bauer in that same memorandum informed Mr. Baldanza that "when our budget information for the balance of the year is more definite, we will forward program breakdowns for the third and fourth quarters." To the best of my recollection, it was between these two memoranda, the one of Mr. Baldanza dated September 26, 1952, and Mr. Bauer's to Mr. Baldanza of October

1, 1952, that I as program manager stepped into the picture and instructed Mr. Bauer to make known the apportionments he had made for preparation of transcriptions to the various areas of the world. Since Mr. Bauer had received his final figure only on September 17 and he replied on October 1 to a request of September 26, I do not feel that an inordinately long amount of time passed before he made such information known and carried out my order. Moreover, I point out again, this amount of money—\$30,942.70 through the second quarter—does not represent an allotment to Messrs. Baldanza and Ayers' Division but an apportionment of Mr. Bauer's total funds for Latin-American transcribed programs for which he is responsible. I should point out in passing that Mr. Bauer in making his allocations, allotted \$30,995.60 (final figure) for Latin-American transcriptions, \$13,463.74 for transcriptions to be sent to Europe, \$22,685.25 for transcriptions to be sent to the Near East, and \$21,813.52 for transcriptions to be sent to the Far East. A sum of \$2,290 was allotted for worldwide English transcriptions. You will note that the Latin-American transcription work was given a fair share of the total allotment.

## II. THE EYE OF THE EAGLE

Mr. Ayers testified to the effect that when he learned about his allocation for the first and second quarters of the fiscal year, the expenditure for the Eye of the Eagle "turned out to be almost our entire budget." Once again he referred to our entire budget. He should have referred to the allocation Mr. Bauer made for transcribed programs for Latin America. It is true that Mr. Bauer told Mr. Baldanza in the same memorandum of October 1, 1952, quoted above that "the Eye of the Eagle in 13 half-hour programs in each language is estimated at \$14,643.85 for Spanish and \$13,985.85 for Portuguese. There remains a balance of \$2,313."

Mr. Ayers characterized The Eye of the Eagle as "a juvenile program" and in general lacking anti-Communist material. You heard me describe the program as soap opera, corn, Dick Tracy thrillers depicting the American hero victorious over injustice and evil having Russian names. The scripts which I have read since Mr. Ayers' testimony, convince me that (a) they are anti-Communist in nature, and (b) that they represent the sugar-coated pill. What is more significant, however, is the fact that 20 posts in Latin America requested this program for placement with radio stations in their areas. Here are a few brief quotes from messages to the Voice from radio officers in South America:

Asuncion, Paraguay—"The Embassy has already requested complete shipment of the series The Eye of the Eagle in its operational memorandum of December 17, 1952. The request is hereby repeated—for two sets in Spanish."

Bogota, Colombia—"These programs are particularly effective and this Embassy would appreciate receiving \* \* \* as well as The Eye of the Eagle. Dramatic shows are the most popular in Colombia."

Caracas, Venezuela—"The Embassy has reported so frequently on the success of these programs that it is unnecessary to repeat the praise. The demand is constant; the greatest difficulty is supplying that demand. At present the Embassy has requested, or is receiving, the following programs (among them is listed The Eye of the Eagle)."

Guatemala, Guatemala—"Three sets of each of the six programs listed \* \* \* are requested by the Mission. This includes three sets of the complete series The Eye of the Eagle."

Lima, Peru—"As stated in the Embassy's Operations Memorandum of January 13, 1953 \* \* \* The Eye of the Eagle in Spanish (three sets) is definitely required at this post, as are any other Spanish-language dramatic shows, particularly if they carry some pertinent message."

Managua, Nicaragua—"Dramatic programs such as Pension Rodriguez, the Clark Family, The Eye of the Eagle, and Alma D' America, are believed to have the greatest effect in Nicaragua from the standpoint of USIE (United States Information and Education) aims."

I should point out in all fairness that Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires (Peron's country) turned the series down. But the important point to remember is that Mr. Bauer, acting in accordance with the manual of operations, was fulfilling the requests of field officers.

I might point out additionally that The Eye of the Eagle may in a sense be considered the successor to fabulously popular program sponsored by Nelson Rockefeller during World War II in Latin America, called Counter-Spy. My own personal point of view on programs of this type is that they are not the most effective, yet a useful device in accomplishing United States objectives.

And finally, it should not be forgotten that my examination of The Eye of the Eagle scripts reveals that they all bear the signature of the transcription officer in Messrs. Baldanza and Ayers' Latin American Division, indicating approval and acceptance of the series and the scripts.

### III. WERE CHANGES MADE OR NOT?

The brunt of Mr. Ayers' testimony was that he attempted to strengthen these programs by inserting stronger anti-Communist terms. My check of the scripts in question reveals that ordinarily the changes recommended by the Latin American Division, of which Mr. Ayers is Assistant Chief, were made by Mr. Bauer's division. In script No. 26 of The Eye of the Eagle, which Mr. Ayers described and which resulted in a memo dated October 14, 1952, containing the words "we don't want to waste our money on pap when we can use it for bullets," there appears to have been a hassle between personnel of the Baldanza-Ayers division and the Bauer division. This, to the best of my recollection, was not called to my attention nor have I ever seen the memorandum of October 14 which was allegedly withdrawn at the request of Field Services. Apparently the "seven mentions of the name Communist in the script" recommended by Mr. Ayers' people were not made by Mr. Bauer's personnel. At least the Spanish version was returned from the producer without the changes made. The platter was again auditioned by Mr. Ayers' people and accepted. My only explanation in retrospect of the failure of Mr. Bauer's people to accept the suggested changes is that (a) a point which was adequately made in the script was being belabored unnecessarily, and (b) jurisdictional strife had arisen between the personnel of the two divisions, which as you know is possible wherever any group of people, particularly temperamental people, are concerned.

### IV. MY ACTION IN THIS MATTER

Mr. Ayers stated in his testimony "we reported to him [Puhan] on other difficulties we had with the Overseas Branch, but not this in particular, not on the individual scripts." He was asked by Senator Potter, "Was he [Puhan] sympathetic to your recommendations?" Mr. Ayers replied, "Yes, I think so. He said that he would be the referee of the discussions that we had." Mr. Ayers went on to state, "Mr. Puhan directed that Overseas not do any programs without our approval and by that time our money had been all spent, so the direction was academic." My observation is that if the matter involving a script or the entire series had become a major issue between these divisions, they should have reported it to me at once. I am, as Mr. Ayers stated, and always have been sympathetic to the reactions of the broadcasting divisions. I have repeatedly felt and stated that since the broadcasting divisions, of which Messrs. Baldanza and Ayers represent one, have the experts, they can pass judgment on not only their own programs but the transcribed programs prepared by Mr. Bauer and his division. As a matter of fact, I find in my files a little note in my hand which reads, "I want a meeting with Bauer, Baldanza, A. Foulke, S. Ayers and any others on this right after election and I will lay down the law." Incidentally, the reference to "right after election" has no significance other than that I was terribly busy with the running of the broadcasting of the United States election coverage by the VOA. After VOA had covered the election and I was prepared to go on with my meeting, I received assurances from both Mr. Baldanza and Mr. Bauer that relations between the two divisions were now excellent. I find another note in my hand which reads, "Believe this is all settled now—frequent conferences between Bauer and Baldanza are the order of the day. A. P."

### V. LOYALTY

Although I do not have access to the security files of any of my personnel, and never have had such access, I have never been given by anyone substantial evidence that Mr. Bauer, Mr. Baldanza, and Mr. Ayers are in any sense disloyal. My opinion based on observations of their work over a matter of some time is that they are all three loyal American citizens. As for Mr. Ayers' intimation that Bauer was empire building and usurping authority, let me point out that Mr. Bauer did not ask for his job, and that furthermore he personally requested some time ago a management survey to study his particular operation, with the view of possible decentralization of his Division to the broadcasting divisions. This does not sound like an empire builder to me.

## VI. PROMOTIONS

Mr. Ayers reported in his testimony that Mr. Bauer was promoted while his promotion is in "an acting status." Here are the facts:

Mr. Robert A. Bauer began his work with the Voice of America in 1942 as a CAF-11. Since that time he has held a variety of positions of increasing importance in the Voice of America. He received his promotion on the 21st of December 1952 in a position which had been classified as GS-15 in October 1950. The point I am making is twofold: (a) That he moved from a CAF-11 to a GS-15 in the course of 10 years; (b) that he had demonstrated his ability in a position which was classified as GS-15 in 1950, that he received his promotion in 1952.

Mr. Stuart Ayers came to me as a radio script writer in November 1950 at CAF-11, part time. On the 4th of March 1951, he was given a full-time assignment at CAF-11. On the 3d of February 1952, less than 1 year later, he was promoted to GS-13. On the 16th of January 1953 (long before I had any indication that Mr. Stuart Ayers would ever appear as a witness before any subcommittee) I submitted an action to the classification section of the New York regional administrative office for the promotion of Mr. Ayers to GS-14. It would appear from the above, and I am sure Mr. Ayers would corroborate this, that he has had the most sympathetic backing from me and that he may even be considered a rapid promotion case. The fact that he does not have a GS-14, the fact that my recommendation of the 16th of January 1953 to promote him to this position has not been effected, is completely out of my hands. It concerns the determination by the classification section, not under my control, whether the position which Mr. Ayers holds should be a GS-14 and whether he is qualified under civil-service rules and regulations to receive what I have recommended.

I attribute the incident or incidents which Mr. Ayers described in his testimony to a number of factors. (1) The normal desire of some division chiefs, in this case Baldanza and Ayers, for recognition of the importance of their area and their work; (2) a desire to do a most effective job, but with conflicting opinions on how this should be done; (3) some misconceptions and misunderstandings; (4) to a particular situation where feelings apparently reached a high pitch and where I, with good reason but apparently mistakenly, believed that the situation had been rectified. I decidedly do not attribute it to subversive activities on the part of any of the people concerned.


I have not consulted either Mr. Bauer, the Chief of the Field Program Services Division, or Mr. Ayers, the Assistant Chief of the Latin American Division, in preparing this explanation. These observations are my own and are based entirely on my knowledge of this situation. As I stated during my testimony, I consider Mr. Bauer, Mr. Baldanza, and Mr. Ayers to be good public servants, who have all contributed a valuable share in making the Voice of America an effective instrument in carrying out United States foreign policy. I should add that Mr. Ayers, in my opinion, has misunderstood the functions of Mr. Bauer's division.

I cannot express too deeply my profound regret that this matter became an issue before a Senate subcommittee, particularly since I have always thought highly of all three people involved.

Sincerely yours,

ALFRED PUHAN,  
*Program Manager, Broadcasting Service.*

INTERNATIONAL RADIO PROGRAMMING (2/24/53)



## SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

No. 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,  
*Washington, April 13, 1953.*

Senator JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,  
*Chairman, Senate Investigations Subcommittee,  
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: During the hearings before your subcommittee, March 3, 4, and 5, at which I appeared as a witness, you invited me to submit additional information. I am now availing myself of this opportunity by submitting with this letter a statement and documentary exhibits relating to matters discussed during the hearings.

I request that the statement and the accompanying documents be included in the record of the hearings published as part of the printed record.

Sincerely yours,

REED HARRIS,  
*Deputy Administrator.*

## STATEMENT BY REED HARRIS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, IIA

At the end of my 3 days of testimony before this committee, March 3, 4, and 5, I was invited by the chairman to return or otherwise to furnish the committee with such additional information as I might wish. I am responding to that invitation with this statement, because I want to supply the committee with any and all information it may need in order to render its final report. I have done what I could to speed the answering of the various inquiries the chairman has addressed to the IIA over the past month; and I will continue to supply information both personal and official to meet the needs of the committee.

At the outset, it is important that these points be clearly stated:

I, Reed Harris, have always believed firmly in our American way of life, in our Constitution, our traditions, our Government.

Like many other American citizens I have served honestly, loyally, and honorably in civilian and military branches of our Government.

I have sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States. I have never betrayed that trust for one single instant.

I have demonstrated my anti-Communist attitude time and again through working wholeheartedly in the anti-Communist programs to which I have been assigned.

These things are provable. My actions—my deeds—have already proved their truth beyond contention.

The theme of some of the questions which have been raised in these hearings is that because a part of my writing in college and just after was immature, now, 20 or more years later, doubts may exist concerning my fitness for Government service. I resent deeply any such un-American, unfair implication.

I remind the committee that I have said that the truth is on my side. The documents which accompany this statement will help to prove the truth. They will help to demonstrate, for instance, what I have testified to under oath, that I am proud to be a patriotic American, and that I am not, never have been, and never have wanted to be a Communist or a Communist sympathizer.

I do not want or expect the committee or the American public to rely only upon my own word concerning my loyalty, my character, my performance as a public servant. For this reason I have assembled the statements of a few of the representative Americans who have known me and worked with me.

At this point, I request that the full texts of the letters, listed below and furnished herewith, be published as part of the record of these hearings. The list follows:

From Edward N. Mayer, Jr., respected businessman, winner of the highest honors in the American direct-mail advertising field, a consultant to the IIA and the predecessor organization from 1951 until the present.

From Vernon A. McGee, budget officer of the State of Texas, letter bearing an attestation by Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, president of Pennsylvania State College. (Mr. McGee, under Dr. Eisenhower, was my supervisor in the OWI.)

From Thurman L. Barnard, former leading advertising executive and former general manager of the international information and education exchange program, presently a consultant to the Department of State.

From John S. Sickels, Esq., a friend for 23 years, Republican and counsel for the national fraternity of Phi Gamma Delta, in which I have maintained an active interest.

From the Reverend George B. Ford, well-known priest in the New York diocese, who was adviser to Catholic students at Columbia University when I attended.

From Dr. Luther H. Evans, Librarian of Congress, who was a senior executive in the WPA national headquarters when I was a junior executive there.

From Edward W. Barrett, leading editorial consultant, who was Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1949 to 1952.

From Dr. Herbert E. Evans, vice president and general manager, People's Broadcasting Co. of Columbus, Ohio, who was adviser to Protestant students at Columbia University in 1932.

From the Honorable Joseph D. McGoldrick, well-known official in New York State and New York City administrations, currently rent control director for Gov. Thomas E. Dewey; formerly a professor at Columbia University, and currently a fellow director with me of the National Self-Government Committee, Inc.

From Mrs. Thomas Parran, wife of the former Surgeon General, a writer and lecturer in her own right who served with me in the OWI during World War II.

From E. R. Freedman, foreign news editor of the New York Times, who worked with me at Columbia University, 1929-32, and in OWI, 1942-44.

From Dr. Richard D. Weigle, president of St. John's College, Annapolis, Md., who served in the Department of State, 1946 to 1948.

From Lawrence S. Morris, cultural attaché of the American Embassy in Paris, who served in WPA, OWI, and the State Department and has known me for 17 years.

From Dr. Albert James McCartney, religious adviser to the HIA, former member of the Chaplains' Corps, United States Naval Reserve, and a trustee of Princeton Theological Seminary.

From Dr. Wilson Compton, former president of Washington State College, and administrator of the HIA from January 1952, to February 1953.

In addition, there are many career officers in the Federal Government who would testify to my character, my loyalty, and my efficiency as a Federal officer if the need arose. These men—whether Democrats, Republicans, or Independents—have been fully satisfied regarding my loyalty, my good character, my honest hard work, and they have so demonstrated by giving me excellent efficiency ratings, by promoting me, by entrusting me with positions of responsibility and sensitivity.

Superiors who are not career men have submitted statements among those listed above. Mr. Thurman L. Barnard, my superior during 1951, who in past years as an advertising executive guided the million dollar advertising campaigns of such corporations as the Ford Motor Co. and Procter & Gamble, says about me, in part:

"If loyalty consists of a devotion to the principles of our country; of living a life that sets an example to others for character, integrity, and uprightness; of dedication to a job of the utmost importance in today's world and an intelligent understanding of the needs of that job and willingness to make every possible sacrifice to fulfill them—then Reed Harris is a loyal man—and this country is fortunate to have him in public service."

The issue of communism was drawn into the hearings during earlier sessions, and I was asked when I had become anti-Communist, as though I had once been pro-Communist. Yet, in spite of implications in such statements and questions, neither my hastily written 21-year-old book King Football, nor the editorial columns of the Columbia Spectator during my editorial year, 1931-32, supported communism. Nothing I have done in my lifetime has been done to serve the aims of the Communist Party.

"I have watched Mr. Harris in operation and sincerely and firmly believe that he is not only a good public servant but as thoroughly pro-American and anti-Communist as anyone I've met in the entire Government service," says Edward N. Mayer, Jr., member of a local Republican executive committee in the State of Connecticut, president of James Gray, Inc., and a consultant to the HIA since 1951.

It is time that there be general recognition that honest, loyal performance as a Government employee is worthy of impartial evaluation by fair people.

No one has questioned my honesty; and letters mentioned above show that reputable people regard my honesty as unimpeachable.

Throughout my Government career, I have diligently sought ways to secure maximum results from the expenditure of public funds.

Although I shall not argue here at length the charges made that large sums have been wasted by the IIA, of which I am an officer, I believe history will show these charges have been greatly exaggerated and are in some cases utterly false.

As several persons who have observed my Government work—T. L. Barnard, Vernon McGee, Dr. Luther Evans, and L. S. Morris—indicate in the statements submitted, my planning and managing have been devoted to efficiency so that the best possible value could be obtained for each of the taxpayers' dollars.

Mr. Barnard's only complaint, as he says in his letter, was that I "worked too hard and too long hours." He adds:

"Decisions to change procedures for greater efficiency but often with pain to people involved, are not easy but Harris made them. \* \* \*[His] decisions to reduce expenditures on certain marginal operations in order to increase expenditures for checking and evaluation were in the interest of a more effective United States psychological activity."

Dr. Evans says:

"Mr. Harris was careful in his management of Government property; he was cautious in the employment of people; he was devoted to the public interest."

I have served as one of the vast majority of State Department career employees who have carried out orders loyally throughout their service.

A loyal Government career employee is much like a soldier. A soldier's performance, whether he be private or colonel, is not judged by the political views of the commanding general.

The career employee must carry out orders; if he didn't, he would not be doing his duty. The career employees of State will carry out the orders of Mr. Dulles as they did those of Mr. Acheson or General Marshall, Mr. Byrnes, or Mr. Stimson. Such employees should be judged by their own individual performances. They should not be subjected to criticism because someone doesn't like the political attitudes of their superior officers. Otherwise, there can be no effective career service.

In my own Government service, I not only have avoided improper partisan politics but I have made sure that all my activities of whatever nature were open to the examination of my superior officers. For instance, in 1947 when the New York Journal American published a short article representing my Columbia activities as "Red," in addition to asking my lawyer to consider action against the paper for this misrepresentation, I passed the article immediately (April 15), accompanied by background information, to the State Department security officer, Robert Bannerman, and followed this with a memorandum of May 26 in which I said:

"I have been glad to know that CSA (the security office) has followed up on this matter and has been reinvestigating my background with thoroughness \* \* \*. I would like to see the matter carried as far as may be necessary to remove any possible doubts in anyone's mind." (I added details concerning organizations with which I had been active, etc.)

The questioning during the hearings before this committee has made much of my experience as a college newspaper editor at Columbia University over 21 years ago. One attached letter, from the priest who was religious adviser to Catholic students at Columbia when I was editor, will show that there was nothing abnormal or communistic about my performance. A second letter, from Dr. Herbert E. Evans, who was religious adviser to Protestant students at Columbia at the same time, also shows that my editorship reflected the spirit of the times; and that I did not follow the Communist Party line.

The picture of my Columbia College career has been strangely distorted in the hearings. Actually I was an average student, a member of the student governing board and of other key boards and committees, and was president of my fraternity chapter (Phi Gamma Delta).

An official of the State of New York who was a Columbia professor when I was in college, the Honorable Joseph D. McGoldrick, has this to say:

"I have never known anyone who knew him either at Columbia or in later years who expressed doubt as to his character or loyalty as an American citizen."

The chairman asked me whether I was a member of the Social Problems Club, which was the radical group on the Columbia campus. I replied that I was not aware of having been a member, although I had not had an opportunity to check the records. Since then I have checked the available records and find that my previous recollection is confirmed. To the best of my recollection, I never joined or contributed to that organization, even during the period in April 1932 when

campus feelings were at a high point because of my suspension; and I had never associated with the club in my 4 years as a student.

Much has been made also of the book King Football, written in 3 weeks, shortly after I left Columbia in 1932 while I was still steaming from what I felt was rough treatment given to me by the university. The fact is the book is principally an exposé of the commercialism of college football and other athletics, with some comments on the standardization of education.

The references to the word "Communist" in this book are tied to the subject of academic freedom—the right of teachers of all political faiths to teach. In the book I took the same position that Senator Taft has recently taken, that both Communists and Socialists should be allowed to teach in the schools and colleges. I have since come to the belief that Communist Party members, since they form in effect a plain clothes auxiliary of the Soviet Red Army, do not belong in the teaching staff of any college or school in America.

I testified, and state again here, that I have repudiated this book; but that repudiation is as much because of the tone of the book, which is too one-sidedly sarcastic, too bitter, too "know it all"—as it is because of half-baked political opinions, which are few and far between in its pages.

As I indicated in 1933 to the late George Bernard Shaw when sending him a copy of King Football in reply to a postal-card request he sent me from Scotland, I recognized even then that the tone of the book was unfortunate. I told Mr. Shaw that my publisher had wanted me to give the book the tone of youthful fury and that I had not found it easy to maintain such a tone.

During the 1932 to 1934 period, I served in several writing and advertising positions. Since left-wing publications love to grab popular publicity, I am sure my Columbia publicity would have given me quick entree to their staffs, but I did not desire and did not seek such connections. I served as a reporter on the anti-Communist New York Journal American. I wrote features for the anti-Communist King Features Syndicate and the anti-Communist New York Sunday Mirror. I worked and wrote for business organizations having no political interests—an advertising agency, Badger and Browning and Hersey; another, Robert Mack, Inc.; a medical publication, Diabetes; a pulp quarterly, Green Book Quarterly; the North American Newspaper Alliance; the NEA Syndicate.

From 1934 to 1938 I served in Washington as an executive editor for WPA and its predecessor. In his letter, previously listed, the Librarian of Congress, Dr. Luther Evans, then an historian supervising the WPA historical records survey, makes this comment on my service in WPA:

"I can say with a clear conscience that I found Mr. Harris to be an extraordinarily upstanding and patriotic administrator. He was devoted to the task set before him; he was honest and honorable in all of his dealings with me; and he had a reputation among those who knew him of being the same way to all of the persons with whom he dealt. Mr. Harris was careful in his management of Government property; he was cautious in the employment of people; he was devoted to the public interest. In short, he was one of the finest examples of a loyal and able American citizen giving complete devotion to a difficult job who ever came to my notice."

In 1937, as was mentioned in the hearings, I was listed as a sponsor of an "alumni homecoming dinner" run by the American Student Union but featuring names of people, not all of whom were members, who had achieved prominence as students over a period of years. I do not remember contributing to that dinner, although I may have contributed a small amount. But I also note that among the sponsors listed were at least two men who subsequently became well known as anti-Communists outside the Government; and that one man listed is today an anti-Communist United States Senator himself.

Two of the men listed, known to Senator McCarthy, were the late Benjamin Stolberg, an anti-Communist writer for the American Mercury and other publications; and John Chamberlain, editor recently of the magazine, the New Freeman.

On this list of sponsors with my name, in addition to the two men listed above, there was the name of a man who is now a member of the Senate, the Honorable Paul H. Douglas.

Now, if the list has these three names on it, does the presence of my name on that list turn me into a Communist sympathizer, as has been implied?

The record of the hearing also gives some implication that I was an editor of Direction, which was referred to as a Communist-front publication. This must be based on misunderstanding. I was listed, as part of the semiofficial duties of my position as assistant national director of the Federal writers project of WPA, as a member of the special honorary editorial board for one single issue

of the magazine Direction, that single issue having been bought out by friends of the WPA (a committee including Franklin P. Adams and other prominent writers) to permit publication of the work of WPA writers. I was listed on this board as a courtesy only. I did not select the magazine's contents, nor did I have anything to do with the regular editorial board of the magazine.

The committee staff also discovered a fact about this period of my life which I have reported previously to investigative agencies of the Government—that I belonged for a short period to an organization called the League of American Writers in 1938. I do not remember exactly how long I was a member, but it cannot have been more than a few weeks. More than a year later, late in 1939, the league was reported to be dominated by the Communist Party; but that was after I had resigned. At the time I was made a member (my name having been sent in by a fellow officer of the Federal writers project on his own initiative) a number of other non-Communist authors also became members. Mr. Louis Bromfield, the well-known Republican writer of Ohio, was on the same list of new members of the league on which my name appears. (See Bulletin of the League of American Writers, May 1938.) The name that followed mine on the list was Ernest Hemingway. To imply that an organization in which Bromfield and Hemingway held membership was at that time known to be Communist is to give an erroneous impression.

It was because I noted a Communist trend, and some Communist names, in the League of American Writers that I resigned from it, just as Mr. Bromfield did. Like many other non-Communist American writers, I wanted no part of a Communist organization. The organization kept me on its mailing list for some time after my resignation and I find a notation in my records that I had to write four times to get finally off the list. A rough copy of one letter is still in my files, and it restates the fact that I did not want my opinions made for me, especially by people following the Communist Party line.

I testified that in 1938 I left the American guide project of the WPA principally because I felt Communist-dominated unions had gained too much control over some local units of the project, especially that in New York. I had protested over that situation but had been unable to convince an easy-going superior that strong action was called for. An exhibit previously submitted to the committee is a memorandum I addressed to this superior, Henry Alsberg, urging him to take action to prevent domination of certain local projects by Communist-led "unions."

In view of my inability to get action, I welcomed an opportunity to go back into private business early in 1938 with Robbins Travel House of New York.

In 1939 I returned to Government service in the National Emergency Council, which shortly became the Office of Government Reports, both agencies being concerned with explaining the work of all Federal agencies to the general public, and facilitating relations of such agencies with the general public. My New York office aided businessmen in their dealings with the Government. As a result, I was invited by such businessmen to join the Sales Executive Club of New York and was a member for 2 years. During about the same period, I was a member of the Affiliated Young Democrats of New York, an anti-Communist organization. It was partly at my urging that the Affiliated Young Democrats combined their 1940 State convention with a national defense rally to gain the support of young people for the efforts of President Roosevelt to offset the diabolical effects of the Hitler-Stalin pact by rendering aid short of war to Great Britain, France, and their allies.

I joined the Committee To Defend America by Aiding the Allies at this time, subsequently attending several meetings of New York units, and making one talk for the committee.

In 1942 I went to Washington to serve in the OWI as chief of management planning. The work of my division saved the organization over \$300,000 by improving methods and procedures before I left to serve in the Army Air Force in 1944.

My Army career was a conventional one for a man over 30 who entered the service after January 1941. I was given no opportunity to go overseas, but had an honorable service record, including a short period of military intelligence training and over a year in public relations.

When I returned to civilian Government service in December 1945, I was assigned to the Department of State, where I worked as a management consultant, including a period with Maj. Gen. Otto Nelson and Col. Carl Humelsine, working on improvement of organization, methods, and procedures of the Department. I was made Chief of Communications in 1947, a position in which great attention had to be given constantly to security problems. The records will show that my

division, and I personally, maintained an excellent record for preserving security regulations throughout my service. We frequently worked with the Department's security officers in tracing and correcting faults in handling or use of communications; and we cooperated fully with all investigative procedures.

My experience in reorganizing and improving operations was put to further use when I moved to the Division of Publications in 1949; and again when I moved to the international information and educational exchange program in August 1950. From that time until this, I have worked extremely hard to help my chiefs achieve improved efficiency in conducting their worldwide fight against international communism. Like other top officers of IIA, I have devoted many hundreds of hours of unpaid overtime to the work. The letters of T. L. Barnard, Wilson Compton, Edward Barrett, Albert McCartney, and Lawrence Morris will testify to the character of my service.

Several witnesses, including myself, were questioned regarding a recent operating decision of the IIA—proposed discontinuance of the Hebrew language broadcasts beamed to Israel by the Voice of America. There seems no need to go into the subject at length here, but in the interest of accuracy, I have developed a statement clearly setting forth the chronology of events leading to the proposed elimination of these broadcasts. This chronology, which I submit for the information of the committee and request be published in the record at the conclusion of my statement, shows that the value of Hebrew broadcasts had long been questioned; that the original proposal for discontinuance was made by VOA officials in New York, was then raised in priority by a board of IIA officers including Administrator Wilson Compton; and was ultimately carried to the point of a flat order by me, as Acting Administrator.

It is worth noting that as recently as March 25, 1953, the VOA officials were again including Hebrew in the list of languages to be eliminated to meet necessary budget cuts.

In a memorandum dated March 25, Mr. Alfred Pulhan of VOA listed eight services, including Hebrew, to be eliminated to meet budget requirements. An accompanying statement indicated by order of priority that the VOA considers broadcasting in Hebrew less effective than broadcasting in Burmese, Urdu, Hindi, Italian, German, Spanish to Latin America, Turkish, Vietnamese, and many other languages.

Note also that a news dispatch from Tel Aviv, published in the New York Times of April 5, 1953, reporting the effectiveness of the IIA book and library programs in Israel and commenting on our other activities there, says this about VOA broadcasts:

"The least effective United States propaganda medium here is probably the Voice of America. Not because of shortcomings of its programs, but because Israelis prefer reading to listening and, when they do listen, prefer their own station or European stations that are easier to pick up than the Voice. A local resident who questioned 200 persons in Tel Aviv a few weeks ago found only 1 who had ever listened to the Voice of America."

During committee questioning concerning books in IIA overseas libraries, a non-Government witness said that she had been unable to find in a USIS library such an excellent anti-Communist book as Edward Hunter's Brain Washing in Red China. I was surprised by this statement since I know that IIA secured a special printing of 10,000 copies of this book for overseas libraries and for presentation to leading citizens in a number of countries. Additional copies were secured for domestic staff use.

Although I do not myself participate in book selection, I did become interested in this particular hard-hitting anti-Communist volume. I recommended it strongly to IIA staff officers in a memorandum dated May 2, 1952, as follows:

"Some of you are familiar with the important book by Edward Hunter entitled "Brain Washing in Red China" (Vanguard Press). ICS has sent to the field a considerable number of copies (the ICS supply is exhausted). I think it would be worthwhile for every key officer in IIA to read the book from cover to cover.

"Propaganda techniques of the Soviet and Chinese Communists are covered in considerable detail by Mr. Hunter and there is especially useful information on Chinese Communist publications.

"In Mr. Hunter's reporting of techniques in use in Communist China there are many parallels with the fictional predictions in George Orwell's 1984.

"All editors and writers will find especially interesting the chapter on Publications, beginning on page 206, in which symbols, themes, and methods are fully explored.

"The extent and viciousness of the 'Hate America' campaign in China is covered more fully in this book than in any other source I have seen."

I have cooperated fully and wholeheartedly with congressional committees throughout my Government career. I have never publicly questioned the conduct of any congressional hearing or other proceeding until the one-sided picture of IIA activities and my own personal history made it necessary for me to point out that in the current proceeding an inaccurate picture was being painted for the public. I am hopeful that this statement and other information being submitted through witnesses or in writing will help correct the lack of balance, before this series of hearings is concluded.

APRIL 13, 1953.

REED HARRIS.

#### CHRONOLOGY REGARDING PROPOSED SUSPENSION OF HEBREW LANGUAGE BROADCASTS

*November 30, 1951.*—Usefulness of Hebrew language broadcasts was questioned in a written report by public affairs officer in Tel Aviv, who said USIS in Israel could make more progress if it were to receive the equivalent of money used for Hebrew radio programs for use in other ways. He said that according to reports he had received, Hebrew broadcasts had fewer listeners in the whole country than the average number of persons who visited the USIS library in Tel Aviv in 1 day (600 persons).

*May 14, 1952.*—Foreign Service inspector, long trained in international information techniques, reported that Hebrew is ineffective as a broadcast language from outside the country. He called VOA Hebrew language service a marginal operation; said that if any cut had to be made in any type of IIA service to Israel, the cut should be made in VOA.

*July 10-19, 1952.*—As a result of appropriations action by the Congress, the total 1953 funds available for VOA operations were cut from the President's budget figure of \$30 million to \$22,165,000, making necessary many adjustments in VOA operations. Administrator Compton asked VOA to recommend ways in which it could absorb the cut, so VOA filed two undated memoranda during the July 10-19 period. Each memorandum included the item: "Elimination of Hebrew language service to Israel." The second memorandum listed items in VOA's suggested order of priority, placing Hebrew as No. 13 in a list of 15.

*July 21, 1952.*—The Program Allocation Board, chaired by the Administrator, met and a decision was made to suspend Hebrew language broadcasts to Israel. The following day the VOA was notified by the Administrator. The decision was based primarily on the following consideration:

1. Comparative smallness of audiences in relation to costs of regular language service.

2. Only 14 percent of Israelis are native born; the large majority have another native language which they use in their families. (Audience mail received by VOA from Israel—and it totaled only 881 letters in the first year of Hebrew language broadcasts—included 595 letters in English, only 198 in Hebrew. Other languages: German, 35; French, 16; Arabic, 11; Turkish, 7; miscellaneous, 19.)

3. Existence of good press service. (Israel's 17 newspapers are served by UP, AP, INS, and Reuters; several papers have American correspondents. Surveys indicate that 67 percent of Israelis rely primarily on newspaper for international news, only 22 percent on radio.)

4. Weakness of VOA signal being delivered to Israel. (This has been corrected to some extent since that time by relay transmissions from the U. S. C. G. *Courier*, anchored at Rhodes.)

5. Effectiveness of other IIA-USIS services in Israel, including book distribution, press service, library operation.

*August 11, 1952.*—IBS Director, in long memorandum to Deputy Administrator, appealed PAB action, including suspension of Hebrew: "IBS recommends against this step, not for programing reasons, but rather as a matter of public relations."

*August 12, 1952.*—Chaired by Administrator, the Program Allocation Board reconsidered the orders affecting allocations to the Voice of America, and agreed that the Portuguese and Hebrew broadcasts could be continued for a time pending development of further information. New field reports had raised a question about the advisability of cutting out Portuguese. Several persons had pointed out that cutting out Hebrew during a national election campaign could cause not only domestic political reactions of unknown effect, but might inject some

issue of anti-Semitism into the campaign which would receive wide attention overseas and be damaging to the objectives of the program.

*October-November 1952.*—The Administrator, before leaving on a trip abroad in mid-October, had left instructions that the Program Allocation Board should meet and find ways to adjust the programs of all media so that the transition from 1953 to 1954 would not be too difficult. The Bureau of the Budget had cut the 1954 request sharply and it was apparent that IIA could not continue its 1953 rate of expenditure to the end of the fiscal year without facing disaster early in fiscal year 1954. Also, another factor had entered the situation when the budget office of the Department of State ordered IIA to make available the unexpectedly large sum of \$1,150,000 extra to the Department to cover "administrative support." To do this, cuts in media programs would be necessary. Therefore, the elimination of Hebrew, and many other economies, were considered by the PAB, and plans were laid for putting the economies into effect.

*December 2, 1952.*—The special assistant to the Administrator, Mr. Micocci, in checking to see whether agreed cuts had been made, discovered that the VOA had not yet done anything toward cutting out Hebrew. He therefore checked informally with the chief of the Department's Israel Desk and with a member of the Public Affairs Staff of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. He determined that the program considerations which had pointed to suspension of Hebrew language broadcasts had remained unchanged. Accordingly, on December 2 he wrote to the Chief of the Radio Programs Division of the Voice asking him to take further action. Because of some uncertainty in New York as to whether they were being invited or ordered to suspend Hebrew, those in charge sent a wire to the Acting Administrator, Mr. Harris, asking for clarification and calling attention to what they felt would be the public relations implications of suspension.

*December 5, 1952.*—The Acting Administrator sent a memorandum to the Acting Director of the Voice ordering suspension of Hebrew.

*December 11, 1952.*—The Acting Director of the Voice said in a memorandum that necessary steps were being taken to comply with the order by January 15, 1953, but pointed out that in the opinion of the Voice officials the public relations problem had not been accurately assessed in Washington.

*January 2, 1953.*—The Director of the Voice, having returned from Europe, addressed a memorandum to the Administrator, IIA (also back from overseas) stating that "IBS does not deem the Hebrew service its most significant broadcast by any means" but recommending that any suspension be held up until the new Administration could consider the idea. The Admiinistrator of the IIA, Dr. Compton, decided to hold off temporarily, but wrote on a copy of the memorandum "Had the PAB not better act on this as soon as the President's state of the Union message is out?" The result was to postpone suspension of the broadcasts until the PAB could reconsider the matter. PAB meetings on the subject were scheduled for February 4 and 11 but had to be postponed owing to the pressure of other events.

*February 5, 1953.*—Administrator Compton wrote to Senator Wiley, in response to the Senator's inquiry, that the proposed suspension of Hebrew was being examined in the light of:

"\* \* \* the effectiveness and adequacy of all the media used in our information program in Israel, including broadcasts audible in Israel in languages other than Hebrew.

"If these activities give sufficient coverage to Israel at less cost, the discontinuance of broadcasting in the Hebrew language would be a prudent step to take.

"Until a decision is reached, the Hebrew language broadcasts are being continued."

*March 25, 1953.*—The Chief of International Radio Programming, Mr. Puhan, listed a series of reductions which could be made to meet the "Dodge cuts" in the 1954 budget. Mr. Puhan's list would eliminate Hebrew and the following other language services: Portuguese to Portugal, Spanish to Spain, Brazilian, Thai, Malay, French, and Finnish. An accompanying statement listed other languages which would be eliminated if additional cuts should become necessary. These included Urdu, Hindi, Vietnamese, Japanese, Turkish, Indonesian, Italian, German, Spanish to Latin America, and additional languages.

The new Voice estimate said annual savings from cutting out Hebrew would be \$123,532. (Figures mentioned earlier in the hearings were as low as \$12,000).

*April 5, 1953.*—The New York Times carried a dispatch from its Tel Aviv cor-

respondent describing the United States information program in Israel. After commenting on the marked effectiveness of the libraries and publications programs, the dispatch goes on to comment on the Voice of America:

"The least effective United States propaganda medium here is probably the Voice of America. Not because of shortcomings of its programs, but because Israelis prefer reading to listening and, when they do listen, prefer their own station or European stations that are easier to pick up than the Voice. A local resident who questioned 200 persons in Tel Aviv a few weeks ago found only 1 who had ever listened to the Voice of America."

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NEW YORK 17, N. Y., March 27, 1953.

Senator JOSEPH McCARTHY,

*United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: I have known and worked with Mr. Reed Harris for approximately 6 years. I first knew him as Division Chief of the Publications Branch of the Department of State, and since then as Deputy Administrator, International Information Administration.

I have watched Mr. Harris in operation, and sincerely and firmly believe that he is not only a good public servant but as thoroughly pro-American and anti-communistic as anyone I've met in the entire Government service.

I'd go even further and say in my contacts I have found him to typify the kind of intelligent anti-Communist worker we need so terribly, both in and out of Government, these trying times.

For your information, sir, I have acted as consultant to IIA since 1951; I am president of James Gray, Inc., 216 East 45th Street, New York, N. Y., a resident of Westport, Conn., and a member of the executive committee of the Greens Farms Republican Club.

Yours very truly,

EDWARD N. MAYER, JR.

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LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD,  
*Austin, Tex., March 29, 1953.*

Hon. JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,

*Chairman, Senate Investigations Subcommittee,*

*Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: Mr. Reed Harris, Deputy Administrator of the United States International Information Administration of the Department of State, has asked me for comment on the loyalty and competence of his service in the former Office of War Information while I was his supervisor.

To the best of my knowledge he did serve competently and with complete loyalty to our Nation. At no time did he give me any cause for suspicion or distrust. On the contrary, to the extent his official duties and actions were observable by me, there was every reason to regard him as efficient, trustworthy, and completely dedicated to the best interests of his Government and his Nation.

You may recall that the wartime Office of War Information was, by Presidential Executive order, constituted of the former Office of Government Reports, and parts of the Office for Emergency Management and other agencies. In a sense, Mr. Elmer Davis as Director of the new OWI had "inherited" his staff, except for a few mavericks pulled in from the outside, like myself. He was naturally desirous of checking the loyalty and dependability of such an amalgamated staff. To the best of my present memory, the investigations upon which we relied cleared with Mr. Harris without suspicion.

Sincerely,

VERNON A. McGEE,  
*Legislative Budget Director.*

Attest:

Mr. Vernon A. McGee, as Assistant Director of OWI, was, during my term as Associate Director of the organization in 1942-43, under my immediate supervision. I can, without qualification, certify to his loyalty and to my full confidence in his judgment in all administrative matters, including those regarding persons who worked for him.

MILTON S. EISENHOWER,  
*President, the Pennsylvania State College.*

[Typewritten copy of hand-written letter from Thurman L. Barnard]

MARCH 23, 1953.

*To Whom It May Concern:*

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to write this letter for it is about my friend Reed Harris.

For information about the author I refer you to the 1952-53 edition of Who's Who for complete details. Perhaps for the purpose of this letter it is enough to say that during a successful career of over 30 years in the advertising business I was called into Government service twice. The first time in March 1943 following which I served as Executive Director of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information and assisted in the liquidation of most of that emergency operation at the end of the war. The second time was in March 1951 to assist in the planning, development, and conduct of our psychological operations.

It is perhaps unnecessary to say that both of these terms of government service were undertaken at a heavy financial and personal sacrifice. The OWI activity cost about two-thirds of my income, the current activity between 80 and 90 percent. I only mention this to show how seriously I regard the information and psychological operations at this period in our history.

During the OWI operation I had no very close contact with Harris—as our fields seldom crossed. However, I knew him and about him and all I ever heard was good.

From March 1951 I have had almost daily contact with Harris—first in my capacity as a consultant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, E. W. Barrett, and then as general manager of the United States international information and educational exchange program. This covered a period roughly from July 1951 through December—and Reed Harris was my deputy, as he had been to my predecessor Charles M. Hulten, whose health had broken down under the pressure of the job.

Harris offered his resignation on my arrival but I refused it because I had had ample opportunity to observe the devotion and intelligence he supplied to his job as deputy. I considered myself lucky to retain him and the following 6 months proved I was right. My only complaint about Harris in that 6-months' association was that he worked too hard and too long hours and was damaging his health. But this was a very difficult period in the history of the information program—we were short handed at the top and Harris as the best qualified and most experienced senior executive bore an enormous load.

As to his loyalty there was, nor ever has been any doubt in my mind. I don't think loyalty is demonstrated by any incident or series of incidents—the way disloyalty may be. Loyalty is part and parcel of a man's character. It shows in his minute-by-minute, hour-by-hour reactions to the important problems that arise—the decisions no matter how hard or distasteful that must be taken. Decisions to change procedures for greater efficiency, but often with pain to people involved, are not easy but Harris made them. Decisions to discontinue individuals whose loyalty was in question are always hard but they were made. Decisions to reduce expenditures on certain marginal operations in order to increase expenditures for checking and evaluation were in the interest of a more effective United States psychological activity. I think there is ample evidence in the files of the House Appropriations Committee investigations that during the past 4 years when Harris was deputy to Hulten, myself, and Dr. Compton, the taxpayer has obtained progressively more for his money, and been provided with an effective device to stave off a third world war.

If loyalty consists of a devotion to the principles of our country; of living a life that sets an example to others for character, integrity, and uprightness; of dedication to a job of the utmost importance in today's world and an intelligent understanding of the needs of that job and willingness to make every possible sacrifice to fulfill them—then Reed Harris is a loyal man—and this country is fortunate to have him in public service.

Sincerely,

THURMAN L. BARNARD.

CLARK, SICKELS & BARTON,  
New York 17, N. Y., April 2, 1935.

To Whom It May Concern:

I reside at 74 Macdougal Street, New York, N. Y., and am a native-born citizen of the United States, where my Dutch ancestors have lived since the 17th century days when New York was New Amsterdam. I own land which has been owned continuously by members of my family for the past 175 years or more. I was admitted to the bar of the State of New York in 1910, and am engaged in the practice of law at 51 East 42d Street, New York, N. Y. My political affiliation has always been that of the Republican Party.

I am informed that aspersions have been made upon my long-time friend Reed Harris, now employed in the United States International Information Administration, questioning his loyalty to his country and mine. I have known him long enough and well enough to be certain in my own mind that those aspersions are unjustified.

He and I first met when he was attending Columbia College, in New York City. This was somewhere around the time of the 1929 crash; and I saw him from time to time throughout the years when he was in college. As a man who had attended Columbia, I was particularly interested in the efforts which he made, through his editorials in Columbia's daily newspaper, to clean up the football situation at that institution; efforts of which I heartily approved, as I told him at the time. I liked especially the forthright way in which he expressed himself.

After he left Columbia, I continued to keep in touch with him, both through occasional personal contacts and through letters. He worked in Washington for some years in the 1930's before returning to New York City; and during those first years of his living in Washington he came to New York and visited in my home. Our personal contacts were more frequent, of course when he came back to New York. Then they became less frequent after he returned to Washington to work in Federal Government offices. After this lapse of time my memory is not clear as to what this work was; but I think it had something to do with reports which the Government got out and with its information service. I was not particularly concerned at any time with the work he was doing; but I was always very much concerned with Reed Harris as a person and as one whose friendship I valued.

I recall that on one occasion, when he was lunching with me, we discussed with mutual approval an organization sponsored by the late William Allen White and then in the current news. That organization, whose name as I recall it was the Committee To Defend America by Aiding the Allies, had been formed to further ways and means of helping the hard-pressed allies in Europe in their struggle against Hitler's Nazi forces. I remember that Mr. Harris was emphatic in his approval of the work and aims of that White committee.

It was either on the occasion of this luncheon discussion or at some other time when Reed Harris and I were talking together that he expressed to me his strong disapproval of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

Certain of my contacts with Mr. Harris have been of a professional nature. I prepared a will for him before he entered the Army, and after he returned to civilian life he consulted me about some other matters, though none of any great consequence. I mention them only as further indication of the fact that he and I continued to keep in touch with one another, and that our relationship was sufficiently close to make it natural for him when he needed legal advice to turn to me even though he was in Washington and I was in New York.

There was one occasion, perhaps a couple of years after the end of his military service and at a time when he was with the State Department, when there was published in one of the issues of the New York Journal an item in which Mr. Harris was referred to as a "college Red," or some such expression. I knew the attorney for the publisher, called him up, told him what I knew about Mr. Harris, and in so doing explained what a grave injustice had been done to Mr. Harris by the article in question. Mr. Harris informed me that he called that newspaper article to the attention of the State Department.

I understand that some question has been raised as to whether or not a book entitled "King Football," written by Mr. Harris shortly after he left Columbia, contains matter indicating that he had a political viewpoint characteristic of the Communist regime in control of Russia. I read the book when it came out. Certainly nothing in it gave me an impression that he was following the Communist Party line, or that he himself had leanings in that direction.

There is one thing in particular about Reed Harris which would have revealed any pro-Communist leanings if he had had any. He is characteristically forthright in expressing his thoughts. He says what is in his mind and leaves you in no doubt about it. If he had been a fellow-traveler or anything of the sort, it would have come out in his talks with me or his letters to me. It never did.

It seems to be pretty well known that those Americans who get caught up in the Communist shenanigans exist in an atmosphere of duplicity. Reed Harris simply could not play any such role. If the Communists ever took him into their organization, he would be one of their worst security risks. It just isn't in his makeup to dissemble.

I am and long have been very strongly opposed to communism and highly critical of Americans who have fallen for it. If Reed Harris had been one of those misguided persons I am sure that I would have come to know that fact. The truth is that over the twenty-odd years in which I have known him well, there has never been the slightest indication to me in his words or actions that his views have at any time reflected the Communist Party line or that he has been even faintly sympathetic with communism as practiced by the Soviet Government or with that Soviet system or regime. I am certain that Reed Harris is fully aware of the evil nature of that communism and of the threat it carries for our Nation. He is characteristically honest in his opinions and judgment, and in all sincerity, without secret reservations of any sort, I can say that he is a thoroughly loyal and patriotic American citizen and a person in whom our Government can safely put its trust.

Very truly yours,

JOHN S. SICKELS.

CORPUS CHRISTI RECTORY,  
New York 27, March 21, 1953.

United States Senator JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,  
*Chairman, Senate Investigations Subcommittee,*  
*Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

HONORABLE AND DEAR SIR: I find it both a satisfaction and a matter of conscience to write you in defense of Reed Harris whom I have known closely over a period of nearly 25 years. I was counselor to Catholic students at Columbia University when he was a student, editor of Spectator, the college daily, and at the time he wrote King Football. No editor of that paper, during my 16 years at Columbia University, gave more coverage to religious announcements and news, or who was more vitally and personally interested in religious activities than was Reed Harris.

Reed was a student during the slough of the depression. If many of the students had 10 cents for lunch it was a luxury. Of course many of the students were rebellious against abuses—whether these were immediate on any campus such as the sordid manipulations of football or on the wider scene—the mediocrity of national leadership and the glaring injustices in the operation of our economic system. They were suffering, and in hunger they felt that suffering as did many of their families. Any student who was unconcerned about conditions as then existing meant that education was going over his head instead of through it. Many students were attempting to do something about these conditions in order that our democratic institutions might be perpetuated and strengthened instead of weakened by agitators with an alien message of salvation. Youth did not have the answers, they were interested enough to search for them but elders did not possess the answers either or the world would not be in its present mess.

Reed Harris is a worthy citizen of our democracy. I share the public humiliation to which he has been subjected, a situation that has brought the Congress of the United States in widespread disesteem. For any information about me I refer you to Senator James Murray of Montana and Senator Herbert H. Lehman of New York. I remain, sir,

Sincerely yours,

(Rev.) GEORGE B. FORD.

THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS,  
Washington, D. C., March 20, 1953.

The Honorable JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,  
*Chairman, Senate Investigations Subcommittee,*  
*Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: Mr. Reed Harris has asked me if I would be one of the persons to respond to your request that affirmative evidence be presented to you that Mr. Harris has served loyally in the Government of the United States in past years. This I am very glad to do in an effort to assist you in coming to a determination of the issue before your committee.

I first met Mr. Harris in 1935 when I, myself, came to Washington to be the national director of the historical records survey, which I proposed and organized under the sponsorship of the Work Projects Administration, known at that time as the Works Progress Administration. The historical records survey was, in the beginning, set up in the States and in the national headquarters in close association with the Federal writers project. Mr. Harris at that time was assistant to the national director of the Federal writers project. I was closely associated with him until 1940, first in the capacity of subordination to his chief and secondly, after approximately a year, as an associate engaged in directing a companion project.

I can say with a clear conscience that I found Mr. Harris to be an extraordinarily upstanding and patriotic administrator. He was devoted to the task set before him; he was honest and honorable in all of his dealings with me; and he had a reputation among those who knew him of being the same way to all of the persons with whom he dealt. Mr. Harris was careful in his management of Government property; he was cautious in the employment of people; he was devoted to the public interest. In short, he was one of the finest examples of a loyal and able American citizen giving complete devotion to a difficult job who ever came to my notice.

There were in the WPA in those days a number of persons who aroused questions in one's mind as to their wisdom, to say the least, in dealing with difficult public issues, and their loyalty, to say the most, to the system of Government of this country. I can say unequivocally that I was convinced at that time, and I still am convinced, that Mr. Harris was one of the other kind of people—namely, those well-balanced and firmly loyal people who were strong in adversity, who counterbalanced the evil influences and made of the WPA projects, of which I am speaking, projects with which one could be associated with pride.

In all my associations with Mr. Harris in the subsequent years, although not as close as in the period 1935-40, have given me renewed evidences of his patriotism and his fine American qualities, and have in no way caused me to revise my earlier judgment of him.

If I can answer any specific question concerning Mr. Harris' work during the period I have mentioned, please feel free to call upon me.

Sincerely yours,

LUTHER H. EVANS,  
*Librarian of Congress.*

NEW YORK 16, N. Y., April 7, 1953.

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to state that I have known Mr. Reed Harris off and on for some 10 years, first when he worked in the Office of War Information and subsequently when he worked in the Department of State in divisions under my direction (1950-51 and early 1952).

While I understand Mr. Harris did a little silly and immature writing while still of college age, all of my contacts with him left me with a high regard for his ability, character, loyalty, and fundamental decency.

I saw Mr. Harris' work only slightly during the war years, but in the years 1950-52, I had many opportunities to observe parts of his work. Since reflections have been cast on his loyalty and anticomunism, I should state that I particularly remember him taking the initiative for a very strong anti-Communist pamphlet about Germany to be issued by the Publications Branch of the State Department. It was, in my opinion, an effective job. I also recall his showing a clear-cut, intelligent desire to expose the many fallacies of communism in the course of planning meetings of the interdepartmental psychological operations

coordinating committee. At no time did I see any evidence whatever to support any belief that Mr. Harris' loyalty was questionable in any way.

I shall be glad to answer inquiries about Mr. Harris.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD W. BARRETT.

PEOPLES BROADCASTING CORP.,  
Columbus 16, Ohio, March 16, 1953.

Senator JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,

*Chairman, Senate Investigations Subcommittee,*

*Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: I knew Reed Harris intimately during the 4 years he was a student at Columbia University. I was serving at that time as the counselor to Protestant students at Columbia University, which office I held for a period of about 16 years.

Mr. Harris as a student was an active supporter of the student religious work being carried on at the university through the cooperative efforts of a Roman Catholic priest, a Jewish rabbi, and a representative of the Protestant church. When Mr. Harris was editor of the Spectator, he was very generous in the publicity he gave these organizations.

Mr. Harris was a liberal, and to my mind, was a young man searching for some of the answers to the problems existing in the troubled world of his college generation. He spoke to me many times about his hopes and aspirations, and those hopes and aspirations were not those of the Communist-type of mind, which tears down the structures of decency.

While editor of the Spectator, in a youthful crusade, Mr. Harris picked on football with some resulting difficulties and complications. While his judgment may have been criticized, he certainly was not a part of the "party line" of thinking, dominated by Communists.

I saw Mr. Harris in later years engaged as a citizen in business endeavors, and he certainly was in opposition to all Communist lines of thinking. I was amazed to learn that anybody was even thinking of Mr. Harris as a disloyal American. His life since leaving college has been that of a person interested in building America rather than destroying it. He has devoted his life to government with somewhat the same type of fundamental belief that a person devotes himself to the ministry of the church or a service in education.

The Government needs more men like Mr. Harris, and I hope that any question about his loyalty can be cleared up so that he can continue to render service to us all in the fight against the enemies of good government and religious faith.

Sincerely yours,

HERBERT E. EVANS,  
*Vice President-General Manager.*

NEW YORK 17, N. Y. March 12, 1953.

Senator JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,

*Chairman, Senate Investigations Subcommittee,*

*Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR: The recent examination of Mr. Reed Harris of the International Information Administration of the State Department prompts me to write to you concerning my knowledge of Mr. Harris, which extends over a period of 25 years. During the first portion of this period I was an associate professor of government in Columbia College and Reed Harris was a student in my classes. I was also at that time an adviser to the dean on problems of student relations.

After Mr. Harris left Columbia I did not see or hear much of him until, about 10 years later, he became a member of the board of the National Self-Government Committee, of which the late Richard Welling was founder and, for many years, chairman. At the time (1941) Mr. Henry Pringle, who was then a professor at the Columbia School of Journalism, raised the question as to his career at Columbia. Mr. Pringle personally investigated the matter and satisfied himself and the other members as to Harris' character. Mr. Pringle moved his election and it was voted unanimously.

Mr. Harris has served on the board continuously except during the period when he was in military service during the war. He has been at all times a useful

member of that board and his fellow members have a high regard for his judgment and character.

Whatever doubt any of my former colleagues at Columbia may have felt concerning his judgment as a young man, most of them attributed it to youthful exuberance. I have never known anyone who knew him either at Columbia or in later years who expressed doubt as to his character or loyalty as an American citizen.

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH D. McGOLDRICK.

PITTSBURGH 32, PA., April 11, 1953.

*To Whom It May Concern:*

It has distressed me to read, particularly in the New York and Washington newspapers, which gave more details than our local press, of the recent attacks by a congressional investigating committee upon Mr. Reed Harris, my former chief in the Office of War Information. I hope that this voluntary statement may serve to throw some light upon his fine record in the years between 1942 and 1948. In 1948 my husband and I left Washington and moved to Pittsburgh. I have not seen or talked with Mr. Harris since then. Reports since then, however, from some able and loyal persons who know Mr. Harris and his work indicate that he has not deviated from his previous high standards of trustworthiness.

First, let me identify myself: I am a native American born of American parents in Chicago, Ill. I am proud to trace back my maternal ancestry to the Edwards family who arrived in Massachusetts on the first ship after the *Mayflower* and to the Carrolls of Maryland, who helped found the first Colony in America with real religious liberty. I am even prouder of my father's father, who came to America from southern Germany with the group including Carl Schurz, the Wisconsin Civil War hero. My husband, whose family has lived on the same land in southern Maryland since 1647, has been a career officer in the United States Public Health Service and was Surgeon General from 1936 to 1948, when he retired to organize and direct at the University of Pittsburgh the new graduate school of public health endowed by the A. W. Mellon educational and charitable trust. Both Dr. Parran and I have been investigated and cleared several times by several Government agencies in connection with the successive governmental assignments which he has held and the three temporary war positions in which I have served.

I first met Mr. Reed Harris in 1942. There was at that time a great manpower shortage in Government agencies. The 2 eldest of our 4 sons were already enlisted in the Marine Corps; the 2 youngest, still in preparatory school, had made clear their intention of enlisting in some branch of the Navy as soon as they reached their 17th birthday. Since my immediate domestic responsibilities were not heavy, I felt impelled to put my considerable business experience to work for my country and hoped to free an able-bodied man for the services. Accordingly, with my husband's permission, I went "cold" to Civil Service and asked for any useful job in any agency with which the Public Health Service had no affiliations.

Civil Service sent me to the newly organized Office of War Information, where I was subjected to a searching interview by Mr. Reed Harris, of the Management Branch, OWI, under the general supervision of Mr. Milton Eisenhower, Associate Director. After some delays, I was appointed to a position classified as "administrative and procedure editor" and entered upon my duties early in 1943.

Although I liked Mr. Harris very much as a person and found him an excellent chief, I admit that I watched the operations and personnel of the section, the division, the branch and, indeed, of the whole agency, with a cold and critical eye. In the first place, I am a Roman Catholic. My mentors in the faith liked the Communists no better than the Nazis or the Fascists, even after the Communists became our so-called "gallant allies." Amid the welter of rumor which permeates Washington—and which only of late has been taken at face value by responsible persons—I had heard that these several subversive influences were at work in the new war agencies. I had been trained as a factfinder by some competent editorial masters. I knew the difference between gossip and evidence and if there were any evidence I intended to find it. I knew to whom such evidence, if found, should be reported.

In the second place, on the basis of my experience in private business between 1918 and 1930, I felt that I knew a great deal at firsthand about efficient business operation and had the preconceived idea characteristic of the uninformed that Government operation *ipso facto* is wasteful and inefficient.

My findings on the latter point are not germane to the purpose of this statement. I cite the matter only to indicate the reasons for keeping my eyes and ears open while I did my work.

As to the matter of subversive influence, I can say with a clear conscience that there was no trace of it to be found in the attitudes, the decisions, or the deeds of Mr. Reed Harris. He met every test which the most skeptical observer could apply to a man in his position. Eminently fair, he never penalized an individual without a full hearing and an exhaustive examination of the facts in any given situation, but he was determined that the employees for whom he had responsibility should give their Government an honest day's work for a day's pay. He cautioned us frequently and checked constantly to insure the proper handling of classified material. He was generous in giving credit for good work and good ideas, was always searching for better methods of doing the job, and was firm in his management of the inefficient and the undisciplined employee.

My worst enemies have never accused me of being gullible. I was looking for fault in this man and could find none of the slightest consequence, even though I disagreed with him from time to time as to method and detail.

After about 6 months in the Management Branch, Mr. Harris, on his own initiative, took me to the Associate Director, Mr. Eisenhower, to give me the opportunity of explaining personally several suggestions which I believed would improve the operations of the Overseas Branch which I had been studying as a part of my job. Upon Mr. Harris' recommendation, I was then transferred to the Overseas Branch where in due course I became a special assistant to its Chief, Mr. Robert Sherwood. I remained there until the summer of 1944, when I resigned for personal reasons. After a few months rest at home, which I badly needed after my OWI schedule averaging more than 60 hours a week, in the autumn of 1944 I took a position in the Special War Problems Division of the Department of State, under the general supervision of Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr., then Assistant Secretary, and remained in the Department, serving in various capacities, until the summer of 1947.

After I was transferred to the Overseas Branch from Mr. Harris' section of the Management Branch in OWI, I continued to see him both personally and officially and was then in a position to get a much broader perspective of his work since his section serviced both the Domestic and the Overseas Branches. I saw him less frequently after I entered the State Department but my work there brought me into frequent contact with his associates and his superior officers. I myself have never seen him do anything questionable nor have I heard any responsible person report anything of that nature. Neither directly nor indirectly have I heard of any imputations—not even gossip, in a gossip-ridden city—against his character or loyalty until I read the newspaper accounts to which I referred earlier in this statement.

To my personal knowledge, because I was among those questioned, the FBI and at least one other qualified investigating agency have already inquired into Mr. Harris' background. As a taxpayer who worked for Mr. Eisenhower's nomination because of his public statements in regard to economy in government, I should like to inquire if these reports have been put in Mr. Harris' record to begin with or if the congressional committee has been plowing over the same ground at my expense? I intend to ask our very able junior Senator from Pennsylvania to look into it.

It is natural, I think, for many taxpayers to feel—especially Republicans like myself, both in western Pennsylvania and in my native Middle West—that if half of what we read in Republican newspapers is true, several congressional committees are straining at gnats and swallowing camels with great complacency. As I read the record, there may be a gnat of blame in Mr. Harris' freely admitted youthful indiscretions, which no responsible person has even intimated were imperiling our national security. Nevertheless, it is swallowing a camel by contrast to give credence to the contradictory and libelous assumptions and accusations made against him by persons who are not shown to have come into court with clean hands.

To my mind and in the opinion of many substantial citizens in this and other communities, to attempt to overthrow the constitutional guaranty that a man is considered innocent until he is proved guilty is in itself subversion. My ancestor, Daniel Carroll, fought to put that provision into the Bill of Rights. My sons—two of them again in active service—will carry on the fight to preserve it in our daily lives.

I shall be glad to make this statement in the form of a sworn affidavit if any authorized or responsible individual or committee requests it. On the basis of

5 year's acquaintance and association, both personal and official, during a critical period in our Nation's recent history, I believe Mr. Reed Harris to be an honorable man, a true patriot in the literal sense of the words and a competent public servant. He worked faithfully and loyally for his country during the years in which I knew him. Never to my knowledge did he by act, word, attitude, or implication assist the enemies of our country.

Respectfully submitted.

CARROLL KELLER PARRAN.  
Mrs. Thomas Parran.

MARCH 24, 1953.

*To Whom It May Concern:*

I, Emanuel R. Freedman, employed by the New York Times since 1934 and foreign news editor of that newspaper since 1948, affirm that I have known Reed Harris since our student days at Columbia University in the early 1930's. I was closely associated with him on the student daily newspaper at Columbia and have had contacts with him through the years since then. On the basis of these associations I can affirm that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, he has conducted himself as a loyal and conscientious citizen and public servant.

I can testify that during the war when Mr. Harris was employed by the Office of War Information and I myself was also employed by that agency on war-service leave from the New York Times, he devoted himself to the requirements of his job without thought of normal working hours.

In short, it is my belief that Mr. Harris is a loyal public servant of the highest caliber.

Yours very truly,

EMANUEL R. FREEDMAN.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE,  
*Annapolis, Md., March 27, 1953.*

Senator JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,  
*Chairman, Senate Investigations Subcommittee,  
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: I welcome this opportunity to present to you and the other members of the Senate Investigations Subcommittee such testimony as I can on behalf of a former colleague of mine, Reed Harris, who recently appeared before the committee.

My acquaintance with Mr. Harris dates back to the fall of 1946 when he was Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Communications and Records of the Department of State. I was appointed documents officer of the Far Eastern Commission on December 10, 1945, having just completed active duty as a captain in the United States Army Air Corps. On February 8, 1946, I began service as administrative officer and, subsequently, executive officer of the Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

It was during this latter period, which continued to October of 1949 when I accepted the presidency of St. John's College in Annapolis, Md., that I met Mr. Harris and had a number of occasions to work with him on mutual departmental problems.

Based on this acquaintanceship of approximately 3 years, I have no hesitancy in expressing my impression of complete honesty and loyalty upon the part of Mr. Harris. To the best of my knowledge he performed his duties ably, as evidenced by his promotion to be Chief of the Division to succeed Walter K. Scott in mid-1947. In all of his dealings with fellow officers and subordinate employee he seemed to demonstrate a quiet wisdom and a degree of thoughtful consideration of others which characterize a Christian gentleman. At no time was there any shadow of a doubt in my mind about his complete and wholehearted devotion to the United States.

Finally, in view of the predisposition of the subcommittee, I consider it necessary to make a further statement as to my qualification to testify on Mr. Harris' behalf. I served for over 3 years in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, but I am not a Communist, nor have I ever been a Communist. I carry no brief for Communists or their ideology. I am proud today to be president of St. John's College in Annapolis, Md., which to my way of thinking is most effectively perpetuating the true American heritage of freedom. To any of the above statements I should be happy to swear under oath at any time.

Very truly yours,

RICHARD D. WEIGLE, President.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,  
*Algiers, Algeria, March 24, 1953.*

*To Whom It May Concern:*

I, the undersigned, Lawrence S. Morris, make the following affidavit concerning the character and loyalty of Reed Harris, who has been known to me personally for the past 17 years. My present position is that of cultural attaché in the Embassy of the United States at Paris, France. Since the duties of that position are among those authorized by Public Law 402 of the 80th Congress, known as the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, I was investigated by the FBI before appointment in accordance with title X, section 1001 of that act. I was born on December 25, 1894, at Watertown, N. Y. I graduated from the Albany Academy at Albany, N. Y., and from Yale College.

I first met Reed Harris in Washington, D. C., in October 1935, when I joined the Washington staff of the Federal writers' project, then in process of organization. Mr. Harris was at that time assistant to the national director of the project; I joined the staff as a field supervisor. The main work of this project was to be the production of a series of State guides. The texts of the guides were prepared by staffs hired locally in the States, working under general direction from the Washington office. No comparable series of State guides had ever been prepared, and consequently the first necessity was to determine what the contents of the books should be and how the material should be organized. A series of editorial conferences, in which Mr. Harris and I participated, was held to determine these questions. Working thus in close personal association with him, I heard him discuss many points from day to day, and express his opinions with the utmost frankness. At that time, which was a period of economic depression, one frequently encountered among young writers points of view which were either communistic or procommunistic, and there was agitation to give the guides a propagandistic slant. During all of the discussions, Mr. Harris consistently and loyally maintained the position that these guides should be kept free from such propaganda. As is well known, the series of books that resulted has subsequently established itself as an outstanding work of Americana, both from the standpoint of comprehensiveness and accuracy. The completion of these books several years, and before they were finished, Mr. Harris resigned in order to accept a position in New York under private enterprise. However, his contribution at the very beginning to the preparation of the State guides had been of the most solid and patriotic nature.

During the few years after he left the Federal writers project, I saw Mr. Harris from time to time in New York. When the war came, however, he returned to Washington with the Office of War Information as Chief of the Section of Management Planning and Organization. I joined this Section as a consultant on management, and worked under his immediate direction. As the Government was again engaged in an activity in which there were few precedents, it was necessary to develop appropriate methods and controls. At Mr. Harris' request, I developed a plan for placing all the information and propaganda activities of the OWI on a project basis, which would have made possible a close financial and policy control of these activities. In connection with this work I had frequent discussions with Mr. Harris concerning the problems and objectives of the OWI, and I found then, as in my earlier association with him, that his point of view was unfailingly true to what was highest and best in the American democratic tradition. The project system which we developed was never put into operation, because of administrative difficulties and the relative degree of autonomy enjoyed by the various operating units in the organization. If Mr. Harris' plan had been put into effect, however, it would have provided a regular system of reports for each project undertaken by the OWI and would have enabled the top officials of the organization to maintain a more effective policy supervision over their staffs than was possible under the conditions that existed.

Although Mr. Harris was married and already had at that time one child, he resigned from his position as an important official in the OWI to volunteer in the Armed Forces and served the rest of the war in the Army. I also left the OWI, and joined the staff of the Foreign Economic Administration, serving first in Washington, then in London and in Germany. Consequently, Mr. Harris and I did not see each other again during the war, but we kept in touch by correspondence during that critical period.

After the war, I again met Mr. Harris in the State Department, where he served, first as a management consultant and then successively as Chief of the Division of Communications and Chief of the Division of Publications, before joining the Staff of the International Information Administration. During this period I was again in close association with him before coming overseas to my present assignment, and we frequently discussed the problems of the establishment of the postwar information and educational exchange program. No such program had ever been undertaken before by the United States in peacetime, and consequently it raised the basic issues of the position of our country in the world and the nature and strategy of our struggle against communism. In discussing these problems, Mr. Harris showed himself to be unflinching in his opposition to communism.

In summary, I should like to say that throughout all the years I have known him, Mr. Harris has always been an outstanding example of a patriotic and mature American, with a profound sense of the traditional American values, and with the utmost personal integrity and loyalty to the United States Government.

LAWRENCE S. MORRIS.

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE,

DEPARTMENT OF ALGIERS,  
CITY OF ALGIERS,

CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ss:

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of March 1953.

[SEAL]

ARCHER K. BLOOD, *American Vice Consul.*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,

*Washington, March 27, 1953.*

The Honorable JOSEPH McCARTHY,

*Chairman, Senate Investigations Subcommittee.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: Upon my retirement from the active ministry of the National Presbyterian Church, Washington, D. C., my attention was called to a statement by a Mr. Charles Hulten—at that time general manager of the information program under Mr. Edward Barrett—in the public press, expressing a desire to increase the amount of religious programming in the Voice of America. I was prompted to address a letter to him, offering my services in such capacity as my special qualifications might appear to be of use. In the course of time I received an acknowledgement from Mr. Hulten's deputy, Mr. Reed Harris, inviting me to a conference.

I gave Mr. Harris the following information: For many years in Chicago and elsewhere I was engaged in interfaith and interdenominational organizations and undertakings; for 16 years minister of the National Presbyterian Church, Washington, and presently its emeritus minister; charter member and organizer of the Committee on Religious Life in the Nation's Capital, composed of distinguished representatives of the 3 major faiths, and for 5 years president; traveled widely throughout Europe, the Scandinavian countries, Russia, and the Middle East; guest preacher in various churches abroad; graduate of the University of Wisconsin; Princeton University; graduate work at Oxford; for 23 years, and currently, trustee of Princeton Theological Seminary; honorary degrees conferred from various colleges and universities throughout the country; served in World War II as chaplain in the United States Naval Reserve with rank of commander; author of innumerable pamphlets, magazine articles, etc.

After several conferences with Mr. Harris, with the approval of Messrs. Barrett and Hulten, I was engaged in the capacity of consultant for the information program in the field of religion; and in that capacity have been continuously and closely associated with him for well over 2 years.

Mr. Harris has ever impressed me as a cultured, efficient, and forthright citizen, a man of unimpeachable character, conscious of his responsibilities to the Government he is serving, and a gentleman at all times.

By the very nature of his administrative position, Mr. Harris' name often comes up in informal conferences and in conversations up and down the hall; yet in all this time I have never heard a whisper that could by any stretch of imagination be interpreted as a questioning of his loyalty to the Government of the United States.

I had never heard, until recently when I read it in the press, that Mr. Harris had written a book; so also have many of us, for "of the making of books there is no end." Some of us have preached sermons in our immaturity and when later on, in our maturity, we read these manuscripts we find ourselves at a loss to know why the congregations remained through to the benediction.

The Bible says "Young men shall see visions and old men shall dream dreams." The very progress of the world is based on the disturbing visions of youth and it is held in place by the counsels of our maturer years.

Outside of Government circles Mr. Harris is held in high regard all over Washington by those who know him.

I am glad of the opportunity to express my personal appreciation for his thoughtful guidance, unfaltering cooperation, and genial friendship.

Upon my suggestion, Mr. Harris arranged for the appointment of a religious advisory panel, composed of a representative from each of the three major faiths—Msgr. T. J. McCarthy of the National Catholic Welfare Conference; Dr. E. H. Pruden of the First Baptist Church; and Mr. Isaac Franck of the Jewish Community Council, all of Washington, D. C. I believe that by reason of their association with Mr. Harris they will bear me out in these expressions of regard for him.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT JOSEPH McCARTNEY,  
*Religious Consultant.*

—  
SENECA FARMS,  
*Herndon, Va., April 8, 1953.*

Senator JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,  
*Chairman, Senate Investigations Subcommittee,  
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: I have followed with more than ordinary interest the press accounts of your subcommittee's investigations of the international information and educational exchange program. On one item particularly I would wish to comment. This refers to the criticisms of Reed Harris, who was the deputy general manager of this program when I came into it, and continued as Deputy Administrator while I was in the International Information Administration.

I regard Reed Harris as a man of good character, and his loyalty to his own Government unquestionable. During the course of the past year, in expressing his willingness to fit into the International Information Administration organization in any capacity in which he might be the most helpful, he mentioned to me personally his "indiscreet" and "extravagant" writings as a youth in college. He said at the time that these writings might rise up to plague him and that he regretted having written them.

It seemed to me then, and it seems to me now, that these extravagances and indiscretions of 20 years ago have no bearing on Mr. Harris' present fitness for the type of service which for several years he has been rendering in this program. I found him to be stanch, dependable, and willing to take responsibility. He obviously had the respect of his colleagues, many of whom had worked with him for a long time. I regard him as an able, intelligent, and conscientious public servant. I have never had any question of his loyalty. If there had been any question, he would, of course, not have continued as Deputy Administrator.

Yours sincerely,

WILSON COMPTON,  
*Former Administrator,*  
*United States International Information Administration.*



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# STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

**S. Res. 40**

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS TO EMPLOY TEMPORARY ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AND INCREASING THE LIMIT OF EXPENDITURES

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PART 8

MARCH 12, 1953

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations



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# STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met (pursuant to S. Res. 40, agreed to January 30, 1953) at 10:30 a. m., in room 318, of the Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan; John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; G. David Schine, chief consultant; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I have informed some of the Senators that Julius Hlavaty would appear this morning. He has refused to show up. He said the notice was too short, and it may have been. He is being served with a subpoena today to appear tomorrow morning.

Who is your first witness, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. COHN. The first witness, Mr. Chairman, is Mr. Bracken, if he is in the room.

The CHAIRMAN. Please step up to the witness stand, Mr. Bracken. Hold up your right hand, please.

In this matter in hearing before the committee, do you swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

## TESTIMONY OF THOMAS E. BRACKEN, ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BRACKEN. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. COHN. Will you give us your title, Mr. Bracken?

Mr. BRACKEN. I am an assistant legal adviser in the Department of State.

Mr. COHN. And are you attached to the International Information Administration?

Mr. BRACKEN. I am assigned to handle the legal problems in the IIA.

Mr. COHN. You are assigned to handle the legal problems of the IIA. The reason we asked you to come down here this morning is this, Mr. Bracken: You are familiar, of course, with the project known as Baker West; is that correct?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes.

Mr. COHN. That is a transmitter site in Seattle, Wash., on which construction was proceeding, and the total cost was to be about \$10,000,000; is that right?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. There was some dispute that arose as to whether or not this site was mislocated and should not be further south, and as a result of that the day after this committee commenced hearings, the work on Baker West was suspended. Do you recall that?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. The day following that, Dr. Compton, who was then the Administrator of IIA, appeared before this committee and testified about the suspension of Baker West and indicated that he had ordered, not a floating type suspension, but a complete shutdown, so that the taxpayers' money would not be spent on what appeared to be a mislocated project.

The committee has now received information that, in spite of that assurance from Dr. Compton, taxpayers' money in large amounts is still being expended on Baker West. That is in spite of the fact that the Bureau of Standards has reported to this committee that Baker West is definitely a mislocation and that on 90 percent of the days, 50 times the power would be required at Baker West as compared to a proper southern location.

Now, Mr. Bracken, we would like to know if it is a fact that money is still being spent at the suspended project of Baker West?

Mr. BRACKEN. The contracts have not been terminated.

Mr. COHN. The contracts have not been terminated?

Mr. BRACKEN. They have not been terminated.

Mr. COHN. Is it a fact that money is being spent there?

Mr. BRACKEN. That would be true; yes.

Mr. COHN. Can you first give us a figure as to how much money, total, is being spent, say, per month at Baker West?

Mr. BRACKEN. On a so-called suspended basis, I would estimate that approximately \$25,000 a month would be spent.

The CHAIRMAN. Approximately \$25,000 a month is being spent as of now?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, a little less than a thousand dollars a day. Would you tell us what that is being spent for in view of the fact that there is no construction work being done on Baker West at this time?

What was the language of Dr. Compton, Mr. Counsel, with respect to the suspension of the project?

Mr. COHN. I have it here, Mr. Chairman. I have here the proofs sent back from the Government Printing Office; page 24, of Dr. Compton's testimony of February 17.

He was asked by you, Mr. Chairman, when you were inquiring to determine whether or not this was a complete suspension, so no more money would be spent:

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Compton is here; he wrote the order. I assume he can tell us what type of suspension this is. What type of suspension is it?

Dr. COMPTON. I certainly did not intend any floating type of suspension. I mean to shut it down until we can get a complete reexamination. As a matter of fact, the nature of these contracts, this 8½-percent clause, and so on and so forth, was one of the specific reasons why in my judgment we had better shut it down at once.

So it was very clear from Dr. Compton's testimony that there was to be a complete shutdown and no expenditure of funds.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of that order of the then head of the IIA, which I assume has not been revoked by the new head of IIA, can you tell us why you are spending nearly \$1,000 a day on this mislocation?

Mr. BRACKEN. The order which went out to the contractors, irrespective of what might have been said here in this committee, was to the effect that the contracts were to be suspended and not terminated.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you mean Dr. Compton was in error when he tried to explain the type of order he had sent out?

Mr. BRACKEN. If he had in mind that he was to terminate the contracts in their entirety, he did not instruct the rest of the Department to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. The staff informs me that the IIA up to this time has not asked a report from the Bureau of Standards, which is the logical Government agency to ask for a report on a project such as this. The committee asked the Bureau of Standards for a report and received the report in a matter of days.

I am curious to know why, if you have this in a suspended state, you are spending nearly \$1,000 a day, and up to this moment you have not asked for a report from the Bureau of Standards?

You understand when I say "you," I am not referring to you personally. That may not be your job. I refer to the IIA.

Mr. BRACKEN. Frankly, I don't know why they have not asked for a report from the Bureau of Standards. I would assume that they would seek all technical advice possible. Obviously, I am not consulted on that type of decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether a report has been received up to this time from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on this propagation study as to the proper location of Baker West?

Mr. BRACKEN. To my knowledge, I have no record or no knowledge of the fact that a further report from Massachusetts Institute of Technology has been received.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you explain what this money is being spent for?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes, Senator. In working out a suspended basis for the contract, the contractor believes that he should keep a certain number of people in his Portland office, who are accountants, who are bookkeepers and such. In addition to that he felt that he should keep an office in New York, consisting of one individual who acts as liaison with the Department.

Speaking approximately, the office in Portland would cost about \$4,000 per month. The office in New York would cost about \$1,500 per month.

In addition to that, the contractor as of today, in my opinion, is still entitled to a proportionate part of his entire fixed fee.

Mr. COHN. That is the profit part.

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you say he is entitled to a part of the profit he would have gotten on the contract had it been completed. You say he is entitled to a proportionate part of that. Are you paying a part of that profit each month?

Mr. BRACKEN. The matter as to the amount of the fixed fee has not been decided as yet.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Are you paying him at the present time a part of what you think his profit would be had he gone through with the contract?

Mr. BRACKEN. He is claiming that, and I would assume that we would have to pay part of it in any event.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked yesterday by some of the staff members whether it was not true that you were paying part of that profit to him which he would have made had the contract been completed, and that you are paying a certain amount each month. The question is how much a month?

Mr. BRACKEN. He agreed to keep the project—

The CHAIRMAN. How much a month are you paying on the profit? I am not speaking of the maintenance of auditors and the maintenance of men, and I am not speaking of rent on the machinery. The question is how much are you paying this contractor on the profit which you estimated he would have made had he completed the contract? How much money are you paying him each month?

Mr. BRACKEN. May I explain that, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. First give us the figure and then you can explain it. Is it a figure of about \$10,000 a month?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes. I will take the figure, if I may explain a moment.

The contract is so drawn up that after he completes certain stages of work he gets paid certain amounts of his fixed fee. To date he has been paid about \$40,000 of that fixed fee. He contends that if he keeps the contract in a suspended basis, because of his overall direction, because he keeps the office going and things of that sort, he is still entitled to a fixed fee until such time as it is determined to either terminate the contract or to do otherwise. He stated he was prepared to take approximately \$7,500 a month for his fixed fee during the suspension interval.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bracken, your title is legal adviser, is it?

Mr. BRACKEN. Assistant legal adviser.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize it is not your task to make the decision on whether a contract should be terminated, or not, but in view of the fact that you have been consulted on this maybe you can answer some of these questions for us.

We have before us now the report of General Stoner made back in 1952, about a year ago, in which he said that this is a mislocation, the project should not be located here.

We have the testimony that Mr. Kaplan, who was either killed accidentally or committed suicide in Boston, had been sent to southern California to pick a proper location, that he had located two places for the station. That is about a year ago. That was then can-

celed even though General Stoner had advised Dr. Compton that Seattle was the wrong location, even though the Bureau of Standards states that it would take 50 times as much power at certain times of the day, 90 percent of the time.

In view of that I am curious to know why you are continuing this contract when apparently you tell us that it could be terminated and Dr. Compton told us it had been terminated. Do you know why it is being continued? Why is this expense going on day after day?

That is especially important in view of the tremendous amount of testimony of Mr. Harris that they went to such great length to close down 1 desk to save a total of \$10,000 or \$15,000. Do you follow me?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes, sir; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, there was a great plea for the taxpayer on the part of Mr. Harris, the Acting Administrator. He said, "We closed down this desk because we saved around \$15,000, or something like that." Now we find you are spending nearly \$1,000 a day on a project which apparently all engineers agree is a bad project. Every engineer we have had here says this is a mislocation. Some have said it is a deliberate sabotage of the program to get the proper signals to the proper area. We asked the Voice and the IIA and the State Department whether they wanted additional engineers called, and they informed counsel they did not desire additional engineers called and felt that we were getting a complete picture.

Is that correct, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. COHN. That is correct, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of that unanimity of opinion, that a mistake was made, that it should be changed, why do we continue to spend about \$1,000 a day, if you know? As I say, I know this is not your responsibility, but you may know something about it.

Mr. BRACKEN. I would assume, Senator, that there are people in the Department who feel that there is a possibility of continuing on at that site.

The CHAIRMAN. Despite all the engineering advice to the contrary?

Mr. BRACKEN. I would assume so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you conceive of any reason why the Voice has not called on the Bureau of Standards for a report as to whether this is a wrong site?

Mr. BRACKEN. I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. The Bureau of Standards is set up for this purpose; they have experts. It is conceded, I believe, that they are the only organization fully equipped to conduct a propagation study of this kind. I believe I referred to the Voice; I should refer to the IIA.

Do you have any idea why they have not asked for a report from the Bureau of Standards?

Mr. BRACKEN. I have no idea why they have not. I have been informed in various conversations with the people concerned that they have gone far and wide in order to get expert technical testimony on the site. It has been a subject of high controversy within the Department for a year or more, and most people have had an opportunity of expressing their opinion from a technical standpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it has been a point of high controversy. From all the information we have there was no controversy insofar as the engineering aspects were concerned. General Stoner had reported

to Dr. Compton that this was a mislocation. He said, and I think I can quote him, "It would be worse than a calculated risk to continue on, but if we move we have to explain to the Congress and the press and that might adversely affect our ability to get appropriations."

So the controversy has not been over the engineering aspects, but from the public-relations standpoint, is that correct?

MR. BRACKEN. No, sir; Senator. I believe the controversy has been from an engineering standpoint, and I have been informed recently—

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

MR. BRACKEN. By General Stoner, by Mr. Herrick, by other engineers. Apparently at the present time they are seeking further advice of outside technical engineers on this particular matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what outside engineers they are seeking advice from, because if there is any engineer who differs from the Bureau of Standards, who differs with the engineers who say this is a mislocation, we would like to have him here and find out if there is anything to it. Do you know the names of any engineers?

MR. BRACKEN. I am informed that General Stoner has consulted with Mr. A. D. Ring, consulting engineer in Washington, and Mr. Maury Pierce.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been informed he has been consulting Mr. Ring. Mr. Ring has been in the Pacific for 2 or 3 months. He could not have been consulting with a man out in the Pacific, or does he do it by long-distance telephone?

MR. BRACKEN. I believe Mr. Ring left for the Pacific rather recently; I would say within the period of the last 10 days.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel tells me Mr. Ring has been out in the Pacific for over 2 months.

MR. COHN. I would say, Mr. Chairman, since the Baker West controversy started, the day after it began, we were advised by Mr. Crosby of the State Department that Mr. Ring had left for the Pacific and was not available to talk to the committee. I think this was 1 day after we held the first open hearing on this. I assume that if Mr. Crosby said that he went, he went.

The CHAIRMAN. If Mr. Ring has been gone ever since Dr. Compton ordered this project discontinued, Dr. Compton could not have been consulting with Mr. Ring.

MR. BRACKEN. Mr. Ring, to my knowledge, was in this country after Dr. Compton ordered the suspension of the contracts because I talked with Mr. Ring.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, will you call Mr. Crosby and find out whether he was telling the truth when he said Mr. Ring had left and could not be questioned by this committee. We want to question him. Mr. Crosby said that he was gone. If he has been in the country and consulting with General Stoner, we want to know it.

MR. BRACKEN. He might have left quickly after that, but I saw him immediately after that suspension order.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me read the concluding sentence in the report from the Bureau of Standards: "To deliver a satisfactory signal on at least 90 percent of the days at a given time of the day, a transmitter located at Seattle would require about 50 times the power of a transmitter at San Francisco or at San Diego. San Francisco and San

Diego do not possess any appreciable advantage with respect to each other."

Are you aware of this report?

Mr. BRACKEN. I have not read that report.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, the witness was about to give us the names of some more engineers. I think we should get those names.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we should, too.

Mr. BRACKEN. The other engineer who was with Mr. Ring was Mr. Maury Pierce. Mr. Maury Pierce at one time worked for the Voice, and to my knowledge now he is the head of a radio station, I think, out in the Middle West somewhere.

Senator MUNDT. Are there any others?

Mr. BRACKEN. They are the only two I recall at the moment.

Senator MUNDT. What we are trying to do is to get to the facts, and we have been beseeching the State Department for a long time to suggest some engineers who would come in with facts to support the location of these transmitters, Baker East and Baker West, if they have them. We cannot find them. We are eager to hear them.

I do think that somebody is becoming pretty negligent down there in the State Department by not providing that kind of evidence, because the taxpayers' money is obviously going to be wasted if we do not get the facts. If you are with the State Department, I wish you would convey to whoever has charge of this particular activity that the time is almost here when, if they have engineers to be heard, that they should send them up here to be heard.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, Senator Mundt, that we have gone into detail with the proper members over in the State Department on this subject. They have had copies of the testimony, and they have informed counsel that they are satisfied with the evidence taken insofar as engineering is concerned, that they have no witnesses to contradict this.

I am inclined to think that Dr. Johnson, the new head of the IIA, was entitled to rely upon the sworn testimony here, namely, that this project had been discontinued, that no more money was being spent on it. I do not think we can blame the new head of the IIA for this until it is brought to his attention. It will be brought to his attention today, of course, and I assume he will take appropriate action.

I mention that because I think it should be clear that as far as the new team over in the Department is concerned, I think they are trying to clean up this situation.

Let me ask you, have you consulted any of the engineers yourself?

Mr. BRACKEN. Over a period of the last year and a half, various people concerned with the location of the site have discussed the matter with me, and from those various discussions I conclude that there has been a difference of opinion from a technical viewpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McClellan, have you any further questions?

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Bracken, apparently very little of this controversy comes under your jurisdiction, as I understand it. But if there has been serious controversy within the agency with regard to the location of Baker West, and there is no controversy or serious differences of opinion regarding the suitability of the southern sites in San Francisco or San Diego, why is it necessary to take such a

long time to determine whether you will continue with the project at Baker West?

Apparently there is no testimony before the committee indicating that either San Francisco or San Diego would not be a much better site. In fact, all of the testimony apparently is that they have great advantages over the present site of Baker West.

I cannot understand why all this long delay with a suspended contract that is costing you \$1,000 a day in coming to a definite decision once and for all, either to continue the construction of Baker West, or abandon it and remove the site, or construct the facility on a site where there is no controversy and where there is no disagreement as to its suitability. What is causing the delay under those circumstances, if you know?

Mr. BRACKEN. I don't know what is causing the delay. I think that you have presented the situation, that the most important thing is to have a quick and final determination.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is true in view of the report before the committee from the Bureau of Standards which, so far as I know in testimony before the committee up to now, is unchallenged by the Department or by the agency or by anyone else. I cannot understand, unless you have something to present from a competent source to clearly convince this committee that this report of the Bureau of Standards is subject to challenge, why there should be procrastination and delay at the expense of \$1,000 a day to the taxpayers.

Mr. BRACKEN. I concur heartily in that, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. That indicates that there is something wrong, a lack of initiative or a lack of aggressiveness, to try to resolve this problem, is that not right?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. I am not blaming you or anyone. But if a mistake has been made, as it now appears, that is going to involve a wasteful expenditure, as I see it, of some \$15,000,000 or \$18,000,000 in the construction of these facilities, then some action should be taken to correct it and not simply a suspension that is dragging along here at the expense of the taxpayers that can never be recouped. If you are going to abandon it, this is just money thrown away.

Mr. BRACKEN. I agree heartily with you on that, Senator, that a prompt and final decision should be made, and I certainly hope that the people charged with that responsibility will make it as rapidly as possible.

Senator McCLELLAN. You had no responsibility, did you, regarding the contract that is made for the construction of Baker West? It seems to be an awful bad contract as far as the Government is concerned. Did you have any responsibility in connection with that?

Mr. BRACKEN. I had the overall legal responsibility for that, yes, Senator. I happened to be out of the country during a good part of the time that negotiations on the contract were going on. On the other hand, I might say in some defense for a moment that the contract follows the form of the ordinary cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. The form which is normally used by the Army and Navy, that is.

Senator McCLELLAN. You do not mean to tell the committee that the 8½ percent advance on purchases per month, with the right of the contractor when the equipment is purchased to own it, control it, is a

standard contract of cost plus fixed fee? You would not tell the committee that, would you?

Mr. BRACKEN. I certainly would not, but if I may say this: There was no provision in the contract itself for the payment of 8½ percent.

Senator McCLELLAN. How does that come about if it is not a contractual obligation? Why are they doing it?

Mr. BRACKEN. The contract itself states that the rate to be paid to the contractor shall be determined by the contracting officer.

Senator McCLELLAN. So it is not a contractual obligation, but a determination that is being made that is left under the terms of the contract to the discretion of others, is that correct?

Mr. BRACKEN. And that is necessary to allow flexibility, because machinery could be used 24 hours a day and the depreciation rate is great.

Senator McCLELLAN. Or it may not be used at all.

Mr. BRACKEN. That is right.

Senator McCLELLAN. Is there a ceiling placed on that allowance? Is there a ceiling placed on the discretion of that authority in whom the discretion reposes?

Mr. BRACKEN. I know of no ceiling except ordinary common sense and good business practice.

Senator McCLELLAN. Can you always anticipate that will follow?

Mr. BRACKEN. We must place that responsibility upon our contracting officer.

Senator McCLELLAN. Would you say that this contract conformed to that criterion? I have reference to the discretion that is being exercised to pay the 8½ percent per month.

Mr. BRACKEN. I am, of course, not qualified to speak as to whether 8½ percent is too much or too little.

Senator McCLELLAN. Maybe I am not qualified, either, but if I can exercise a little common sense, it seems to me like a very exaggerated sum.

Mr. BRACKEN. I may say that the contractor takes the position, and informed me recently in the West, that he does not consider 8½ percent excessive.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is the contractor that informed you?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes, sir; and that is the amount of money that he is paid by the State of Oregon for his machinery on road work in Oregon.

Senator McCLELLAN. This is a different type of work, though, is it not? Notwithstanding you have a road-contractor constructing it, it is entirely a different type of work from road work, is it not?

Mr. BRACKEN. They use big and heavy pieces of machinery, bulldozers and pushers, and so forth. It is not too far removed.

Senator McCLELLAN. You think a good road builder could build the station, or would be competent to build the station?

Mr. BRACKEN. I don't know. I assume that he could.

Senator McCLELLAN. Unless he possessed some other qualifications and experience, I doubt it, do you not?

Mr. BRACKEN. The work which the contractor is doing out there up to date has been, for instance, a matter of clearing and taking stumps off.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is what he has done to date. But that is not what he contracted to do. He contracted to do all of it.

Mr. BRACKEN. He subcontracts a good part of it.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one or two questions. As of today you are still paying the 8½ percent on the machinery which is not being used; is that right?

Mr. BRACKEN. Eight and one-half percent is being paid on the machinery which is still on the site. The engineer has been requested to ask the contractor to get the machinery off the site as rapidly as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Has he gotten the machinery off the site, or any of it?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes. As of 7 or 8 days ago I estimate that he had gotten off nearly one-half of the machinery.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that there is no contractual obligation to pay that 8½ percent per month. You say that is decided by the contracting officer. Who is the contracting officer?

Mr. BRACKEN. Senator, may I—

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Who is the contracting officer?

Mr. BRACKEN. The contracting officer at the present moment would be, I assume, Mr. Seymour.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Frank Seymour?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Seymour succeeded Mr. Herrick?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you say this 8½ percent is being paid not because of any provision in the contract, but because Mr. Frank Seymour thinks it should be paid?

Mr. BRACKEN. No, sir; that is not correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Then tell us who is responsible for the 8½ percent being paid on the machinery that is not being used.

Mr. BRACKEN. The contract contains no provision for paying 8½ percent.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you understand my question? The question is, Who is responsible as of this moment today for the 8½ percent being paid on this machinery which is not being used, some of which has never been used? Who is responsible for it? I want to get the name of the man. We want to get him here.

Mr. BRACKEN. If I may answer your question directly as to who is responsible for it, it is the Administrator of the IIA. If he terminates the contract then there is nothing further to be paid.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that someone decides whether it should be 8½ percent, whether it should be 3 percent, or 5 percent, or 6 percent. You and I know Dr. Johnson does not do that, so let us not have any of that. Let us get the name of the man who is responsible, and you are going to answer that.

Mr. BRACKEN. I certainly will. May I say this, Senator, to correct what has been said, that there is a contractual agreement to pay 8½ percent, but it is not contained in the contract itself. A subsequent communication to the contractor after negotiation stated that the Department would pay 8½ percent on the machinery.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you say that subsequent correspondence set the fee at 8½ percent. That would make it a part of the contract.

Mr. BRACKEN. A part of the contractual agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. It would make it a part of the contract.

Mr. BRACKEN. I will agree it is a part of the contract.

The CHAIRMAN. You just got through telling us that there was no contract to that effect. Now you tell us it is a contract, but it was made subsequent to the original contract. It is made by letter, you say?

Mr. BRACKEN. If I recall, I was asked why the 8½ percent was in the contract which the legal advisers' office drew up. I stated there was no provision for 8½ percent in that contract.

The CHAIRMAN. My question to you is, Who is responsible for our paying 8½ percent as of today upon that machinery which is not being used? If you do not know that, tell us you do not know.

Mr. BRACKEN. I will say I don't know.

Senator McCLELLAN. May I ask him a question, Mr. Chairman, at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly.

Senator McCLELLAN. As I understand—if I can get your testimony clearly in my mind—in the original contract the 8½ percent was not specified?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is correct, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. But was left to the discretion of the contracting officer on the part of the Government?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. Later, by correspondence between him and the contractor, the 8½ percent was agreed upon?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. And therefore, by that correspondence and by the authority conferred and the power vested in the contracting officer on the part of the Government to determine, he did determine and then they agreed upon that amount?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is exactly right.

Senator McCLELLAN. Whether it was an undetermined factor in the original contract but was subsequently determined and confirmed by writing, it now becomes a part of the agreement?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is exactly right.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mundt.

Senator MUNDT. Is this 8½ percent in addition to the other fee that the contractor receives? Is it a fixed fee?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes. Under the contract he is to receive a fixed fee of \$150,000 for the complete job.

Senator MUNDT. He will get \$150,000 plus these 8½ percent advances?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is correct.

Senator MUNDT. Plus his costs?

Mr. BRACKEN. Pardon me, sir?

Senator MUNDT. Plus his costs?

Mr. BRACKEN. Plus his costs.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, a profit of \$150,000?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are proceeding to pay him that profit each day even though he is not performing the contract?

Mr. BRACKEN. He is claiming that profit, and I would assume that we would have to continue to pay him that profit until such time as the Department makes up its mind whether it wants to go on a suspended

basis, when he is likely to reduce the profit, or terminate it, when the profit would stop.

Senator MUNDT. What would happen if the \$1,000 a day payment were stopped?

Mr. BRACKEN. That would constitute termination of the contract, if we were to inform him that we were not going to pay any more under the contract. It would be in effect termination of the contract.

Senator MUNDT. What claim would he have, then, against the Government?

Mr. BRACKEN. He would possibly, for the period since the contract was suspended, I would assume, say, "I want a proportionate amount of the fixed fee to cover this month or 2 months," or whatever it may be. He would have no claim as such because of the termination of the contract. The cost plus fee contract is of such a nature that the Government may terminate it without incurring any overall liability as a result of the termination.

Senator MUNDT. So if you were to terminate it outright, he would have no claim against the Government?

Mr. BRACKEN. Except for this interim period since February.

Senator MUNDT. If you were to terminate it as of today, he would have no claim against the Government?

Mr. BRACKEN. The claim that he would make is that since the time of the suspension he is entitled to a fixed fee.

Senator MUNDT. Up to today?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. I understand that. I am asking you whether if you were to terminate it as of today, he has any further claim against the Government?

Mr. BRACKEN. I don't think he would have any claim of any sort.

Senator MUNDT. It would seem to me if the contractor is in that position he would very naturally desire to continue the contract because he considers it good business for himself.

Mr. BRACKEN. I think so.

Senator MUNDT. With that situation prevailing, I cannot see why the State Department could not go to him and say, "We have to consult some more engineers, this thing has gotten very controversial, the Bureau of Standards is on the other side, and the engineers we were depending upon to support us are beginning to wilt under the pressure of facts submitted by the opposition. We want to hold this thing in suspension for 60 days."

I do not see why you have to pay him \$1,000 a day. He is interested, certainly, as a contractor in trying to get the job done.

I think you have driven a poor bargain. I think you are in a better bargaining position than that and that you could have said, "We do not have to terminate, we hope we do not have to terminate it, we hope the evidence will support the location which we have selected, but for 60 or 90 days until we can get this thing ironed out, we will have to suspend."

I was wondering what persuasive argument he could use to get you to pay \$1,000 a day when he has no claim at all if you were to terminate the contract outright?

Mr. BRACKEN. In direct reply to that, he simply says, "Do you want guards at the site in order to protect the Government property there?" And we would normally say, "Yes." Six thousand to seven thousand

dollars a month will be used to keep guards at the site for the protection of public property. Furthermore, he would say, "Do you wish us to completely disband the accounting group we have together here, the bookkeeping group?" And if we were to say "Yes," then I think it would more or less throw the thing in some chaos, because it would mean all operations would stop immediately and bills would not be paid, and contractors who have claims would have nobody to turn to. So to some extent you have got to taper the thing off. You have got to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. That sounds like a drunk tapering off on 2 quarts of whisky a day, does it not?

Mr. BRACKEN. It can be tapered off by simply terminating the thing today.

Senator MUNDT. I can see how if the thing is still controversial in the minds of your engineers you might want some time.

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. I would not quarrel with that particularly. The committee is not trying to arbitrarily ask for a suspension of the contract if there is any authentic evidence to support the present location. We have been unable to get it. We have been unable to induce anybody to come up and testify in support of these positions.

The question that comes to my mind is whether you could not have driven a better bargain than \$1,000 a day, if that is what you are paying. That sounds like a lot of money for guards and a few bookkeepers. I would like to subcontract that one myself.

Mr. BRACKEN. It costs \$6,000 a month for guards, according to the figure I was given at the site. It costs approximately \$5,000, or so, to keep his office expense going in Portland.

Senator MUNDT. May I inquire what you are guarding with \$6,000 a month for guards? What are you protecting up there?

Mr. BRACKEN. There is a lot of heavy radio equipment on the site at the present time, transformers, and so on.

Senator MUNDT. How big a site is it?

Mr. BRACKEN. Subject to some check, I would probably say there are probably 800 acres.

Senator MUNDT. How many guards have they got?

Mr. BRACKEN. They were estimating, I think, on the basis of six guards.

Senator MUNDT. Three shifts would be 18 guards, if you have a 24-hour shift, at \$6,000 a month.

Mr. BRACKEN. They have buildings on the site. In addition to the guards, the contractor felt that he should have a representative there to correlate, if nothing more, the work of the guards.

Senator MUNDT. Nineteen men at \$6,000 a month.

Mr. BRACKEN. Nine you have counted?

Senator MUNDT. Nineteen. I am saying 6 guards, and I am assuming each one works an 8-hour shift, and the guard is on duty 24 hours a day, and I multiply that by 3, and that would be 18, and 1 person to represent the contractor, which sounds reasonable, and that is 19. Nineteen men at \$6,000 a month.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not so understand his testimony. I understood they had six guards hired. Is it 6 guards or is it 18?

Mr. BRACKEN. I understand it is six guards.

The CHAIRMAN. A total of six guards?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. That is probably two guards on each shift. Then you have seven people getting \$6,000 a month. That is right good pay.

Mr. BRACKEN. Let me point this out, that the actual cost of the people up there, whether they are guards or supervisors or such, is paid directly by the Government. If it is felt, as we get machinery off the site, that that can be reduced to 3 people or even 2 people, it will be done. It is a matter of calculation to the best interests of the United States Government as to how many people you should have.

Senator MUNDT. Is the prevailing rate \$800 a month for the guards?

Mr. BRACKEN. I don't think it is.

Senator MUNDT. Do you not think the legal counsel should explore a little bit to see why it costs \$6,000 a month for seven guards?

Mr. BRACKEN. When I mentioned seven guards and the representative of the contractor, who, I would assume, gets \$600 or \$700 or \$800 a month, it was on the basis of the figure of \$5,000 a month that was given to me. That is as it was explained to me.

Senator MUNDT. Are you satisfied with that explanation or that price for that small number of guards?

Mr. BRACKEN. From the standpoint of adding their salaries up, it would certainly seem to be high.

Senator MUNDT. It certainly does to me.

Mr. BRACKEN. It certainly does.

Senator MUNDT. They pay them better than they pay Senators.

I do not know whose job it is to enforce this contract, but somebody should be representing the taxpayers' interest in there. In the first instance, I thought you could drive a better bargain than \$1,000 a day. I am certainly convinced you can get the guards for less than \$800 a month.

If a period of suspended animation in the contract is desirable—and I am not prepared to quarrel with that because this committee wants to get the facts, this committee does not want to assume the responsibility of suspending a contract if there is evidence on the other side, or you have to wait for someone to arrive from the Pacific in order to reply—I am wondering if you could not have driven a better bargain. I am thinking in terms of \$1,000 a day and guards being \$800 a month, according to your testimony. I tried to make it easier by saying 19, but if you say 7, I am willing to accept your figure.

The CHAIRMAN. I have Dr. Compton's testimony before me. Before I quote that, let me preface it with this quotation:

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in view of Dr. Compton's statement that the contract has not been terminated, that operations and construction have been suspended, is it your opinion that the \$20,000-a-month rental will continue to be paid?

Mr. FREEMAN. If it is a floating suspension, but there are various types of suspension.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Compton is here. He wrote the order. I assume he can tell you what type of suspension it is. What type of suspension is it, Dr. Compton, so that the witness can answer?

Dr. COMPTON. I did not intend any floating type of suspension. I meant to shut it down until we could get complete reexamination such as I mentioned yesterday afternoon. If, as a matter of fact, the nature of this contract, this 8½-percent clause, which was one of the specific reasons why my judgment was that we had better shut it down, we want to get at that and eliminate that. If we have to take further action, we do that right away.

I may say, Mr. Legal Counsel, that my opinion is that the new head of IIA, Dr. Johnson, is trying to do a good job. I am curious to know why you or someone else did not call this situation to his attention.

I assume you and I will agree that after the sworn testimony of Dr. Compton that the operations were being knocked off completely, that there would be no further cost, the question is, Why did not the legal department say to the new Administrator, Dr. Compton was mistaken, we are still paying about \$1,000 a day? Why was that not done? Why was not Dr. Johnson informed about that? I am sure if he had been, he would have taken action.

Mr. BRACKEN. The administrative determination was made, presumably representing Dr. Compton's viewpoint, to suspend rather than to terminate the contracts, and a telegram went out to that effect.

Senator POTTER. In other words, you are saying that his testimony to us was not the fact?

Mr. BRACKEN. I will say that he instructed a suspension of the contract, sir.

Senator POTTER. He told us that he had ordered that it be completely closed down.

Mr. BRACKEN. Unless some administrative people refused to follow his direction, I have no other explanation.

Senator POTTER. Who sent out the order?

Mr. BRACKEN. The order would have come again through Mr. Kimball's office and Mr. Seymour's office.

Senator POTTER. When was the order issued? When was the telegram sent?

Mr. BRACKEN. Subject to correction because I don't recall the date, I would say it was about February 17.

Senator POTTER. You don't know whether Dr. Compton misrepresented the facts to the committee, or whether the subordinates of Dr. Compton failed to carry out his orders?

Mr. BRACKEN. No, I do not.

Senator POTTER. But it is one or the other?

Mr. BRACKEN. What you read, Senator, seems fairly conclusive as far as I am concerned to the effect that they were going to shut down. I don't know what he means by this floating suspension.

Senator POTTER. Who was the man that sent out the order? What is his official capacity in the Department?

Mr. BRACKEN. It would stem from Mr. Kimball, who was Assistant Administrator for Administration, and his representative in New York, Mr. Seymour, to Mr. Herrick.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you, as the legal officer, get us all the correspondence in regard to Baker West since this hearing commenced? Is that available?

Mr. BRACKEN. The correspondence with the contractor, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Correspondence with anyone with regard to Baker West.

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You will be ordered to produce anything that is not classified. When can you produce that? We are curious to know what wires were sent and what letters were written in regard to this project. How soon can you get that material?

Mr. BRACKEN. I can certainly have it by tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you have it here by 10:30 tomorrow morning?

Mr. BRACKEN. Very fine, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You started to add up the figures to give us this total of \$25,000. You say there is about \$10,000 paid to the contractor on the profit which he would have received had the contract been completed?

Mr. BRACKEN. We are now speaking of March?

The CHAIRMAN. Let us speak of March, then. How much to run the Portland office by the contractor? You gave me a figure of \$4,000 and you mentioned \$5,000.

Mr. BRACKEN. There is \$5,000 in this memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. That is to run the office. That is separate and apart from the guards?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the office at \$5,000 a month or at the rate of \$60,000 a year to run the office. You were just out at the Baker West site, were you not?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you sort of explain this \$5,000 a month office to us, who is there and what costs \$5,000? How large an office is it, and how large a staff is being kept on?

Mr. BRACKEN. I, of course, didn't check the detail as to the salary and the number of people there.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in the office? Did you look around and get some ideas?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes, I did. I would say there are probably three stenographers, there is an overall manager, as they term him.

The CHAIRMAN. An office manager?

Mr. BRACKEN. An office manager. There are two other men who, I suppose, would be called accountants, I would assume.

The CHAIRMAN. Two accountants?

Mr. BRACKEN. I would say accountants.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what they are accounting right now?

Mr. BRACKEN. What are they accounting?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BRACKEN. For instance, there is a little over \$200,000 worth of contracts with local people for sand, gravel, and things of that sort. They are working on that type of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. When this bill is sent to the IIA, who passes on it before the check is issued to the contractor?

Mr. BRACKEN. There is a representative of the Government out there who is called the certifying officer.

The CHAIRMAN. What is his name?

Mr. BRACKEN. His name skips me for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get that for us?

Mr. BRACKEN. I certainly will.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you say there is a man on the site who decides how much should be paid to the contractor per month?

Mr. BRACKEN. He is at the Portland office.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a man representing IIA in the Portland office, working full time, and he determines how much should be paid the contractor?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, we have the figure of \$5,000 for the Portland office, \$10,000 profit, and you set up a \$1,500 for the contractor's New York office.

Mr. BRACKEN. Field payroll \$6,222.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are the guards you refer to?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. \$6,200?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is \$22,500. Give us all the figures.

Mr. BRACKEN. It is estimated that during March there will be \$7,200 paid on equipment rental.

The CHAIRMAN. \$7,200 on equipment; very well. How much more will be paid?

Mr. BRACKEN. The only other item is an item which reflects obligations already incurred with local contractors, and that would be \$117,000. For instance, they have already contracted for sand and for gravel and for other items of equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you said it was at the rate of \$25,000 a month. We now have added up figures that run \$29,900. Now give us any additional monthly payments.

Mr. BRACKEN. I know of no other additional monthly payments.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the \$117,000 for sand and gravel that has not been delivered. You say we will have to pay for that, too?

Mr. BRACKEN. I was informed that had already been delivered to the site.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, that will have to be paid for?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they been delivering any since Dr. Compton ordered the project discontinued?

Mr. BRACKEN. No. The contractor's representative told me that they would assume no further obligations of any sort with the subcontractors.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it correct that your legal officer, when he heard that they were paying 8½ percent per month on all the equipment, that the equipment would belong to the contractor when it was fully paid for, at the end of a year, objected to that and urged that the contract be immediately terminated?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that to be a fact? If you do not, tell us.

Mr. BRACKEN. I do not know the answer to that. I would have to check it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you discussed that with the legal officer?

Mr. BRACKEN. You are speaking of our legal officer in New York? I am the legal officer in Washington. There is a legal officer in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us take any legal officer at all, New York or Washington. In other words, has this been a subject of discussion among the legal officers? You are one of them. Do you follow me, Mr. Bracken?

You have a contract which pays 8½ percent per month on equipment. We have been told that some of the equipment is purchased at least 10 months before it is used, which would mean that he had

been paid 85 percent of the cost before he turned a wheel of some of that equipment. Now we find that you are paying \$7,200 a month rental on equipment, which means that it will be fully paid for whether he has to use it or not. He will own the equipment. We have been told under oath that about 3 percent would be a reasonable rental fee. My question is: Did you and the other legal officers discuss what on its face would appear to be an unusual contract? Did you discuss it or did you not?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes, it has been discussed.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it generally agreed this was an improper contract?

Mr. BRACKEN. No, it was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is a proper contract insofar as the 8½ percent is concerned?

Mr. BRACKEN. As to the amount of the fee to be paid, there are differences of opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us the name of anyone who said 8½ percent was a reasonable figure? I have reference to anyone on your legal staff.

Mr. BRACKEN. No one on our legal staff has indicated that 8½ percent is a reasonable figure.

The CHAIRMAN. Then do I understand that all of you on the legal staff felt that 8½ percent was too high?

Mr. BRACKEN. I felt it was too high.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know anyone who thought it was a reasonable fee?

Mr. BRACKEN. Except the contractor.

The CHAIRMAN. And who is the man you say was originally responsible for this figure of 8½ percent?

Mr. BRACKEN. To my knowledge the 8½ percent was agreed to by the then acting contracting officer in New York, Mr. Myers.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one further question. You are paying the contractor each month on the profit which he would have made, \$150,000. We have had testimony—if I am incorrect in restating the testimony, Mr. Counsel, will you correct me—that the contractor was not too financially responsible. The question is: If you pay him his profit of \$150,000, if he is not financially responsible, how can you insure performance of the contract in case you should proceed with the Baker West project where it now is?

Mr. BRACKEN. I have heard nothing to the effect that he is financially irresponsible.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen his financial statement?

Mr. BRACKEN. I have not seen it. A financial statement, I am informed, was made available by him for scrutiny by the contracting officer in New York.

Senator MUNDT. As legal officer, have you required a performance bond under the contract from the contractor?

Mr. BRACKEN. Not under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract.

Senator MUNDT. No performance bond?

Mr. BRACKEN. No, because we can immediately terminate that contract at any time.

Senator MUNDT. But if you paid him his profit in advance, he might welcome such a termination.

Mr. BRACKEN. That would be true. But we don't pay him his profit in advance. The contract states that after he has done a certain amount of work, then he is to be paid so much. After he has completed such and such, he is to be paid so much. To date according to my figures he has been paid about \$40,000 out of that total fixed fee.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel tells me that Mr. Myers refused to show the contracting officer the financial statement of the contractor, is that correct, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. COHN. That was his sworn testimony, I believe, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You will therefore be requested at this time to obtain the financial statement which Mr. Myers had at the time the contract was made and submit that to the committee. I assume there is nothing classified about that financial statement.

Mr. BRACKEN. Not to my knowledge.

Senator MUNDT. Will you also get the correspondence over the signature of Mr. Myers, by which he agreed to this 8½ percent figure. You said that was done by correspondence?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. You can get that correspondence and bring it to the committee?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, you will furnish the committee with both items.

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Chairman, is that contract on file with the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you also produce the contract?

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. I think that should be done. As I understand from your testimony, the contract, as written, I assume, could be terminated without there being any continuing obligation on the part of the Government to the contractor for his anticipated profit had the contract been completed?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is right.

Senator McCLELLAN. Are you sure that you have such a provision in the contract? It is a bit unusual. A breach of contract on the part of one possibly entitles the other contracting party to receive the anticipated profit that he would have made had the contract been performed. I do not know. As I understand you, you are saying that there would be no further liability on the part of the Government other than to pay him his anticipated profit up to date, but not his future profit?

Mr. BRACKEN. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. If that is true, then, it should be easier and less loss would be sustained if you proceeded to terminate the contract rather than to keep it in a continued state of suspension with these payments accruing all the time. Therefore, the more urgent the necessity for a determination one way or the other promptly.

Mr. BRACKEN. I agree, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you promptly notify the new head of the IIA of this situation?

Mr. BRACKEN. I will be very glad to.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can find out why he has not been notified before this time. You see, this committee cannot supervise your work. That is not our job. We assume that when there is sworn testimony that a certain thing has occurred that has actually occurred. We assume that the staff over in IIA will try to cooperate with the new head, Dr. Johnson. We have found that no one has told him a thing about this. He may be interested in knowing why. I assume he will be. So we would like to request you at this time to promptly get in touch with Dr. Johnson and tell him about this situation. Not tomorrow or the next day, but today, if you will. Will you do that?

Mr. BRACKEN. I will be very glad to.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. BRACKEN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pratt, will you take the witness stand. Will you stand up and raise your right hand?

In this matter in hearing before the committee, do you swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

#### TESTIMONY OF HARADEN PRATT, ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Mr. PRATT. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You are the President's adviser?

Mr. PRATT. On telecommunications.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, counsel.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Pratt, will you tell us a little bit about your background? I think you have told us you are President Eisenhower's adviser on telecommunication matters at the present time. Will you give us a little of your own background?

Mr. PRATT. I started as an amateur in radio communications in 1905 and as a wireless operator on ships starting in 1910. I graduated as an engineer from the University of California in 1914. Since that time I have held various positions. I was first with the Marconi Co of America building radio stations. I was for 5 years an expert radio aide in the Navy Department, which terminated at the end of 1919. I had construction and maintenance responsibility for their high-powered radio stations. That was a worldwide system. Subsequently I was in business myself. I built a radio system for Western Air Express, an early airmail contractor. In 1927 and 1928 I was in the Department of Commerce, in charge of the development of radio aids for air navigation, working in the Bureau of Standards. Up to the year before last I was with Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., and the American Cable & Radio Corp., as vice president and chief engineer, and constructed and maintained a worldwide communication system of telegraph services, a public system. In October of the year before last, I had the appointment to the post I now hold.

Mr. COHN. And at the present time you are the telecommunications adviser to the President of the United States; is that correct?

Mr. PRATT. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. As such do you have any concern with frequency allocations?

Mr. PRATT. Yes, that is my responsibility under an Executive order.

Mr. COHN. That is under Executive order. And does that responsibility extend to wartime planning of frequency allocations?

Mr. PRATT. It does. Those are functions that are vested in the President under the Communications Act of 1934, and it is my duty to carry out what is to be done under those functions.

Mr. COHN. Now, as part of the carrying out of those functions, has it become necessary for you to consult with the engineering department of the International Information Administration and the Voice of America to determine what frequency allocations they would require in connection with various of these important transmitting projects which they were erecting throughout this country?

Mr. PRATT. It has.

Mr. COHN. What has your experience been?

Mr. PRATT. Generally I have found them not very well prepared to state what their requirements are, much less so than any other department of government. I would say from my point of view that there has been an appearance of considerable incompetency in that branch.

Mr. COHN. You say there has been an appearance of considerable incompetency. Let me see if we can develop that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, will you make clear he is referring not to the Voice but to the International Information program, which is superior to the Voice.

Mr. COHN. That is right, Mr. Chairman. I assume your initial dealings were with the International Information Administration in Washington, is that correct?

Mr. PRATT. Generally. But we were talking about people that deal with and have the responsibility for implementing the program from the standpoint of frequencies.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, Mr. Pratt, the reason I brought that up is that there has been considerable misunderstanding on the part of the public as to just when we are referring to the Voice of America, which is one of the five branches of the International Information Administration. The Voice has been getting the blame for all of the incompetence in the International Information program, that is, for the Library Section, for the Press Section, and for the Movie Section, and for that reason I want to make clear you were referring in effect to the superior of the Voice rather than to the Voice of America.

Mr. PRATT. Yes. Although with respect to these other departments, Senator, I have no knowledge of, and they don't deal with radio stations, as I understand it.

Mr. COHN. Now, let me ask you this: Did you go to the engineering department of IIA to determine what frequencies they would require for, say, projects like Baker West and Baker East, which you have heard here this morning?

Mr. PRATT. Yes; questions of that sort were posed by me to them.

Mr. COHN. When you went to them would you find that before they went ahead and spent millions of dollars on these projects that they had clearly in mind what their frequency requirements would be?

Mr. PRATT. If they did, they did not impart that to me.

Mr. COHN. Did you try to get them to impart it to you?

Mr. PRATT. Yes, I did.

Mr. COHN. And you were not too successful?

Mr. PRATT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, putting it simply, you were of the impression that they were going to proceed to build the radio sta-

tions without knowledge of what their frequency requirements would be, or what frequencies were available to them?

Mr. PRATT. Let me elaborate, Mr. Chairman. I would not expect them to state specifically what frequencies they would want to use. That would be very difficult for any man to do too far in advance. But I didn't seem to find very much of an answer as to the direction in which they would proceed to satisfy such requirements.

Mr. COHN. And you were unable to get an answer to that?

Mr. PRATT. That is right.

Mr. COHN. And, of course, you needed an answer to that in making your overall plans; is that correct?

Mr. PRATT. It would eventually be required, yes, within the scheme of things, naturally.

Mr. COHN. Did you find this difficulty on more than one occasion?

Mr. PRATT. Yes.

Mr. COHN. Let me ask you this: Did you ever have any occasion, Mr. Pratt, to see any of this part of the curtain antenna program of the International Information Administration for the Voice of America?

Mr. PRATT. Only in a very general way. I saw one of them that had been partly finished. I saw the plans in Mr. Herrick's office lying on the table. I gave them a quick glance. I have a general idea of what sort of thing it is.

Mr. COHN. Did you see one of these projects in a partial state of completion?

Mr. PRATT. Yes.

Mr. COHN. Based on your background and experience, what was the impression you gained as to the feasibility of this type of antenna?

Mr. PRATT. I thought offhand it was a pretty expensive sort of instrumentality for the job it was supposed to do, as I saw it. If in private practice I had attempted to build a structure like that, then I think my company would have become bankrupt very shortly.

Senator POTTER. So is this company.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Pratt, I neglected to ask you what your first name is.

Mr. PRATT. Haraden, spelled H-a-r-a-d-e-n.

Mr. COHN. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one question. I have been reading about these disgruntled employees who have been giving us information. You are not a disgruntled employee; are you?

Mr. PRATT. Not whatsoever. Sometimes I get a little impatient, Senator, at the slow-moving Government machinery.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you very much.

Senator McCLELLAN. What stations have you been talking about? You have not been talking about Baker West and Baker East; have you?

Mr. PRATT. Yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Those are the ones you are talking about?

Mr. PRATT. I am talking about all of the stations that they have responsibility for. Some of them I think are privately owned under contract and others under construction by the Government.

Senator McCLELLAN. But Baker East and Baker West were included in your remarks?

Mr. PRATT. Yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Specifically about Baker West, have you examined that plant thoroughly?

Mr. PRATT. No, sir

Senator McCLELLAN. Do you have any comment or views regarding the location presently as a suitable location?

Mr. PRATT. As a man in business for many years I often wondered why they put the station there, because I wouldn't think a man that was informed in this particular field would deliberately select a location of that sort.

Senator McCLELLAN. In your judgment, if he was informed in this field and located it there, you would not attribute such a decision, then, to stupidity; would you?

Mr. PRATT. It all depends on what the objectives were. That might have had something to do with it. If the objective had been fairly good reliable communication for the least outlay, I certainly as an engineer would not select that sort of a place. I am not speaking of the particular real estate but the location with respect to the country.

Senator McCLELLAN. You are not talking about the local location, but the general area?

Mr. PRATT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement was that you would not select that?

Mr. PRATT. No.

Senator McCLELLAN. Would you tell us why, just generally, and not in detail.

Mr. PRATT. The general picture is that international communication by radio is difficult from any part of the North American Continent due to the general proximity of the North Magnetic Pole which introduces disturbances that interfere with the propagation of radio waves. Therefore, northern sections in North America should be avoided as far as possible. As a matter of fact, there is not any place in the United States that one might call ideal. It is just the way the geography works out. But to select spots in the northern area is technically to be avoided.

Now, communication companies working out of the east coast have selected the New York area. It so happens that perhaps if you went down to the tip of Florida you might get better propagation conditions, but costs enter into it. Private enterprise could not operate that far away from New York. So you make a business compromise and you put up with whatever slight disadvantage the northern location has for other benefits.

Now, it is considerations of that sort that may have entered into the selection of these sites by the Voice. I would not be able to know because it has not been my business to investigate those aspects.

Senator McCLELLAN. The thing at issue before the committee, as I see it, is that here is a project defined as Baker West, that has been approved and contracted for and construction has started. Now information comes to us, apparently from the highest source and most reliable sources, that no one who really knew his business would have selected that location which would involve not only much greater initial cost to construct but far greater expense to operate and with less satisfactory results than had the station been located at a more southern site. Is that your view about it?

Mr. PRATT. Yes. I don't know that I could agree with the magnitude of the differences that I have seen as a result of your hearings and in the press, but there is a difference and a definite one.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is all. I want to be fair about it. If we started a project up there and contracted for it, one that when finished is not going to give the service that is required in this program and is going to be tremendously expensive, I think the time to correct it is now before we have expended any more money. That is what we are trying to find out.

Mr. PRATT. I could make this remark, Senator. I would expect as a businessman that anyone who selected a site like that for me would have to give very good reasons in order to convince me of it.

Senator McCLELLAN. Do you know of any good reason that can be given?

Mr. PRATT. I don't know what the purposes of the Voice might have been in selecting that particular site. I don't know what the facts are.

The CHAIRMAN. Assume the purpose was to get the best signal to a distant target area; would you then say that it was a mistake? Let me ask you one question before you answer that.

Am I correct in this: That this magnetic storm area or the auroral absorption belt, call it what you may, is located a considerable distance above the earth and it would not seriously affect a transmitter which was transmitting to a near area, but that magnetic storm area only becomes a serious impeding factor when you are trying to hit a target some distance away? Is that roughly correct?

Mr. PRATT. I believe you have overstated it a little bit, but I think roughly that would be correct; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then if the purpose of this transmitter was to hit a target area a great distance away can you think of any reason why it should be located in that particular section of the magnetic storm area?

Mr. PRATT. No. My answer would be "No," generally. But I would like to point out that these disturbed conditions that arise by reason of the magnetic storms only occur occasionally. Sometimes they occur frequently and then you will have a long period of time when you may not have any communications. During those quiet conditions, a northerly location would be as good as any other. If it was closer to the target area which might be the case in this instance, you might during those quiet periods have a superior result, although I think measurably it would not be too significant. For a person that is trying to maintain a communication system, a public service one, one that offers a telegraph service to the public, he would want to keep away from a location which would interrupt his service too much.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one further question. I am not sure if you are equipped to answer this question or not, Mr. Pratt. I will ask it, and if you feel this should be asked of some engineer who is more familiar with the project, we will ask it of Mr. McKesson or one of the other engineers.

I have the Bureau of Standards report, and it indicates, as you say, that at times you could get good transmission from this area, but a very small period of time apparently. They say, for example, "General conclusions can be drawn from the results so far obtained. To assure delivery of a satisfactory signal at a given time of the day

on at least 10 percent of the days, a transmitter at Seattle would require but 5 times as much power as a transmitter at San Francisco or San Diego. To assure a signal for a given time of the day on at least 50 percent of the days, a transmitter at Seattle would require about 15 times as much power as a transmitter at San Francisco or San Diego. To deliver a satisfactory signal on at least 90 percent of the days, at a given time of the day, a transmitter located at Seattle would require about 50 times the power of a transmitter at San Francisco or at San Diego. The above conclusions are supported by the attached exhibits, exhibits 2 to 10," and so forth, and so forth.

Could you give us any estimate of the additional annual cost because of the tremendously greater power requirement at Seattle than farther south? We have had testimony that the original cost would be tremendously higher than farther south.

Now my question is: Could you give us any estimate of the additional cost after the facilities would have been completed at Seattle because of the additional power requirements, or could you do that?

Mr. PRATT. I could not do it quantitatively, but it would be considerable. However, the extra cost might not be justified because the benefit that you would get from the extra power might not be commensurate. It all depends on how you want to appraise your objective. If you want to get a program down over on the other side, say 23 hours out of 24, and you don't want to sacrifice another half hour on certain days, and you want to pay a big price to get that very marginal additional result, yes, then you would be involved not only in large capital costs but correspondingly increased operating costs.

However, I think that there are many factors that have to be weighed in a thing of that sort. You always can trade costs against compromised results.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you got my question. The Bureau of Standards says that if you locate a station in San Diego or San Francisco, that it will take only one-fiftieth as much power to get the same results at 90 percent of the days, at certain times of the day, than a station up in Seattle. I am not asking you whether you think you should shut down the station in Seattle rather than to spend the extra money on the power. The question is: Can you give us an estimate of the comparative costs, assuming you are operating on the same time of the day, hitting the same target area? If you cannot give us that—and I can easily see how you could not—we will not ask you. If you can give us some estimate, good.

Mr. PRATT. If I assume those figures, I would have to say if the difference is 50 times your electric power bill will be about one-fiftieth at the other location, your upkeep of your equipment will be less, there being less equipment, your vacuum tubes would be correspondingly less, not necessarily one-fiftieth, and undoubtedly there would be fewer people necessary to maintain it. The cost of maintaining the buildings would be correspondingly reduced because they would not need to be so large and all other things in proportion.

Senator McCLELLAN. I have just one question. As I understood you, you qualified your answer here by saying that if you accept those figures, the figures of the Bureau of Standards. I do not know whether you are prepared to accept them or to reject them.

Mr. PRATT. They are a little bit surprising to me, Senator. I have high regard for the Bureau of Standards organization; I know some-

thing about it. I would like to see the foundation upon which their statements are based before I accept them.

Senator McCLELLAN. You agree with the general position taken?

Mr. PRATT. Absolutely.

Senator McCLELLAN. But those figures surprise you somewhat?

Mr. PRATT. That is right.

Senator McCLELLAN. And you would want to check those personally before you finally accepted them?

Mr. PRATT. That is right.

Senator McCLELLAN. But as a general proposition it will cost more and it will be less satisfactory, and so forth; you agree with that?

Mr. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, Mr. Pratt, that we have the report from the Bureau of Standards and attached to it are 28 exhibits. I am sure they would mean a lot more to you, a graduate engineer, than members of the committee. We will be glad to give you a copy of this if you care to have it.

Mr. PRATT. I would be very glad to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for taking time off from a very busy day.

Mr. PRATT. You are very welcome, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 12 o'clock. We have some very important witnesses we would like to put on. We will recess now and reconvene at 1:30 p. m.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 1:30 p. m., this day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Will you stand up and raise your right hand, sir? In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. GILLETT. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. COHN. Give us your full name, please.

#### TESTIMONY OF GLENN D. GILLETT, CONSULTING RADIO ENGINEER, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. GILLETT. My name is Glenn D. Gillett.

Mr. COHN. How do you spell your last name, Mr. Gillett?

Mr. GILLETT. G-i-l-l-e-t-t.

Mr. COHN. Now, Mr. Gillett, what is your occupation?

Mr. GILLETT. I am a consulting radio engineer.

Mr. COHN. And would you tell us something about your educational background?

Mr. GILLETT. I am a graduate of Harvard University with honors. I graduated from Harvard Engineering School magna cum laude. I was an engineer for 10 years with the American Telephone & Telegraph System in the department of development and research, which is the headquarters staff organization of the A. T. & T. In that work, I was in charge of the development of techniques and methods of field-strength measurement and was responsible for the inauguration or conception of the use of field-strength contours to depict the results

of field-strength surveys. I made the first field-strength surveys ever made for a broadcast station.

Mr. COHN. Were you ever an employee of the information program?

Mr. GILLETT. I have never been employed by the Voice of America or the information program.

Mr. COHN. You have been employed by the United States?

Mr. GILLETT. I have been employed by the United States Forces in Austria as a consultant, and by the ECA as senior electronic consultant in Europe.

Mr. COHN. But you have never been employed by the information program in any capacity?

Mr. GILLETT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say this man would not qualify for a job with the Information Administration, because he is a graduate engineer.

Mr. COHN. Now, would you continue, Mr. Gillett, and tell us a little more about your background?

Mr. GILLETT. I also, while with the Bell System, had responsibility for an extended program of research on common frequency broadcasting. I am the author of several papers before the Institute of Radio Engineers on basic facets of radio transmission and broadcast field-strength measurement. Since 1932, I have been head of my own firm of consulting radio engineers in Washington. I have practiced before the FCC in behalf of my various clients for 20 years, and have done considerable fundamental research on the development of high-efficiency antennas. My firm has designed 5 out of 6 of the highest antennas in the world today for use in broadcasting.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Gillett, you mentioned Austria; that you were a consultant to the Armed Forces in Austria. When was that?

Mr. GILLETT. In April 1950, I was asked to go on an emergency basis immediately to Austria to serve as a consultant to the commanding general on broadcast problems there.

Mr. COHN. And you proceeded to Austria; correct?

Mr. GILLETT. I arrived 6 days after they asked me to leave.

Mr. COHN. Now, did you, following your arrival in Austria, participate in the planning of some radio stations to be used by the Armed Forces in Austria?

Mr. GILLETT. The Armed Forces were desirous of employing to the maximum possible extent the broadcasting facilities which they were using for the German language, which is the native language of Austria, to disseminate information to Austria and to the territories to the east of Austria.

After a discussion with Commanding General Keys, who was also the High Commissioner for the United States—

Mr. COHN. Would you spell his name?

Mr. GILLETT. K-e-y-s, I believe it is. [Continuing:] These objectives were set up by the United States Forces in Austria: first, that the maximum possible service should be given to northern Austria, including Vienna; second, that the maximum service to the territory to the eastward should be given day and night; third, that the installations built by the United States Forces in Austria should stand as a monument to what a free democracy could do for its wards.

Mr. COHN. Now, in connection with that, were three stations planned?

Mr. GILLETT. Three stations were planned.

Mr. COHN. Which was to be the main one of the three?

Mr. GILLETT. Let me put it the other way. The one in Salzburg was hemmed in by mountains so that there was no great need for high power in Salzburg. So, we took the frequency there with moderate power. Then at Linz we got a good frequency by swapping with the Armed Forces' network, so that with high power we could cover all of Austria and put a second service into Vienna in case the Russians should enter the Vienna transmitter. All of this was designed to back-stop the Vienna transmitter, which was on a frequency which had to reduce the radiation to the westward to protect the station in Libson with which we were sharing the frequency. This meant that all the radiation had to go to the eastward, to enable us, by employing all we knew technically about high-efficiency antennas, to produce an antenna system that radiated the equivalent of 500 kilowatts to the eastward, with 100 kilowatts input to the antenna system.

Mr. COHN. And the principal station was to be the one at Vienna. Is that right?

Mr. GILLETT. It was the key of the arch, to which everything was built.

Mr. COHN. It was the key of the arch. All right. Now, what was to be the height of the antenna tower for that station?

Mr. GILLETT. Originally we had planned to use 1,000 feet; but later we found, from some development work that we did, that we could use a tower 900 feet high, using the top guys to load the antenna, and get the same results at a cost of about 20 percent less.

Mr. COHN. I see. So, the height was to be 900 feet. Is that right?

Mr. GILLETT. It was to be 900 feet.

Mr. COHN. Now, using a 900-foot antenna, would this station have been a powerful one?

Mr. GILLETT. This would have rendered the best service available to all of Hungary within the Danubian Basin day and night. It would also have rendered the most powerful signal, and the signal most free from distortion and fading, to most of Poland, all of Hungary, and much of southern European Russia; in fact, it would have rendered the strongest signal available from any station in western free Europe, and for much of the rural area a stronger signal than was available from any Russian station.

Mr. COHN. What would have been the beneficial effect of having such a station insofar as our program of countering Communist propaganda and bringing the truth about the free world behind the Iron Curtain and to countries such as Poland?

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt before you answer that?

Mr. Leahy, there is a man by the name of Tom Downs, D-o-w-n-s, apparently in the press section of the information program. I do not know if he is located in Washington or New York. If he is in Washington, I wonder if you could arrange to have him in here. I would like to have an executive session as soon as we are through here. If he is in New York, I would like to have him ordered down here instantly if we could.

Pardon me.

Mr. GILLETT. The object of this was to enable the United States Forces in Austria, which was the operator of the Information Service in the propaganda agency in Austria at the time for the United States, or Information Dissemination Service would be better, to deliver

the facts as to what the United States was doing and was trying to do in the way of world peace and the salvage of Europe from the economic disaster of the last war to the peoples living in the country to the east, which is, of course, entirely Soviet controlled. This was the farthest east outpost that the West had in the Iron Curtain countries.

Mr. COHN. Now, let me ask you this: Did you work on plans for the setting up of this 900-foot tower?

Mr. GILLETT. We made surveys to determine the areas of best conductivity. The best site was, of course, along the alluvial plain near the river on the south side of town. However, this was too close to the Swechat Airport and involved certain other projects, emergency projects, of the Army; so that the next best site was on a large farm operated by the Steinhof, which was the mental hospital.

Mr. COHN. The Steinhof?

Mr. GILLETT. The Steinhof, which is the mental hospital, where there was room to put up a reflector, the reflector necessary to protect Portugal. Measurements showed it was not too much worse than the vegetable patch and was the best available.

Mr. COHN. And was that site selected?

Mr. GILLETT. The site was selected. Request was made to the Austrians for requisition, which was done. Before it was requisitioned, our plans were carried by Colonel Hixon, who was the chief of staff under General Keys, to the High Commissioner for Britain and for France resident in Vienna, and their written approval of the program, including approval for a thousand-foot mast at this site, was obtained, in full knowledge of any potential air hazard that would have existed. We had worked in close conjunction with our own Air Force authorities in Austria at Vienna and had determined that this site, since it is surrounded by higher hills to the westward and north, with woods on top of them, would not cause any substantial or objectionable hazard to air navigation for planes coming into Swechat Airport, which was some 14.5 miles to the south.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you spell Swechat?

Mr. GILLETT. I think it is S-w-e-c-h-a-t. It is the commercial airport for Vienna in the plains to the south of Vienna.

The CHAIRMAN. So you determined, because of the height of the hills around the proposed location, that this 900-foot broadcasting tower would cause no additional hazard insofar as Swechat Airport was concerned?

Mr. GILLETT. No appreciable hazard. It would have been about 200-odd feet above the height of the trees on the hills surrounding it for 1 mile. It was well below the 1-to-40 glide path required by the CAA in this country for protection of commercial airports.

Mr. COHN. And the airport was some 14.5 miles away?

Mr. GILLETT. Some 14.5 miles away.

The CHAIRMAN. In any event, before the Army decided to build this 900-foot tower, you did take into consideration Swechat Airport?

Mr. GILLETT. It was taken up with the British air attachés office in Vienna. I was present at discussions with them.

Mr. COHN. And you say written consent was obtained?

Mr. GILLETT. And written consent was subsequently obtained from the highest British Representative in Austria, who was the commis-

sioner for the English Government in Vienna, as well as for the French.

Mr. COHN. Very good; and then plans went ahead to erect this tower or rather to place this 900-foot tower there. Is that right?

Mr. GILLETT. Immediately plans were made. Money was put together by the Army forces. Telecommunications conferences were held several times at the headquarters in the Pentagon, at which also representatives of the State Department were present, and I was present at the telecoms in Vienna, and the whole program, including the height of towers, the location, the objectives, was discussed and was approved, not only by the authorities in Austria but by the Army authorities in Washington and by the State Department authorities in Washington.

Mr. COHN. Was the 900-foot tower actually purchased?

Mr. GILLETT. On that approval, orders were placed for the purchase of the two 100-kilowatt transmitters required, which were gotten very economically because we bought 50-kilowatt transmitters that were provided with a spare set of tubes and arranged to have them bridged to give us a hundred kilowatts.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was: Was the 900-foot tower purchased?

Mr. GILLETT. I am sorry. Let me continue. The towers were purchased for Salzburg, the 3 for Linz, and the 2 for Vienna.

Mr. COHN. Including the 900-foot tower?

Mr. GILLETT. Including the 900-foot tower.

Mr. COHN. Do you know the approximate cost of the 900-foot tower, just the approximate cost?

Mr. GILLETT. It is about \$125,000.

Mr. COHN. And that was actually purchased?

Mr. GILLETT. And it was delivered in Austria?

Mr. COHN. And it was delivered. Is that right?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes.

Mr. COHN. Now, when did you leave—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, will you find out when it was delivered?

Mr. COHN. About when was it delivered?

Mr. GILLETT. In the summer of 1951.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you find out, Mr. Counsel, where it is now?

Mr. COHN. Do you know where that tower is now?

Mr. GILLETT. I was told that it was in the storage yard of the Voice of America at Munich. I have reason to believe the Voice of America is planning to use it at one of their own transmitters in Munich.

Mr. COHN. Do you mean to say that this 900-foot tower which was purchased for this Vienna station, which would have made a powerful station reaching into Iron Curtain countries which you have described, was never used?

Mr. GILLETT. It was not used in Vienna and it was not used in Austria.

Mr. COHN. When did you discover that it had not been used?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, I had heard rumors and discussions with Mr. Roberts in the spring of 1951 that they planned to cut down the size of the installation in Vienna. Then I was told, in April, by Mr. Roberts who is the head of the Austrian public affairs desk in the State Department, that the original construction was going to be built—or

that the construction in Vienna and elsewhere in Austria was going to be built—exactly as originally planned.

After I had gone to Europe for the ECA, one of the engineers working on the adjustment of antennas came through and stopped to see me in Paris, and by chance mentioned that the heights had been cut to one 450- and one 400-foot tower.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt. When this project was originally planned, the Army was in charge. Right?

Mr. GILLETT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And at what time was that project blanketed into the State Department, if you know?

Mr. GILLETT. In the fall of 1951, essentially after all equipment had been bought and all transmitter buildings and sites had been selected and the buildings completed.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, after all plans had been made, after you had made arrangements with the British and had written consent from them as to the height of the tower and had made arrangements with the French, after the tower and everything had been purchased, then the State Department took over the project?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. GILLETT. And Mr. Commissioner Donnelly, who took over for the State Department, told me in 1951 at a conference in Vienna that he had been sent to Vienna with the distinct commitment that the State Department had agreed to construct the entire red-white-red network exactly as originally planned.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what happened? Was it constructed? If, not, what was constructed?

Mr. GILLETT. The main change was that they did not use the 900-foot tower. The explanation that was given to me was that they didn't know how to cut it down to 650 feet. I found after I got to Austria in November of 1951 that the CAA and the other authorities had offered and volunteered to approve 650 feet without any objection, and instead, because they didn't know how to shorten the tower from 900 feet to 650 feet, they jacked that tower and used a 450-foot tower we bought for the reflector, and swiped the 400-foot tower we bought for Salzburg on a higher frequency to put up what might be called an emasculated station.

The CHAIRMAN. Could the 900-foot tower be cut down to 650?

Mr. GILLETT. Very easily. It might have taken 1 day to cable the manufacturer to see what sections to leave out. It is built in 20-foot sections, you understand, and goes together just like a fish pole.

The CHAIRMAN. And the reason given by the State Department for not having used this tower, it having been purchased, was that they did not know how to cut it down to 650 feet?

Mr. GILLETT. First the CAA had objected to the full height, and in a conference with Mr. Donnelly, Mr. Moffly, who was the head of the actual operations, was present also and admitted to the facts that I had already learned from the CAA, that he knew and had known from the beginning that the CAA would have approved the 650-foot tower. The engineers in Vienna gave the explanation that they didn't know how to cut down the tower, and they couldn't wait to find out. Of course, the station didn't go into operation for another year.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the effect of scrapping the idea of having a 900-foot tower and substituting a 450-foot tower?

Mr. GILLETT. First, day and night it reduced the total area that could be served by about 20 percent. Secondly, it reduced the signal within the area to all points within the area that were still served by 20 percent, which is equivalent to a reduction in the radiation efficiency of 35 percent. Thirdly, because the antenna originally designed had been especially designed to eliminate fading and quality distortion at night at long distances, that the nighttime service, especially in Hungary and within 600 miles of the transmitter would be largely if not totally destroyed for usefulness by what we call selective fading and quality distortion, in which, due to interference between sky waves, the signal is distorted to where a man sounds like he has a hot potato in his mouth and then goes falsetto, and the whole quality goes to pieces in a basket.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, in brief, your testimony is that the shifting of plans from a 900-foot tower, which the Army had planned to construct, to the 450-foot tower, which the State Department decided to put up, was that your broadcasting facilities were very, very seriously impaired, both as to area hit and the reception of the program.

Mr. GILLETT. The most serious impairment at night came in the area up to 600 miles, where we had a very strong signal that nobody could jam with any effectiveness, and where we could have delivered a high-quality service otherwise. The impairment in this area was up to 75 percent, I would estimate, of its usefulness. This latter figure is based on experience as well as data. The 20 percent is absolute test data which has been confirmed by the engineers adjusting the new antenna.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you have prepared some maps to illustrate the effectiveness and the efficiency of the 900-foot tower planned by the Army as against the 450-foot tower constructed by State. Why do you not come right over there, if you will, sir. Will you speak a little louder now?

Mr. GILLETT. Here is Vienna [indicating]. This is the margin between western free Europe and Soviet-controlled countries. This is the zero point 5 millivolt, 50 percent nighttime sky-wave curve, which the FCC in this country defines as the good nighttime service limit of a station of this character. This is half that. And this is one-tenth, which in our judgment represents the limit to which this station could be used for the dissemination of intelligible and useful information to which the people would listen, especially on account of the steadiness of the signal.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make an observation there, Mr. Gillett.

Mr. GILLETT. This is nighttime [indicating].

The CHAIRMAN. Your testimony in the record will have little meaning if you merely point to the circle on the map, unless you identify some of the cities along the route.

Mr. GILLETT. Well, this goes through the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. The limit of nighttime high-grade service covers half of Turkey, goes more than halfway across Soviet Russia in Europe, and goes nearly to the Gulf of Finland.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you mention a few of the major Russian cities that would have been covered had you built the 900-foot tower?

Mr. GILLETT. It is just next to Moscow. I think I should emphasize that this signal is not so much useful in the cities as it is useful in the rural areas between the cities.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you explain that?

Mr. GILLETT. It is what we describe and the FCC describes as rural-service signal level, because the electrical noise in the cities is large enough that that signal has difficulty in getting through against the electrical noise, but it is a very adequate signal in the rural area, which is what this is, except in the immediate center of each city.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, your second line represents what?

Mr. GILLETT. A signal half that strong, which is still a good and useful service.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the people between line No. 1 and line No. 2 would receive the program if you had a 900-foot tower?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes; and not only that but most people would consider it excellent service, even though it would not be defined as top service.

The CHAIRMAN. And then your third line?

Mr. GILLETT. That goes up to almost the upper end of Finland and into the middle of the Caspian Sea and goes beyond European Russia in the center here. That is the limit of what I think would probably be defined as useful service to disseminate information if you wanted to listen to it, and not on an entertainment basis. It would only be interfered with in this area up here, because there is a small station in Finland operating on this frequency. But within a few miles of the Russian border, down over the rest of the area, it will render very high-grade service.

The CHAIRMAN. See if I understand your testimony. If you had a 900-foot station here at Vienna, you say you could get excellent coverage up to line No. 1, satisfactory coverage to line No. 2, and you would get fairly good reception up as far as line No. 3 on the map.

Mr. GILLETT. Useful reception.

The CHAIRMAN. Useful reception.

Mr. GILLETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, just for the record, will you describe the location of line No. 3?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, line No. 3 goes almost to the top of Finland, through the Gulf of Moray, I believe it is, goes well into the middle and past the middle of the Caspian Sea, almost to the Persian Gulf, and well into the Red Sea below the center of population in Egypt, including all of the major population centers of Asia Minor.

The CHAIRMAN. Roughly, what is the distance from the proposed station in Vienna to the end of this last circle?

Mr. GILLETT. Approximately 1,800 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if this station had been built in Vienna as the Army had planned it, you would have had coverage all of Russia, practically, a coverage over a radius of 1,800 miles?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes. And in Asia Minor, and in here, it would have had the best signal available from any source.

The CHAIRMAN. And the cost of that tower was roughly what, again?

Mr. GILLETT. \$125,000.

The CHAIRMAN. And the tower was actually bought and has never been used?

Mr. GILLETT. At least it has never been used in Austria.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you have a map showing the effectiveness of the 450-foot tower that was finally built?

Mr. GILLETT. I have shown as contour A the one-tenth, which is again the limit of useful service except in this area right here.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. The lady was reminding me to mark this so that it would be identified.

Would you mark the first one as exhibit No. 54? We can perhaps have that photostated and made a part of the record. Will you do that, Ruth?

(The map referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 54," and will be found in the appendix facing p. 674.)

Mr. GILLETT. And this is exhibit No. 55. It is the same map, on which I have drawn the same zero point 1 millivolt contour and the same location.

(The map referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 55" and will be found in the appendix facing p. 674.)

Then I have drawn the one-tenth millivolt contour computed from what should have been the efficiency of the antenna as built. As a matter of fact, I computed that to have an R. M. S. or radiation efficiency of 2,200 millivolts. I was able to see the proof of performance measurements that were made by the engineer who made the final adjustment of this antenna system, and his measurements show 2,230 millivolts, a difference of only about a fraction of a percent.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell me what line No. 1 on here represents? Mark it for the record, if you will.

Mr. GILLETT. B is the as-is Voice of America one-tenth.

The CHAIRMAN. You say the as-is Voice of America one-tenth.

Mr. GILLETT. That is the 450-foot tower and the 400-foot reflector.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "the Voice of America as-is one-tenth," that means nothing to me.

Mr. GILLETT. I am sorry. That is the Voice of America station as they built it, with an average field strength of one-tenth millivolt at night sky-wave signal; that is, a tenth of a millivolt, 50 percent of the time. That is the limit of service. It is the same grade of service as A is for the operation as built. That represents a reduction in area of about 20 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. What do the black lines represent?

Mr. GILLETT. The black lines are an attempt to cross-hatch this area without obscuring the territory. And if you think of it as turning like a wheel, the amount of black ink will make the picture gray by the amount that the service is depreciated. That is, here it will be 20 percent down in signal strength, and a little bit worse due to fading in the outer areas. As you get in here to about 600 miles, you may again get into trouble with the high angle radiation that is reflected from the Heaviside layer in Rumania and in this area, and where we have the strongest useful signal the fading will begin to be of the type we call selective, with very serious destruction of the quality, and by the time you get into a hundred or 200 miles that destruction will be large enough that I estimate the value of the program would be cut to perhaps 25 percent as far as listenability or intelligibility as compared to what it would have been with the station as we designed it.

The CHAIRMAN. Looking at these two exhibits, Mr. Gillett, I do

not see any great difference in the coverage. You seem to hit about the same spot on the Caspian Sea.

Mr. GILLETT. No, it is 10 percent shorter actually. And that is 20 percent in area.

The CHAIRMAN. Line A, you say, is that much shorter.

Mr. GILLETT. Than Line B. Line A is the same as is shown here. That is the average that would have resulted if it had been built as originally planned.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. But with the 450-foot tower, your testimony is that you do not get the reception between A and B.

Mr. GILLETT. Well, the reception that was at A is moved into B. The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Mr. GILLETT. Which I have defined as the limit of service.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand your testimony to be that the important thing, however, is not the reduction in area but the reduction in the signal strength, the listener value, in the area which is covered by the 450-foot station, as compared to the 900-foot station?

Mr. GILLETT. The 20-percent reduction in signal strength is serious. But you are quite correct that the major effect is the destruction of the usefulness of the listenability of the signal within the 600-mile radius of the station.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Now, let us say between 600 and 1,000 miles from the station we were to compare the two. How would the 450-foot station and the 900-foot station compare?

Mr. GILLETT. It would not be so good, but it is gradually getting up to where it is only 20 percent worse.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. So that your lower tower gives you the worst reception within a 650-mile radius. Beyond that 650-mile radius the destruction of the signal—

Mr. GILLETT. Approaches only 20 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a sizable number of Senators on this committee, and they want to read your testimony; and if you anticipate what I am going to ask and answer it, they may not anticipate correctly. Let me repeat that question for the record.

Your testimony is that one of the principal objections to cutting this down from 900 feet to 450 feet is, No. 1, you get very bad reception from the listener standpoint up to 650 miles from the station; that beyond 650 miles the difference between the 1,000-foot tower and the 450-foot tower is not so great.

Mr. GILLETT. It drops down to where it is 20 percent.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. GILLETT. Let me point out one thing before you ask that. In this latitude, which is very far north, in the wintertime what I call nighttime reception will apply for more than half the broadcast day as well as night because of the short suntime in the middle of the winter.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you implying that your reception, because you have cut the size of the antenna, is worse immediately around the antenna than it is farther out?

Mr. GILLETT. From a range of 100 miles up to 600 miles it is very much worse.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, you have given us back a hundred miles. Just being the Devil's advocate, you are saying if you cut the antenna

from the 900 feet to 450 feet the reception would be very much decreased inside the city?

Mr. GILLETT. It would be decreased 20 percent out to the 100- or 150-mile point. It will also be decreased all the way out. And the quality will largely be such as to destroy the usefulness of it during nighttime listening conditions from about 150 to 600 miles out.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that testimony in that particular case checked by somebody you felt was an experienced radio engineer in that field. I do not understand that testimony, I must say.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say, Mr. Symington, that the counsel has been ordered to get the best possible radio engineers. We feel we have one of the top radio engineers here. We have asked other engineers whether they consider Mr. Gillett a top engineer. We have not had a single engineer who does not praise Mr. Gillett and say he is one of the very best.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, it is news to me that the reception right around the station is worse than it would be two or three hundred miles away if you cut the antenna in half.

Mr. GILLETT. It may be news to you, sir, but it is well known in the industry. In fact, the FCC has a regulation that will not permit the use of a quarter-wave antenna, which is approximately what this is here, though it is top-loaded a little bit, on a frequency of this kind.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the frequency you are using?

Mr. GILLETT. 755. All or practically all of our American high-power clear-channel stations use half wave or better antennas to minimize this fading which I am speaking of here, and which is well known in the industry.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, then, there is nothing mysterious about the fact that the lower tower, the 450-foot tower, will give you comparatively much worse reception nearer to the station than farther away.

Mr. GILLETT. I have an article, or two articles, published in 1936 in the Institute of American Radio Engineers proceedings, in which that is all computed out in great detail by Dr. Brown, who is the top research man of the RCA, and the figures are given to show exactly why that is true and where this increased fading comes due to lower antennas.

The CHAIRMAN. And is this correct, Mr. Gillett, that in what you would call the key areas of Russia, the key target areas, you lose 75 percent of your listeners at night because of the inefficiency of the transmitting setup?

Mr. GILLETT. I think you lose 75 percent of the intelligibility. Whether you still lose that many listeners or not, I do not know. But it is seriously depreciated. It is a type of distortion that is extremely wearing and annoying to a person to listen to.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: You went over to Europe to work on this at the request of the Army. Is that right?

Mr. GILLETT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that this shifting from the 900-foot tower to the 450-foot tower effectively destroyed the efficiency and effectiveness of that particular broadcasting setup?

Mr. GILLETT. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that was done because of stupidity? Or do you feel it was purposely done to sabotage any attempt to have good coverage of that key target area?

Mr. GILLETT. I have never been able to understand why it was done, because cables went through stating the reduction would be only 10 percent in signal strength, when it is known that that is false. That was sent through to Donnelly. I saw the cable myself. The only explanation that I have is either that the engineers of the Voice of America wanted to swipe the high tower for use in one of their stations, or it was done intentionally to emasculate the service into Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently they did not want to swipe the tower, because it is still lying there gathering rust, is it not?

Mr. GILLETT. They are planning, I believe, to use it at the second Voice of America station in Munich.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we should make it clear that the Voice was not in charge of this construction. It was the International Information Administration in Paris.

Mr. GILLETT. I am not sure of the technical name, because I never worked with them. I did present the whole story to Commissioner Donnelly. I also got the entire story to Mr. Compton as soon as he was appointed.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I bring that up: We have been, I think, here blaming the Voice unintentionally for what the IIA was responsible for.

Mr. GILLETT. The engineering people, whoever they are with.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Gillett, when you found out about this situation, did General Fry arrange for you to go over and see Commissioner Donnelly, our High Commissioner in Austria?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes.

Mr. COHN. And did you have a meeting with Commissioner Donnelly and Mr. Moffly, who was thoroughly familiar with the situation, in which you went over all these facts with them?

Mr. GILLETT. I presented essentially the same facts to them as I did here.

Mr. COHN. And did Commissioner Donnelly after that express in a letter to General Fry his satisfaction with your appraisal of the situation and the fact that he had given instructions that this matter be reviewed with a view toward lengthening the tower so that proper coverage would be insured?

The CHAIRMAN. May I suggest if you have the letter there that it be read into the record?

Mr. COHN. I have two short letters; first of all the letter to Commissioner Donnelly from General Fry.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, some of the Senators came in late. Will you identify Mr. Donnelly and General Fry?

Mr. COHN. Mr. Donnelly, of course, was United States High Commissioner for Austria.

Now General Fry?

Mr. GILLETT. The top military commander, as I understand it, under General Keys, who was the commander in chief. I don't know his exact title.

Senator MUNDT. Were those the Keys from Oklahoma?

Mr. GILLETT. I don't know where he is from.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom is that addressed?

Mr. COHN. This is dated November 9, 1951, and is from General Fry to Mr. Walter J. Donnelly, United States High Commissioner for Austria, APO 777, United States Army.

DEAR MR. DONNELLY: This will introduce Mr. Gillett, consultant, Office of Special Representative in Europe, Economic Cooperation Administration, Paris, France.

Mr. Gillett was our adviser at the time we made extensive studies as to the desirability of increasing radio coverage from Vienna. It was he who selected the location for the 1,000-foot tower that we planned. He knows more about this subject than any man I have met. I am confident that you will enjoy meeting him and that he can give you valuable information concerning the background of our planning and possibilities of future radio efforts from your Vienna station.

All through my acquaintance with Mr. Gillett, I have been impressed with the fact that his greatest ambition is to do a good job for America during this period of cold-war operation. In this respect, his natural instincts are spurred on by the fact that his son was killed in action at Futa Pass while serving in a regiment adjacent to the one I commanded during that battle.

Sincerely,

J. C. FRY,  
*Brigadier General, United States Army, Commanding.*

The reply is as follows from Commissioner Donnelly to General Fry, dated December 4, 1951:

DEAR GENERAL FRY: I spent about 2 hours with Mr. Glenn Dewey Gillett last week and was tremendously impressed with him as an engineer and as a patriotic American citizen. During the course of our conversation, I asked Mr. Charles Moffly to sit in with us so that Mr. Gillett would be informed as to the present work that we are doing on the radio towers here in Vienna.

I was very satisfied with what Mr. Gillett had to report and have instructed Mr. Moffly to study the possibility of lengthening out our towers since, as Mr. Gillett explained, the effectiveness of radio coverage would be so much greater.

I shall keep you informed of whatever progress we might make in this line and thank you again for your kindness in recommending Mr. Gillett to me. With my very best wishes, I remain

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER J. DONNELLY,  
*United States High Commissioner for Austria.*

Now, may we have these two in the record, Mr. Chairman?

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 56 and 57," and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. COHN. Following that, did you also, through mutual acquaintances, have this situation called to the attention of Dr. Compton?

Mr. GILLETT. Almost as soon as Compton was appointed, and before I believe he had left Washington, a mutual friend of my associate, Mr. Bergquist was in the office, and we told him of this problem and what had happened, and he said he was having dinner that night with Dr. Compton, who was a friend of his, and that he would give Dr. Compton all this information.

We were later informed that he had done so and that Compton would undoubtedly get in touch with me. And I have heard just exactly the same nothing that I did from Mr. Donnelly.

Mr. COHN. And as far as you know, the station is still operating with the 450-foot tower; is that right?

Mr. GILLETT. I have seen the proof of performance and measurements of the adjustment showing it is.

Mr. COHN. Did you also make representations along these lines to Mr. Herrick, who was the Chief of the Engineering Department of the Voice?

Mr. GILLETT. Not since it was done.

Mr. COHN. Did you do this prior to the time it was done?

Mr. GILLETT. Mr. Herrick called me, when his agency first took over the responsibility for completing construction, and asked to see all the papers and all the data that we had, as professional engineers, on which we based the predictions. His main objective seemed to be to find some basis to prove that we were wrong. And I never did talk to Herrick after the heights were reduced.

Mr. COHN. There is one question I wanted to ask you here, Mr. Gillett. You stated that you saw a cable from New York just saying that the reduction in the size of the antenna would amount only to a 10-percent reduction in effectiveness. Is that right?

Mr. GILLETT. In signal strength.

Mr. COHN. In signal strength. Where did you happen to see that cable?

Mr. GILLETT. I saw that in the files in Vienna when I was there in November of 1951.

Mr. COHN. You saw that in the files. Is that right? And, of course, you have testified that that figure submitted by the Engineering Department as justification for this reduction in the size of the tower is not in accordance with the facts. Is that right?

Mr. GILLETT. The figure should be 20 percent, and there should be a considerable statement as to what it would do to the impairment of the nighttime service.

Mr. COHN. Now, one last question here. This morning we had Mr. Bracken in from the Legal Department, and we told him we had been trying to locate Mr. A. D. Ring, whose name was submitted to us. Mr. Bracken, I believe, told us that Mr. Ring, who we have been previously told went to the Pacific some time ago, had just left for the Pacific 10 days ago. Have you seen Mr. Ring lately?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, I just have received word from Mr. Leahy that Mr. Ring has returned on March 10 and will be available to us.

Mr. COHN. That was our information.

The CHAIRMAN. I have asked Mr. Leahy to talk with Mr. Ring, and, if he disagrees with the testimony heretofore given, that he should come in and testify. And Jack is going to talk to him.

Is that right?

Mr. LEAHY. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one question. You talk about the reduction of the signal strength by 20 percent. That does not mean too much to the lay mind, to a man who is not a radio engineer. Let me ask you this: How much would the signal strength have to be reduced, by what percentage, until it becomes completely ineffectual from the listener's standpoint?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, that you cannot answer, sir. If you are 6 feet high and you are in water 5 feet 5 deep, if you reduce your height 10 percent then it puts your nose under water, and completely destroys you. But if the water is only 5 feet deep, it only put you half as close to the water as you were before. So that it is a relative matter. It does reduce the signal strength everywhere equivalent to a reduction in power of a third. It does wherever there is marginal reception make a very marked difference. It always increases the

noise by 20 percent that you hear in the background. If you have very little noise, it makes no difference.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, in an area in which you can barely get the program, the 20-percent reduction would knock it out entirely?

Mr. GILLETT. It makes all the difference in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. If you are getting excellent reception, the 20-percent reduction would mean very little.

Mr. GILLETT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say this 20-percent reduction is the most damaging within a 650-mile radius, and in effect cuts out about 75 percent of your listening audience at night?

Mr. GILLETT. No, the 20 percent is not damaging, but the fact that the type of antenna you use totally alters the quality of the program received, even though it is still strong, even thought it is only 20 percent down in strength, does destroy its listenability and its intelligibility.

The CHAIRMAN. So you have two factors, then, to take into consideration. Number one, your signal strength is reduced by about 20 percent. Number two, the change in the antenna from a 900-foot antenna to a 450-foot antenna gives you a poor-quality reception. Is that what you would say?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is entirely separate and apart from the 20-percent reduction in the signal strength?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is this second factor that you mention which makes this broadcasting station of very little value in the principal target area?

Mr. GILLETT. That is right, at night, under nighttime conditions, which at those latitudes in the winter would run until about 9 or 10 in the morning and start again about 3 or 4 in the afternoon, clear through the time the people went to bed.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, at the time people would normally be listening to a broadcast, your station is of practically no value in that 650-mile area.

Mr. GILLETT. Its quality is almost destroyed, seriously depreciated.

The CHAIRMAN. Then is it safe to say that whether this has been done because of stupidity or purposely done, this project has been effectively sabotaged?

Mr. GILLETT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McClellan?

Senator McCLELLAN. Were there any other considerations for the use of the 450-foot antenna that you speak of?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, there was rumor, as I say, that the air attaché for the British had objected to this on account of interference with their gliders in the glide path.

Senator McCLELLAN. Was that the principal objection?

Mr. GILLETT. That was the objection that was given to me by all people concerned as to why they cut it down. This objection was apparently accepted, because they did not have or did not take the trouble to locate the previous signed consent of the British. I was never asked to help locate the information or to tell them what had happened. I have never been consulted as to any of these details since they decided to cut the antenna.

**Senator McCLELLAN.** Were your services discontinued after they decided to cut the antenna?

**Mr. GILLETT.** I was hired by the Army and was paid by the Army. I was never paid for any of the work that I did in giving data. I made a 30- or 40-page report for the State Department on this whole thing. I had numbers of conferences with their engineers. I offered to go to Europe at no expense for my time to help the engineer who was taking over the actual construction, pick up all the details and loose ends, and my offers were refused without thanks.

**Senator McCLELLAN.** Do you know whether the 900-foot tower would have interfered with the aviation operations in that section, of the British?

**Mr. GILLETT.** It would not have been serious, sir. I have spent 20 years working with the CAA and air officials here in this country on air hazards of towers, and I am not an aviator, but I am quite familiar with the problems, and, as I say, the location was such that we would have had no trouble getting approval from the CAA in this country for the tower.

**Senator McCLELLAN.** For the 900-foot tower?

**Mr. GILLETT.** For the 900-foot tower. For even a thousand-foot tower.

**Senator McCLELLAN.** You would have had no trouble here?

**Mr. GILLETT.** That is right. Also it was a question of a calculated risk in order to permit us to do the maximum possible job in the countries to the eastward.

**Senator McCLELLAN.** Apparently there is some indication that the prime reason for abandoning the 900-foot tower, and the use of the 450-foot tower, was the objection of the British.

**Mr. GILLETT.** That is the excuse. I know from the CAA and from Mr. Moffly that they had clearance for 650 feet, which would have recovered about half of what they lost by going to 450 feet, and they did not choose to bother to use it.

**Senator McCLELLAN.** But your position would be, assuming that is true—I say "your position"; I mean it would be apparent, then—that prior to the plans, to perfecting the plans, for the 900-foot tower, the British were not consulted.

**Mr. GILLETT.** Oh, they were consulted, and we have their signature to it.

**Senator McCLELLAN.** Of approval?

**Mr. GILLETT.** Yes.

**Senator McCLELLAN.** Prior to it?

**Mr. GILLETT.** Yes; of the High Commissioner, and of the French.

**Senator McCLELLAN.** All of it was approved, then?

**Mr. GILLETT.** Yes, completely.

**Senator McCLELLAN.** Before you started?

**Mr. GILLETT.** Absolutely. Before we spent a dime.

**Senator McCLELLAN.** And they went so far as to order the antenna, and got it there, got it delivered, and then abandoned the plan?

**Mr. GILLETT.** Yes.

**The CHAIRMAN.** May I say to Senator McClellan that I have just been informed by Mr. Leahy that Mr. Cupps, the construction engineer who is in charge of the entire project, is in the room; that he has what he considers an expert on wavelengths here. And I think while Mr. Gillett is here, we should have those three men here. I understand

the wavelength experts will substantially agree with you on your picture, here, but I would like to have them up here.

Senator McCLELLAN. I would like to ask him one more question.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. Let me get this clear in the record. You have used the word "emasculated."

Mr. GILLET. Well, I have, intentionally.

Senator McCLELLAN. Intentionally. Well, that carries with it pretty serious consequences.

Mr. GILLET. That is my view of what happened.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is exactly what you intended to convey by the use of the word?

Mr. GILLET. Yes. I would stake my professional reputation on this.

Senator McCLELLAN. From a practical viewpoint, then, was there justification for constructing the station, on the basis that it is now constructed and put into use?

Mr. GILLET. I do not believe there was any justification for constructing it as it is now put into use, when it could have been constructed as originally designed.

Senator McCLELLAN. You do not think, then, it would be regarded as a practical project or facility had the original plans indicated that this would have been the result?

Mr. GILLET. Oh, it was better than nothing, sir. But there is no use in putting in a half effort when you can put in a full effort.

Senator McCLELLAN. Has anything been developed since to take care of the deficiency of this station in the areas that it would have covered?

Mr. GILLET. No, there is no possibility of it.

Senator McCLELLAN. And there is no possibility of it.

Mr. GILLET. No, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is what I wanted to clear up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I would like to read into the record a letter from Glenn D. Gillett and Associates, consulting radio engineers, to the Department of State. I think this is important to have in the record to show that this witness had no interest in obtaining the contract. His firm had been asked to bid on this contract, on this construction project.

MAY 18, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM R. HARMON,  
*Department of State, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. HARMON: Reference is made to your verbal invitation to submit a bid on the Austrian project.

Recently two partners of the firm Glenn D. Gillett & Associates have withdrawn to accept positions in defense work. The senior partner is on leave with the Economic Cooperation Administration and is attached to the Office of Special Representative of the ECA in Paris, France. This leaves me the only partner and engineer to conduct the business.

Under these circumstances it is impractical, even if awarded the contract, to leave the country to complete the Austrian project.

Accordingly, it is with deep regret that I must decline to submit a bid on the Austrian project.

Very sincerely yours,

PAUL BERGQUIST.

I merely read this, Mr. Gillett, to show that you had no financial interest in this particular project; that your firm said they did not care to do the construction work on it.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 58," and may be found in the files of the subcommittee).

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: Is it correct that you refused to accept any money for any work you did for the State Department while in Europe on this particular project?

Mr. GILLETT. Not only in Europe but in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. And you paid all of your own expenses over there?

Mr. GILLETT. No. I think I was paid by the ECA, and I was in Vienna and in Austria on work for them and did this evenings and in my spare time between the job for the ECA—

The CHAIRMAN. I see. And you offered to go over again for nothing?

Mr. GILLETT. I offered before that, when the State Department agency first took over the construction and asked me for the details. I explained that there were lots of loose ends that could be picked up only on the ground, really, and when they said they were short on funds, I said that I was not looking for profit or remuneration, that, "I will go if you will pay my expenses for whatever time is necessary, at least 2 weeks, to go over all of the details on all three sites so that you can pick them up without any loss of effort."

The CHAIRMAN. Just shifting for a moment to another subject before we bring Mr. Cupps and Mr. Ross up: In 1936, did you submit a report to the State Department on the matter of propagation on the west coast? Do you remember whether you submitted a report to the State Department in 1936?

Mr. GILLETT. In 1936, I was retained by one of our clients to make a study of the problem of location and service that could be rendered to the Orient and to South America by one of the so-called short-wave broadcasting stations that were authorized at that time by the FCC, to carry broadcasting for pay. And that study was made for my client and delivered to my client in California. I have no knowledge as to what he did with it.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. And that had to do with the same subject we have under discussion, namely, the location of a shortwave transmitter on the west coast?

Mr. GILLETT. Our studies at that time showed that the best location for a station to serve Japan and China, Formosa, and Indochina, was, of all points along the coast, as far south as possible, in southern California, preferably in the Los Angeles or Ventura area.

The CHAIRMAN. I merely mention this, Mr. Gillett, because there has been some claim that it has not been general knowledge in the radio engineering profession that it would be unwise to locate a shortwave transmitter aimed at a distance in the magnetic storm area, and your testimony is that some 17 or 18 years ago you made a complete study and you determined it would be unwise to locate a shortwave transmitter up in the heart of the magnetic storm area, but that it should be located in southern California.

Mr. GILLETT. Yes. I don't know that you should deduce from that that it was complete general knowledge at that time. You see, I had been 1 of 2 or 3 engineers with the Bell System that had run the first systematic measurements on shortwaves to determine skip distance and effective magnetic fields to both Bermuda and England back in 1927 and had worked with the Bell System in the planning department while they were developing the shortwave telephone sys-

tems to Europe, and had been in on the experimental data showing the destruction of service whenever the magnetic storms bloomed in this magnetic area.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this. In view of these studies made not long ago on this particular subject, can you think of any reason why any competent radio engineer would locate a shortwave transmitter which was to be aimed at a distant target in the Seattle area, that is, up in the magnetic storm belt?

Mr. GILLETT. I could think of no reason why you would locate it there to aim toward Asia. If you head it south, it wouldn't make any difference where you put it.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

What about heading it to Manila from Baker West?

Mr. GILLETT. Strange to say, the path to Manila goes up by Attu, the Great Circle course.

Senator JACKSON. You said to Asia.

Mr. GILLETT. Well, I consider Manila as Asia. I am sorry.

Senator JACKSON. I wanted to narrow it on down.

Mr. GILLETT. Anywhere from Manila on east.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Gillett, I want to ask you this question: Can you account for any reason why the people at MIT, in 1951, should recommend the present locations of Baker East and Baker West?

Mr. GILLETT. No. Because the Bureau of Standards Propagation Section were putting out monthly predictions that I found while I was consultant to the 20th Air Force on Guam were extremely accurate, enabling me to predict for weather strike planes back as far as Sakhalin and north of Japan so as to let the men get back when they wouldn't otherwise have gotten back.

Senator JACKSON. How did these men rate at MIT from a professional standpoint?

Mr. GILLETT. I don't know personally.

Senator JACKSON. What is the general reputation in the broadcasting field or the electronics field? What is their general reputation?

Mr. GILLETT. Their general reputation on radar is very high. They did a magnificent job during the war on radar, which is very short pulse. As far as this is concerned, however, I think I am disqualified, because I am a Harvard Engineering School graduate, and there is no love lost between Harvard and MIT.

Senator JACKSON. You are being forthright.

This troubles me, because the testimony we have before the committee is that in 1951 they recommended these sites, and then changed their mind, I believe, a year later, and I am trying to find out the reason for it, or why they recommended it in the first place. It had been my impression that MIT was, if you will excuse me, from your prejudiced position, for a moment—that MIT has always been considered to have some top people in the engineering field, and I, as a layman, just assumed that they should know something about this area of propagation.

Mr. GILLETT. It is not one of their strong fields. And MIT is like a great department store with a great many departments, some of which are excellent, and some of which may not be.

The CHAIRMAN. You say radio is not their strong field.

Mr. GILLETT. So far as I know. I am not primarily a shortwave expert, though I have done a lot of work in it. I am familiar with the

problems and the literature that is available. But I have not come in contact with their work, and they are not one of the sources that I would have thought of to go to.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, have you determined from the witness who it was who made the decision to cut back from 900 feet to 450 feet?

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you testified on that.

Do you know the individual responsible, Mr. Gillett, for the reduction in the height of the tower from 900 to 450 feet.

Mr. GILLETT. I don't know of my own knowledge. The inference was that it was Mr. Herrick that had the final decision, but I don't know.

Senator MUNDT. We have a cable here signed by a man by the name of Dowling. Do you know who Dowling is?

The CHAIRMAN. What is that name?

Senator MUNDT. Dowling.

Mr. GILLETT. I have never heard of it.

Senator MUNDT. He apparently was head of the Vienna station.

Mr. GILLETT. Wasn't that Donnelly?—Oh, he was one of the members of the State Department staff; yes. I did meet and work with him.

Senator JACKSON. Did they give any reason for cutting down the size of the tower?

Mr. GILLETT. The only reason they gave was that an air attaché from the British objected, and they couldn't find quickly in the files the signed approval, and they never asked me to help them find it.

Senator JACKSON. Did you indicate to them that if they cut the tower from 900 feet to four hundred odd feet, it would eliminate the transmission of information to Poland and Russia?

Mr. GILLETT. I have furnished the committee with a transcript copy of the memorandum, setting forth exactly the same information I have given here, with the exception of the maps, to Commissioner Donnelly in Vienna in November, the latter part of November of 1951. It is exactly the same information that I gave by word of mouth, by mutual friends, to Dr. Compton, when he was first appointed. I also made protests to the engineer who had been hired by IBD, or whatever it is, to do the adjustments, that I talked to in Paris, and I asked him to carry my strong protests to the people in Vienna, in the summer of 1951. I have always been shocked and outraged at what has been done to what could have been a monument. You see, this tower was to be erected on about the equivalent of the Lee Custis Mansion position in Arlington here, and it would have been nearly twice as tall as the Washington Monument and would have loomed over all of Vienna, with its lights to avoid aviation at night, like a monument, and would have been a living evidence to everybody in Vienna that the Americans were willing to try to do their utmost to help in Vienna. And, as it is, it has been cut down to where it is not at all conspicuous.

Senator JACKSON. How far will the beam go now?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, I have explained that the actual distance as to any given signal is reduced about 20 percent.

Senator JACKSON. Does the signal go to Poland, or to the Soviet Union, now?

Mr. GILLETT. Oh, at night; yes. But it is also garbled to where, over much of the area, the fading destroys its intelligibility and its listenability.

Senator JACKSON. But the reason that you gathered from your discussions and conversations with the people over there was that the British had protested as to the height?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes; and I got the impression that they welcomed the protest, because it gave them an excuse to not build the tower.

Senator SYMINGTON. The British?

Mr. GILLETT. No; the IBD engineers.

Senator JACKSON. But you felt they wanted to use that as an excuse, that they did not want to build an effective tower?

Mr. GILLETT. My entire impression during all my contacts with them was—in fact, I have wondered whether the objection was not instigated by the engineers of IBD.

Senator JACKSON. Now, could you give the committee the names of the instigators? Because this is pretty serious. I mean the ones that you talked with.

Mr. GILLETT. I have talked to Harmon and to Cupps.

Senator JACKSON. Harmon? And who is the other?

Mr. GILLETT. Mr. Cupps, who is in the room. Mr. Cupps did not come into the picture until the decision was made and could have had no possible part in it.

Mr. GILLETT. Mr. Harmon was over there when the objection developed.

Senator JACKSON. Now, would there be anybody else who would be behind this move?

Mr. GILLETT. I don't know, sir.

Senator JACKSON. I mean that you talked with.

Mr. GILLETT. No; Harmon is the only man I talked to. You see, as soon as I began to voice my protests, there was official word sent out both from Vienna and from New York that none of the engineers concerned were to talk to me or give me any data whatsoever.

Senator MUNDT. Does the State Department have any other projection antenna in that area for reaching the target areas of Poland and Russia?

Mr. GILLETT. Not that section of Poland and Russia.

Senator MUNDT. Not that section?

Mr. GILLETT. The Voice of America stations in Munich are, for the most part, beamed to the northern part of Russia, rather than the central and southern.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask you a couple of questions. I want to be sure that I get it straight.

You call this shortwave. Right?

Mr. GILLETT. No. This is not shortwave.

Senator SYMINGTON. 755 is not shortwave?

Mr. GILLETT. No. That is the middle of our broadcast band. It is the same broadcast band that we use in this country, from 550 to 1600, what we call in Europe the medium-wave band.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, you cut the antenna 50 percent. That is, from 900 to 450.

Mr. GILLETT. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you have destroyed the signal within 600 miles of the station; is that right?

Mr. GILLETT. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. So that you really might as well not have an antenna at all? I am just trying to follow you.

Mr. GILLETT. No; there is service there. But let us say you take a man who can shout so far and fill his mouth full of marbles. You can still hear him, but it doesn't mean much.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, if you were out 600 miles, that would be the 5 feet 5 you were talking about, maybe. I am only asking. I am not arguing. But it seems to me that if you were within 20 or 30 miles of the station, the fact that you cut the height of that antenna, going, I think you said 1,800 miles—I do not quite understand how you would eliminate any desirable reception of any kind whatever.

Mr. GILLETT. The reception within about 150 to 100 miles of the transmitter, I have said, would not be seriously affected.

Senator SYMINGTON. Oh, I see. Within a hundred to 150 miles.

Mr. GILLETT. Then you begin to hit what you call the fading wall, sir, and that reaches its peak at about 300 miles, and then tapers off to where there is not much difference out beyond 600 or 650 miles. I don't know whether you have ever listened around here at night to WWL in New Orleans. It is the best sky-wave service in this area and was designed as such by us for the Loyola University, so as to serve their Catholic population at night.

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to ask you about that glide pattern. Do you know the CAA rules in this country as to how close stations can be?

Mr. GILLETT. Oh, yes. That is stock in trade.

Senator SYMINGTON. How far can you put one airfield from another, from the standpoint of your landing pattern?

Mr. GILLETT. This does not affect the landing pattern at all. This is not to airfields.

Senator SYMINGTON. But the height of the tower would not affect your landing pattern?

Mr. GILLETT. It depends on where it is.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right.

Mr. GILLETT. This is 14.5 miles away. It is in a cup of the mountains in which hills and trees behind are within 200 feet of the same height as the antenna.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think there might have been some justification on the part of the British when they protested?

Mr. GILLETT. No; because their maneuver pattern and landing and approach is from the south, and this is the north. If they have to use a north approach on account of hills to the westward, they have to swing to the east of the beams, which puts them over the flat country. There is no question of interference with the maneuver and landing.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, you think the British request to cut the tower because of their glide path was in error. Is that it?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, any tower is a potential hazard. As one CAA man told me, "If you put up a toothpick anywhere in the United States, I won't approve it, because a plane might hit it, and then I would be to blame for it."

Senator SYMINGTON. I was only asking you a very simple question. Do you think the British were in error?

Mr. GILLETT. I do not think their protest was justified.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do not think their protest was justified.

Now, you said a minute ago that you thought the MIT observation was incorrect. Is that right? With respect to Baker West?

Mr. GILLETT. I think there is no question about it, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, would it not be possible that the British had made a mistake when they first approved it and then decided it did interfere with their landing pattern?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes; there are always horse races.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am not talking about horse races. I am talking about landing patterns. Now, one other question I would like to ask you. You said you felt that the Americans relished, as I got it, the objection of the British. Is that it?

Mr. GILLETT. I think I got the impression that they were not disappointed.

Senator SYMINGTON. Whom did you get that from?

Mr. GILLETT. From a talk with the various engineers.

Senator SYMINGTON. Whom did you talk with?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, one was Harmon.

The CHAIRMAN. To properly identify Harmon, may I add this—

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. Who is Mr. Harmon?

Mr. GILLETT. I also got it from my conversations with Mr. Herrick initially.

The CHAIRMAN. May I, Mr. Gillett, for Senator Symington's benefit, and that of the other Senators, say that we have previously introduced some correspondence by Harmon, which I think might have some significance here at this point. He was with the IIA. And I will read from a document heretofore introduced in evidence. He was referring to a Mr. Creed at that time. He says:

This brings up the question of Creed and how we can eliminate him. Based on a strictly survey value, Creed has done an exceptional job. His operating costs have been reduced. The outage time for negligible overall operation is a relatively clear one. He is always coming up with some moneysaving device, as the attachment shows. His efficiency ratings have been good, which is of course not grounds for dismissal or transfer. The only possible solution I can see to get rid of him is to abolish the job as Director and rewrite a job description to cover the title of Chief Engineer. \* \* \*

I thought you should know that this is the same Mr. Harmon.

Senator JACKSON. What is Harmon's official position?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, he was introduced to me as the engineer that was going to have charge of the construction for the IIA of this entire project in Austria after it had been taken over by the State Department.

Senator JACKSON. Where is he now?

Mr. GILLETT. I don't know. I haven't seen him since the spring of '51.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, just so that we can concentrate and pinpoint your testimony, so that we can understand it thoroughly, you felt that this was maybe just not a mistake of judgment; that it might have been something deeper than that?

Mr. GILLETT. It is significant that the only part of the plan that was altered was that part which would seriously depreciate the service to the areas behind the Iron Curtain.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you mean by "significant"? Could I ask you that?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, it is significant in my mind because it is the same type of mistake that could be accredited to stupidity in individual cases. It is the same type of thing that I have encountered in talking to other engineers with other sections of the IIA's work in construction. It is apparently a pattern.

Senator SYMINGTON. That goes beyond stupidity?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, I think, as one person put it, if you were just stupid you couldn't be wrong all the time.

Senator SYMINGTON. What would you say about the MIT decision on Baker West? Was that stupid, or was that part of a pattern?

Mr. GILLETT. I don't know.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do not know about that?

Mr. GILLETT. I don't know who did it. The answer they came up with is not the correct answer.

Senator SYMINGTON. One other question: About the British changing their mind and thinking the tower was too high—

The CHAIRMAN. Stu, in fairness to MIT, I think it should be pointed out that they have told the staff a sizable number of times that they were not given time to make this study. It was a new study to them. And the location was made before they had a chance to make a complete study. I think that should be in the record.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to respectfully present that I have done a lot of business with MIT, and I think that Dr. Compton is perhaps our greatest scientist today, Dr. Karl Compton.

Mr. GILLETT. I agree with you. I am a great admirer of Compton.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you felt they were probably not equipped to make a decision in this field?

Mr. GILLETT. I was not aware—it may be my ignorance in that—that they had any strong background in this field.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, one other question I would like to ask you. Would it not be possible that the British were just stupid, too, when they made their original decision to approve the height of the tower? Or do you think there is a pattern there?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, they certainly weren't stupid. My observation of British public servants is that they are not stupid.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think there was a pattern in their desiring to cut the tower from 900 to 450?

Mr. GILLETT. No. You see, any air attaché always objects to anything that might possibly be a hazard, because then if he has objected to it and anything happens, he is on record and in the clear.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, Mr. Gillett, I have only one more question I would like to ask you, and I am sorry I was not here when you first started testifying. That is: You were interested in this project. You thought the tower ought to be 900 feet. The tower was cut to 450 feet, apparently, from a document that we have here, at the suggestion of the British air attaché, and that was approved by the Americans as being the right thing to do, to cut it to 450 feet because it interfered with the passage of airplane traffic in this part of Vienna or wherever this was.

Mr. GILLETT. They thought it might interfere.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there not as much chance that they did it sincerely and honestly, as that they did not do it sincerely and honestly, especially as the suggestion originated with the British?

Mr. GILLETT. I am not clear that we have any proof that it did originate with the British.

Senator SYMINGTON. If it did originate with the British?

Mr. GILLETT. The reason I was so concerned is because the ink was hardly dry on the 450 foot decision, when, long before any construction work had been started, it was admitted to me by Mr. Moffly himself, in the presence of Mr. Donnelly, and independently by the CAA authorities, representatives of the CAA in Vienna, that at the same time this objection had come through they had been later told almost immediately that neither the CAA nor anyone else would have any objection to the installation of a mast 650 feet high, which would have recovered half the loss in signal strength and two-thirds of the loss in the service value of the station. And they didn't do it, because it was too much bother to wire the manufacturer as to which sections they should take out of the tower to reduce it from 900 to 650 feet. Now, when they won't take that much trouble to salvage as much as they could of the plans, one wonders.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I put this in the record? Mr. Leahy has asked me not to read this, because it is a decoded message, and it might endanger our code if this were read into the record. I am going to tell what is in the message and let the other Senators examine it, and, if they want to add anything further by a careful paraphrase, good.

This is from Dowling, with apparently the office of Acting Administrator of HICOG.

Mr. LEAHY. The Acting High Commissioner.

The CHAIRMAN. The Acting High Commissioner. And he says that the British object to a 900-foot tower. They would prefer a 450-foot tower. Then he goes on to recommend that a 400-foot tower be used. In other words, Dowling was going to use this 50 feet below what the British had requested. I gather his reason for doing that was because there was a 400-foot tower stockpiled at Salzburg at that time. I believe that is the gist of the message.

May I ask the witness: If this had been reduced all the way down to 400 feet, would that 50-foot change make much difference?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes. Because you go over a critical point. The 450-foot tower had been specially designed with isolating insulators near the top, so that it could be top-loaded and resonated to simulate a tower approximately 600 feet high.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you think of any reason why Dowling apparently on his own said, "Let us make it only 400 feet," when the lowest tower the British asked for was 450 feet?

Mr. GILLETT. I don't know of any reason, except to be a good fellow and go along with the British a little further.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I would like to ask you a question there if I may. Now, if you are going to take a 900-foot tower and cut it up down to a 450-foot tower——

Mr. GILLETT. No; they didn't cut it to 450. They took another tower.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right. If you have a 400-foot tower. And let us assume these people are not completely expert in the rel-

ative attenuation that we discussed, and you have a 450-foot tower available, there. Perhaps would it not be possible to think that they were willing to take a 900-foot tower and use it, say, at Munich or somewhere else intact as a 900-foot tower and then use the 400-foot tower that the had there?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, I have never suggested that they should use the 400-foot tower.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not think you answered my question. My point is: They had a 400-foot tower.

Mr. GILLETT. They had a 450-foot tower, which we had bought, and a 400-foot tower.

Senator SYMINGTON. I beg your pardon. They had a 400-foot tower stockpiled at Salzburg. Might they not think if they had to go from 900 feet to 450 feet at the request of the British, instead of taking a 900-foot tower and messing it up to the point of making it 450 feet, they could take the 900-foot tower and use it somewhere else, and use the 400-foot tower, not being as expert as you were?

Mr. GILLETT. I think Dowling was perfectly sincere. He knows nothing about radio and sky-wave transmission. The 450-foot tower was provided with top loading and resonating so that it could be lifted up to the equivalent of a much higher tower than could the 400-foot. And what they did use, of course, was the 450-foot tower for the main radiator and the 400-foot tower as the reflector, which was the proper choice if they were going to do that.

Senator MUNDT. They had a 900-foot tower, did they not? And they had a 400-foot tower stockpiled at Salzburg?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes; and a 450-foot tower bought for the second tower.

Senator MUNDT. They had three towers, then?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. So they had three towers stockpiled and could use any one of them.

Mr. GILLETT. Yes; but they also had a tower that, very simply, by not putting all the joints in the fish pole, could have been an excellent radiator, at 650, and they could have used the 450-foot tower for a reflector that was much better than the 400-foot tower they did use.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you not say they could have found out within a week how to take a 900-foot tower and make it a 450-foot tower?

Mr. GILLETT. And make it a 650-foot tower.

Senator SYMINGTON. But they still had a 400-foot tower on the grounds somewhere.

Mr. GILLETT. Yes; which they had to use, which was designed as the reflector. This was a two-tower job.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see. Now, reading this telegram, apparently Mr. Dowling said: In order to be sure, as long as the British have protested, maybe we had better use a 400-foot tower instead of a 450-foot tower. Do you think he said that in good faith?

Mr. GILLETT. Now that I place Dowling, I don't question his good faith. I was much impressed with his integrity in my dealings with him, and I have complete faith in him. I just think he didn't know what it meant.

Mr. COHN. We can assume Commissioner Dowling was not the one that had the technical knowledge on this, that he was relying on what he had been advised.

Mr. GILLETT. I think he signed a telegram somebody else prepared.

Senator MUNDT. Do you know what has happened now to the 900-foot tower?

Mr. GILLETT. There are various reports. The last factual report I have is that it is in the warehouse at Munich, and I also was told by people who are authorities, I believe, that it is planned to use it on the long wave second Munich Voice of America station.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make a brief observation. I am greatly disturbed about the report that MIT made in 1951, which I understand was the basis for the location of the Baker projects. And when we get back to that subject again, at the appropriate time, it seemed to me that we ought to have those people down here and get a statement from MIT. Because I am completely confused on it.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, Senator Jackson, that we have asked for the report that was allegedly submitted at the time the station was located at Seattle. We have been informed by both IIA and MIT that no such report was ever submitted in writing. Counsel has been in constant touch, I understand, with the engineers at MIT, among them Dr. Wiesner. He has told them that if they differ with the conclusion arrived at at this time, they may come down and testify. I understand they do not differ with the conclusion arrived at, that is, that Seattle is an improper area. In fact, in fairness to MIT, it should be pointed out that in 1952, at the time when only \$200,000 had been spent on the present location of Baker West, at that early date apparently MIT agreed that the change should be made. General Stoner, at that time, sent a memorandum to Compton.

Senator JACKSON. Yes, I am familiar with that memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. So I think we should make it clear that MIT, No. 1, never submitted a written report suggesting Seattle as a location for Baker West.

Senator JACKSON. Or Baker East?

The CHAIRMAN. No. 2, they were not prepared to submit a report at the time the site was selected.

And No. 3, at a time when very little money had been spent on Baker West, MIT apparently agreed that was the wrong location.

Senator JACKSON. Can we find out: Did they ever recommend in 1950 or any time, the Baker West or Baker East project?

The CHAIRMAN. I think we should, and we have been planning to do it. I think we should get the MIT engineer down here. Unfortunately, Mr. Kaplan, through whom all the information passed, is dead. We will try and get to the man who knows the next largest amount about this project.

Senator JACKSON. That is my concern, to find out just what they did recommend. You say it is not in writing. So was there a verbal recommendation to the Voice of America people?

The CHAIRMAN. As I say, the information we have from them is that they were not in a position to make a recommendation at the time the site was selected. They said, "We have not had time to study it."

Then, when they did have time to study it, in early 1952, apparently they agreed, with some reservations, that the site should be changed.

I am inclined to think the engineer who was in charge should come down, even though he does agree with the conclusion.

Senator JACKSON. I would like to find exactly what went on as far as MIT was concerned, because the previous testimony, I believe by General Stoner or Dr. Compton, was that MIT had recommended it in 1951. He did not say whether it was in writing, or the means employed in making the recommendation, but it has troubled me a lot, because MIT is supposed to have a good reputation, and I am trying to find out what they did do.

Mr. GILLETT. From what has been said here, let me amplify my statement that I gather that the worst that could be said about MIT is that they allowed themselves to be stampeded into giving a preliminary opinion before they had time to make a thorough study of the data.

Senator MUNDT. What was this service that MIT rendered? Just a gratuitous service, they did for the State Department, or were they paid for it?

The CHAIRMAN. The total amount MIT got was \$600,000. However, that was not only for this project. They were making other studies. We have asked for a breakdown so that we can give the committee a breakdown of how much MIT got strictly for this particular project.

Senator MUNDT. I think we ought to have somebody down here from MIT. After all, if they got a \$600,000 fee, they must have made some kind of a recommendation. I have a high regard for MIT, and I cannot imagine them being stampeded into making an erroneous decision just to collect the fee. I think we should have somebody from that institution down here to find out what they did for the \$600,000 fee. I thought it was \$200,000 on this particular matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, it is \$200,000. We have asked for a breakdown, and it always takes some time between the asking and the getting.

Senator MUNDT. I mean, I do not think we can be at the moment too critical of the State Department people, unless it is the fact that they awarded a \$600,000 fee. But if they got the report from a reputable institution and got bum advice, let us find who is responsible for the bum advice. If, on the other hand, the State Department went ahead and anticipated the decision and moved in before it, that is a different question.

Senator JACKSON. Maybe we have a cause of action that Harvard can bring against MIT.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to Senator Mundt that while MIT is a very reputable institution, they apparently have had no background on propagation studies. As Mr. Gillett said, it is like a large department store. Many departments are excellent. Maybe 90 percent of them are excellent. But some departments are not too well equipped to do a certain task.

Senator JACKSON. Might I ask this one other question while we are on the MIT subject? I wonder if we could ask the Voice people or the Department of State people, whoever has jurisdiction, to get all of the memoranda that may have passed between the Department and MIT; letters, memoranda of every kind.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked for not only that but the entire Kaplan file. Indications are that everything having to do with the

MIT work went through Mr. Kaplan, across his desk. We have asked for his file. I understand that is not classified, and I assume we will get it.

And I may say for the benefit of the committee: I was in New York Saturday taking evidence, interviewing witnesses, on this alleged Kaplan suicide. I found that he had phoned his office about 5 o'clock the day he was killed and appeared to be perfectly normal. He said he was going to stay overnight, that he had more work to do. He asked that his travel orders be extended. He had discussed, according to the witnesses the fact that he might be called by this committee; indicated no fear of being called; in fact indicated that he was anxious to come down and tell what he thought the real story to be. His coworkers—we had one of them under oath, took lengthy testimony, and others were interviewed—to a man said they didn't believe he committed suicide.

Senator JACKSON. How long was that before the accident, before his death, this call?

The CHAIRMAN. The call was about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. I do not recall what time of the night he was killed. He was killed after a meeting with some of the MIT engineers, a meeting on the question of a report, I understand. Now, counsel has been getting in touch with the engineers to find out what occurred at that meeting. We have not gotten that yet. The police department has asked that we submit all information we had to them. We intend to do that.

Mr. COHN. Two things, Mr. Chairman. First of all, we have considered this cable that was sent to the Voice of America, here, but we have not considered the reply, dated June 21, 1951. I will not read it, because of Mr. Leahy's request, but I would like to submit it to you and the members of the committee and paraphrase it by saying that the Voice of America here took the position: Don't bargain with the British to get permission, because the difference between 400 and 900 is not enough to bother continuing negotiations; the only difference is a reduction of effectiveness of 10 percent.

Is that inaccurate?

Mr. GILLETT. I think it said a signal strength of 10 percent.

Mr. COHN. Yes, "to the east," I believe were the exact words.

Mr. GILLETT. The measurements show a reduction of 20 percent and exactly what I computed on the characteristics of the antenna.

The CHAIRMAN. May I put the content of this in the record?

This was a message signed "Acheson." Would that be Dean Acheson, do you know?

Mr. COHN. I think it probably might be, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It, in effect, says, No. 1, the difference in value between the 400-foot tower and the 900-foot tower doesn't justify negotiating to get the British to consent to the 900-foot tower, and it says that the difference between the 400-foot tower and the 450-foot tower is of no importance, and therefore the 400-foot tower should be used. It is signed "Acheson."

Actually, as I understood your testimony, there was a 450-foot tower available there at that time?

Mr. GILLETT. Which was bought for this installation as a reflector.

The CHAIRMAN. It was there on the ground.

Mr. GILLETT. Yes. It was bought for this job and had been delivered.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there was no reason on earth to get a 400-foot tower from Salzburg—

Mr. GILLETT. Well, they had to have a reflector, sir. If they used the reflector as the main antenna, they had to get a second antenna from somewhere, so they took the easier course, though it was a very much less efficient antenna because of different construction.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking now about Acheson's recommendations to use a 400-foot tower instead of a 450-foot tower. Actually, the sensible, logical thing to do, if you were cutting it down to 450 feet, was to use your 450-foot tower and then get this other tower as a reflector.

Mr. GILLETT. Yes, though the reflector actually has about 30 percent less radiation efficiency than the 450-foot.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one other question, to clear up some of the questions asked by Senator Symington. Your testimony is that the 900-foot tower could easily have been reduced to a 650-foot tower; that everyone concerned had no serious objection to 650 feet; that this was not done because those in charge said, "We do not know how to reduce the 900-foot tower to 650 feet."

Mr. GILLETT. It was done, and at least one reason alleged was that they didn't know how to reduce the tower from 900 feet to 650 feet.

Senator McCLELLAN. May I ask a question? We have talked about the effectiveness of the 900-foot and the 450 foot antennas. What would be the result of reducing it to 650 feet?

Mr. GILLETT. I have a map, if you are interested. It salvages about half what is lost in signal strength and about two-thirds of what is lost in quality impairment.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, the 650 would have reduced the total loss to about one-third?

Mr. GILLETT. No; it would have only lost 10 percent instead of 20 percent of signal strength, and instead of losing in the 150 to 600 miles perhaps three-quarters of the intelligibility and usefulness, it would have lost perhaps 20 percent or 30 percent.

Senator McCLELLAN. So it would have been far more desirable, according to your views?

Mr. GILLETT. It was much nearer in performance to the original design than the one that was used. In other words, it was about two-thirds of the way back from what they used to what was designed.

Senator McCLELLAN. How do we know the British would not have objected to a 650-foot tower?

Mr. GILLETT. I was told by the CAA and by Mr. Moffly, who was the head of the service, that they had been offered approval of the 650.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, you got approval. You had complete approval of the 900 before the thing started.

Mr. GILLETT. I mean after the air attaché had objected, they had offered 650-foot approval. Because, you see, the 650-foot tower is below the glide angle that will clear the trees on the hills behind.

Senator McCLELLAN. So there could not have been any valid objection to the 650.

Mr. GILLETT. None whatsoever. It is definitely below the glide angle that would clear the trees right behind it. You would have to come over the mountain and go [indicating steep descent] to hit it.

Senator McCLELLAN. I just thought as a matter of record here, since

we had mentioned this 650-foot possibility in here, we ought to have a little information on that.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask you a question. If you go from 900 feet to 650 feet, how much do you lose, roughly, in percent?

Mr. GILLETT. I can give it to you exactly.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, just rough. You gave it rough before. Give it rough again.

Mr. GILLETT. Well, let me get the values. Because I have them worked out here.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would just as soon take it rough. I do not want to hold the hearing up or bother you.

Mr. GILLETT. It won't take a minute. We have seen what comes of quoting too much too quick.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Take your time. This is important enough to get the accurate picture.

Mr. GILLETT. The 900-foot tower would have a radiation efficiency of approximately 300 millivolts for 1 kilowatt.

Senator SYMINGTON. Put it in percentage. You did it before. We all know percentages now.

Mr. GILLETT. The 650-foot tower would have a radiation efficiency equivalent to 265 millivolts, which would be a reduction in field strength to 78 percent of the higher tower, or a reduction in the radiation—I beg your pardon. It would reduce the field strength to 89 percent of what it would have been and would reduce the radiation efficiency, therefore, to 78 percent.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, what were you talking about before? which efficiency?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, the field strength is this map. All right. The 450-foot—

Senator SYMINGTON. Wait a minute, now. I asked you to go from 900 to 650. What percent do you reduce the efficiency?

Mr. GILLETT. You reduce the field strength 11 percent, and you reduce the radiation efficiency 22 percent.

Senator SYMINGTON. Which were you talking about before?

Mr. GILLETT. I was talking about both, but mainly of field strength.

Senator SYMINGTON. You mentioned a reduction of 30 percent. What did you mean by that?

Mr. GILLETT. Radiation efficiency.

Senator SYMINGTON. The radiation strength. I do not want the figures. Just a rough percentage estimate as you did before.

Senator MUNDT. Let us get the figures, and then another engineer can also compute them.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say that the witness has attempted to give us exact figures, has made computations, and as long as he has them there, I think he should be permitted to use his notes and give us the entire picture.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILLETT. The 450-foot tower would have a radiation efficiency equivalent to 245 millivolts or 1 kilowatt, which is 18 percent less in field strength than the 900, and a radiation efficiency which is 33 percent less. The 33 is on a power basis. The 400-foot tower—

Senator SYMINGTON. I beg your pardon. Would you just answer my question, which is: What reduction is there from 900 feet to 650 feet in percentage?

Mr. GILLETT. Eleven percent in field strength and 22 percent in power efficiency.

Senator SYMINGTON. Twenty-two percent in power efficiency. Now, suppose you go from 650 to 450. What percent do you reduce it there?

Mr. GILLETT. The reduction in the main tower to 450 feet is 8 percent in field strength, or 16 percent in power efficiency.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is a total now—we are up to 38 percent. Now, you say, going from 450 to 400 feet you had another reduction of 30 percent.

Mr. GILLETT. Well, just a moment. The reduction in field strength in going from the 450-foot tower as designed to the 400-foot tower as designed will reduce the field strength 16 percent and will reduce the power efficiency 30 percent.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thirty percent. So now we have reduced the power efficiency 68 percent, which leaves 38 percent. Right?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, you can't add them that way. They don't add. They multiply.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, what you are talking about is a percent of the residual left?

Mr. GILLETT. This is compound interest. You use so much percent—

Senator SYMINGTON. Of what you had left. I see.

Senator MUNDT. From the standpoint of a radio engineer who does not have a slide rule in his hand and does not understand these percentages, what counts from the standpoint of the listener—radiation or field strength?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, of course, they are the two ends of the streetcar, but what he hears is the field strength in ratio to the noise, so it is the reduction in field strength that actually reduces his listening quality. But, again, you see, that does not tell the whole story, because the reduction from the 450-foot tower to the 400 of the listenability at night is tremendous. Because one has a radiation of a much higher tower equivalent—we have cheated nature by the devices we used—and the other has essentially the radiation of a quarter-wave tower, which is notoriously bad for fading. That is the reason for the sharp drop of 16 percent between 450 feet and 400. It is because we have changed the entire type and construction of the acceptable to the FCC.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, you had another matter you wanted to go into.

Mr. COHN. Yes; very briefly, Mr. Chairman.

Do you know whether the Voice of America has had any megawatt medium-wave broadcast transmitters constructed?

Mr. GILLETT. It is common knowledge in the industry that they have had several built by Welden & Carr.

Mr. COHN. Now, can transmitters of such power be used in Europe or the Far East?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, In Europe it is practically impossible to find a frequency in the medium waves which is not already occupied by stations in Western Europe, and neither by decency or international agreement or diplomatic possibilities is it possible to use any power like that on these frequencies without totally destroying the service of the existing stations in one or the other of the various countries of

Europe. For instance, the Courier has operated only with 40 kilowatts, because of interference to the Swedish channel, on the best channel they could find, which is a quarter of the rated power.

Mr. COHN. What type of antennas should be used with such higher power?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, the FCC regards the value of the frequencies on which high power can be used as so much that they will not permit a quarter-wave tower to be used with a 50-kilowatt station. They set up requirements that are approximately just short of a half-wave antenna as the minimum antenna which they will permit to be used as the minimum standards of good engineering practice, not the best standards but the minimum standards of good engineering practice acceptable to the FCC.

Mr. COHN. Do you know why the Voice has gone ahead with these megawatt medium-wave broadcast transmitters in view of this?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, it is my understanding that they now have 9 in prospect, 5 delivered. It is my understanding that they have started construction on two, for which they haven't even got frequency clearance yet, and that not in Europe. And I don't believe that any of them can be used. It is my understanding that they plan to use quarter-wave antennas, whereas we developed economic studies some 10 years ago that if you have the problem of laying down the most signal for the least money at any given point, you should spend somewhere between once and twice the transmitter cost on the antenna system, whereas a megawatt transmitter costs about \$900,000, and the generators to supply the power cost about \$600,000 more, and the buildings and equipment and housing will cost you, in construction, three or four hundred. You have about 2 million tied up. And the present plans, I understand, are to spend about fifty or sixty thousand on the antenna system for some short quarter-wave sticks.

Mr. COHN. What is the total amount of money involved in this? Do you know?

Mr. GILLETT. About 15 or 20 million bucks.

Mr. COHN. And you say it is virtually impossible to use these in Europe under the present frequency setup?

Mr. GILLETT. That is right. That is like putting a Cadillac high-powered engine in a Crosley frame. They just don't go together.

Mr. COHN. Can you give us any explanation as to why they are doing this?

Mr. GILLETT. I don't know. The whole basis of efficiency has been explained and spelled out in words of one syllable in articles, as I say, and as far back as 1936 we have had in operation for one of our clients a 900-foot tower in Oklahoma City for which the measured performance was 1-percent distant from the predicted. It is used with a directed antenna very similar in some characteristics to what we proposed to use there.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your testimony is that there is no reason for any intelligent radio engineer to make this mistake, the mistake of embarking on this 15 or 20 million dollar project?

Mr. GILLETT. Without providing adequate antennas, and without having the frequencies in the spots at which they are to be used. You don't buy million-dollar transmitters, or at least industry doesn't, as a speculation, in lots of a half a dozen, before you even know where you are going to use them or whether you can ever get frequencies to

use them or whether you can get frequencies on which to use more than a portion, an infinitely small portion, of the total power.

Senator JACKSON. Who recommended this program?

Mr. GILLETT. That I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume the chief engineer would have to pass on it.

Mr. GILLETT. Oh, undoubtedly. At least, I assume they don't spend 15 million bucks without the chief engineer having approved.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this. And it may not require any answer. We have had testimony that the chief engineer of the Voice, Mr. Herrick, had taken 1 year of preengineering work; that he had either flunked or got D's in all courses except public speaking. Would you think that that might possibly explain some of the unusual activities?

Mr. GILLETT. Well, it explains what the impression was that I got from him in talking to him.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, a likeable fellow but not equipped for that particular job.

Mr. GILLETT. Well, in view of his attitude toward the work I had planned, I didn't even find him likeable.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Gillett, have you ever made a mistake?

Mr. GILLETT. Sure.

Mr. COHN. But you have been right once in a while, haven't you, Mr. Gillett?

Mr. GILLETT. Enough that very few of the engineers in the industry tangle with me on engineering facts.

The CHAIRMAN. I found a Senator tangling with you today.

Senator SYMINGTON. When they tangled with you, they probably lost, did they not?

Mr. GILLETT. More than half the time.

The CHAIRMAN. We have in the audience, I understand, a Mr. Cupps, C-u-p-p-s, who is the construction engineer on the Vienna project. Is that correct, Mr. Cupps? And I understand you have brought with you someone whom you consider an expert on wavelengths, Mr. Ross.

I wonder if I could impose upon you gentlemen to come forward. I would like to have all three of you here.

Will you gentlemen both raise your right hand?

In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CUPPS. I do.

Mr. ROSS. I do.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cupps, C-u-p-p-s?

#### TESTIMONY OF HALBERT CUPPS, ENGINEER, VOICE OF AMERICA, ASSIGNED TO USCOA; AND JULIUS ROSS, ACTING CHIEF, ENGI- NEERING DIVISION, VOICE OF AMERICA

Mr. CUPPS. C-u-p-p-s.

The CHAIRMAN. And your first name?

Mr. CUPPS. Halbert, H-a-l-b-e-r-t.

The CHAIRMAN. When you gentlemen speak, I wonder if you would try to get as near to the mike as you can and lean in when you talk.

And what is your position with the Voice, if any?

Mr. CUPPS. At the present time, I am on detached assignment doing the construction work for USCOA, United States Commissioner for Austria, in Vienna.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been on that particular job?

Mr. CUPPS. I have been there exactly 2 years, and I have now returned on home leave, en route to my destination in Florida.

The CHAIRMAN. And prior to taking over this task, what was your job?

Mr. CUPPS. I was assigned to the Voice of America relay base in Munich, Germany, acting chief engineer.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get your engineering training?

Mr. CUPPS. I am not a graduate engineer.

The CHAIRMAN. I assumed you were not, because it seems if you are a graduate engineer you don't qualify with the IIA or the Voice. Of course, we understand that many good engineers never have had a formal engineering training at school.

Did you take any training at any school of engineering?

Mr. CUPPS. I was connected with Western Electric Co., and took the Bell System courses available to us during employment with them.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that taken.

Mr. CUPPS. In Cleveland, Ohio.

The CHAIRMAN. In Cleveland, Ohio. Was that connected with any university or college?

Mr. CUPPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long was that course?

Mr. CUPPS. That was approximately 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. 2 years full time in school?

Mr. CUPPS. No, this was on-the-job training.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, while you were working for Bell?

Mr. CUPPS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You took some training on the side?

Mr. CUPPS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. And will you just sort of describe that training for us?

Mr. CUPPS. It was connected with telephone work, the installation of central-office equipment, switchboards, automatic exchanges, and basic equipment connected with the telephone industry.

The CHAIRMAN. When was this training received?

Mr. CUPPS. That was between 1936 and 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. 1936 and 1938. You were working for Bell Telephone Co. then?

Mr. CUPPS. Western Electric.

The CHAIRMAN. Then will you sort of trace your employment from 1938 up to date, if you would?

Mr. CUPPS. Following that, I was connected with American Airlines.

The CHAIRMAN. What type of work?

Mr. CUPPS. Communications work, stationed at Buffalo and at Cleveland, Ohio.

The CHAIRMAN. How long were you with American Airlines?

Mr. CUPPS. 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask: Were you discharged or did you resign from that job?

Mr. CUPPS. I resigned from the job and went with the United Broadcasting Co. in Cleveland, Ohio.

The CHAIRMAN. United Broadcasting Co. in Cleveland.

Mr. CUPPS. In Cleveland, Ohio, as a staff engineer.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your duties as staff engineer?

Mr. CUPPS. My duties as staff engineer were in master control, studio work, and transmitter work.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. And how long did you stay with that broadcasting company?

Mr. CUPPS. I left there after approximately 9 months to take a job with the General Motors Corp. at Fisher Body plant No. 2.

The CHAIRMAN. What type of work were you doing with General Motors?

Mr. CUPPS. I was doing electronic work in plant engineering, a large defense plant, connected with radio and aircraft radio installations.

The CHAIRMAN. And then from there where did you go?

Mr. CUPPS. I was recruited by the Department of State, or OWI, as such, for psychological warfare.

The CHAIRMAN. Who recruited you?

Mr. CUPPS. I do not recall the gentleman's name.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember who recruited you?

Mr. CUPPS. Not the name of the individual.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you describe where that recruiting took place? Did someone come out to see you?

Mr. CUPPS. I attended an institute meeting of Cleveland Radio Engineers at which Morey Pierce, presently employed by the Department of State made an address.

At that time I expressed interest in the work, and following that I was recruited and assigned to Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they asked you to come with OWI?

Mr. CUPPS. That is correct. I was actively employed prior to that with General Motors.

The CHAIRMAN. And what year was this?

Mr. CUPPS. That was in the early part of 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was your immediate boss?

Mr. CUPPS. In Honolulu?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. CUPPS. Mr. Herrick.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in charge of the desk having to do with the Pacific at that time?

Mr. CUPPS. In what category, engineering or just Western Pacific?

The CHAIRMAN. Give us both.

Mr. CUPPS. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know?

Mr. CUPPS. I would assume that Mr. Herrick was in charge of engineering at that time, but as far as Western Pacific Affairs, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. That was OWI?

Mr. CUPPS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Owen Lattimore was in charge of Pacific Operations of OWI at that time; was he not?

Mr. CUPPS. I have no knowledge of that.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know who the boss was?

Mr. CUPPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long were you with OWI?

Mr. CUPPS. I have been with them continuously since that time. During the transition period is when I was absorbed into State.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you not with the Signal Corps for a short time?

Mr. CUPPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you not with the Signal Corps for about 2 months?

Mr. CUPPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You never were with the Signal Corps?

Mr. CUPPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you heard all of the testimony of Mr. Gillett?

Mr. CUPPS. I have.

The CHAIRMAN. And your name is Ross?

Mr. ROSS. Yes, sir; Julius Ross.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you work?

Mr. ROSS. At the present time I am acting Chief of the Engineering Division in New York. I have just been assigned that position.

The CHAIRMAN. You served under Mr. Herrick, did you?

Mr. ROSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are now Acting Chief of the Engineering Division?

Mr. ROSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought Mr. Seymour was Acting Chief.

Mr. ROSS. Mr. Seymour is Chief Engineer. There are two divisions under his direction, the Engineering Division and the Construction Division.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are Acting Chief of which?

Mr. ROSS. The Engineering Division.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have anything to do with the Baker West location?

Mr. ROSS. Personally my activity in connection with Baker West was directly in the making of the survey for the purpose of locating the plant in the northwest area of the country. I took part in making the survey to locate the specific site. I was directed to do so by Mr. Herrick.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: Did you have anything to do with locating it in that general area, or did you merely pick the site after a decision had been made to locate it in the Washington State area?

Mr. ROSS. I picked the specific site after the decision had been made.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you enter into the making of the decision as to the general area?

Mr. ROSS. I took part in some of the discussions which led up to that decision.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had the head of the Propagation Section of the Bureau of Standards testify that neither the Voice nor the IIA ever asked for an opinion from the Bureau of Standards. Can you tell me whether that is correct or not?

Mr. ROSS. I believe that the Bureau of Standards was requested to submit certain data, which they did, which in turn was turned over to MIT, and which was used in making up MIT's evaluation.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you believe that. The sworn testimony is to the contrary, so if you have anything which will help us decide whether that is true or not, we would like to hear it.

Mr. Ross. My belief is based on my recollection of having seen documents that indicated that. I do not have copies of those documents here.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked for such documents, and were informed that no such documents were available. Would that change your mind at all?

Mr. Ross. I may be mistaken. The only way I could tell would be to examine the files.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why, instead of getting that information from the Bureau of Standards, which was well equipped to make this propagation study, and getting it free, it was decided to employ MIT at a total cost of around \$600,000 for this and other projects, or did you enter into that decision?

Mr. Ross. I did not enter into that decision, but I do not believe we could have obtained that service at no cost. We would have had to reimburse the Bureau of Standards. It is customary practice.

The CHAIRMAN. The Bureau of Standards has testified to the contrary. On what do you base your statement that you would have had to reimburse them?

Mr. Ross. We have had work done by other Government agencies, and vice versa, and we have supplied material for which we have been reimbursed.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the Bureau of Standards. That is the agency that is set up to do this particular type of work for other departments. The Bureau of Standards has told us that this would cost you nothing, that they were ready and able to do this job, but that they never were requested to do it.

As I recall the testimony, they said they were curious to know why they had not been requested to do it when they heard that MIT was doing it. In view of that do you still say you would have had to pay them for it?

Mr. Ross. I am not competent to state the exact facts in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say that this committee asked the Bureau of Standards for a propagation study insofar as Baker West was concerned. We got that preliminary report in a matter of days, and I believe we have gotten no bill for it yet.

I may say, also, that the staff informs me that this is one of the few engineers they found in the Voice or IIA who has had a good educational background as far as engineering is concerned.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I ask a question of Mr. Cupps?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator JACKSON. Could we have briefly that statement on his engineering background first?

Mr. Ross. Yes, sir. My background runs something like this. I graduated from the Brooklyn Technical High School in 1928, studied at Cornell University in the School of Electrical Engineering for 2 years, then came the crash and I was forced to leave school and I went to work. Finally, I worked my way through and graduated from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn in 1937. My experience in the field dates back to roughly starting in 1933, approximately 20 years of

increasing responsibility. Thirteen years of my service has been with the Government, 5 years with the Federal Communications Commission, and the remaining 8 years with the Office of War Information and the IIA and the various alphabetized versions of it which occurred in between.

My experience in private industry has been with the Federal Telephone & Radio Corp., as project engineer, with the Pilot Radio Corp., with Hearst Radio, Inc., which is a broadcasting station. It was WINS, in New York, in which I served as station engineer and took part in the making of site surveys for the relocation of the transmitting plant, and did some design work and considerable operating work.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you called upon to concur in the decision on Baker West?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question of Mr. Cupps?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but could you answer that one first?

Mr. Ross. I was present at the discussions and at the time the decision was made I concurred with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you ever made any propagation studies yourself?

Mr. Ross. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you discuss with any of the other engineers the effect that this magnetic storm belt, or the so-called auroral absorption area, might have on the signal which you could transmit to the target area from this particular site?

Mr. Ross. Yes, I did. I discussed it with almost every responsible member of the staff at one time or another.

The CHAIRMAN. Every responsible member of the staff? How many engineers do you have on the staff?

Mr. Ross. At the time that took place, my recollection is that we had a staff of about 20 engineers.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree now that Baker West was located in the wrong area?

Mr. Ross. On the basis of some of the statements I have heard, I think that if I were starting fresh, I would be inclined to put the station in California. However, on the basis of the circumstances that exist today and the lack of complete and detailed data to support many of the statements which have been made, together with certain other factors which have to do with the cost of power, for example, and the fact that we would be operating the Baker West plant in conjunction with plants already located in the South, I have a very large question in my mind as to the wisdom of changing the decision at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a report from the Bureau of Standards, dated February 26, 1953. Have you seen this report?

Mr. Ross. No, sir; I have not.

The CHAIRMAN. I might suggest that it might be well for the IIA engineers to have my staff give you a copy of this in view of the fact that you have not asked for one yourself up to recently. This is available to you. It consists of a 3-page summary, with exhibits 1 to 28. Let me read one paragraph:

General conclusions can be drawn from the results so far obtained. To assure delivery of a satisfactory signal at a given time of the day on at least 10 percent of the days, a transmitter at Seattle would require about 5 times as much power

as a transmitter at San Francisco or San Diego. To assure a satisfactory signal for a given time of the day on at least 50 percent of the days, a transmitter at Seattle would require about 15 times as much power as a transmitter at San Francisco or San Diego. To deliver a satisfactory signal on at least 90 percent of the days, at a given time of the day, a transmitter located at Seattle would require about 50 times the power of a transmitter at San Francisco or San Diego.

When you made the statement that the cost of power was one of the considerations that you had in mind when you decided that maybe we should stay in Seattle, I wonder if you were aware of the Bureau of Standards report which says it would take 50 times as much power at certain times of the day, 90 percent of the days, at Seattle to hit the same target?

Let me ask you, first, would you question this conclusion, and, secondly, would that change your opinion as to whether or not these stations should be moved?

Mr. Ross. I would not be in a position to question the conclusion without examining the data on which the conclusion is based. However, on the basis of actual practical experience, which at least one of our engineers has had carrying out monitoring activities on the west coast during the war in connection with radio intelligence activities, he has reported that as a practical matter these phenomena do not exist to that degree.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is that engineer?

Mr. Ross. Mr. Jean Seymour.

The CHAIRMAN. He is the man who took over Herrick's job?

Mr. Ross. No, sir. Mr. Frank L. Seymour is the man who took over Herrick's job.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this the man who was the engineer on the *Courier* project?

Mr. Ross. Yes, sir, he is the same engineer.

The CHAIRMAN. You are aware of the fact that the testimony is to the effect, first, that the wrong kind of a ship was selected, one that did not have a hull strong enough to carry the diesel engines so that it had to be rebuilt; secondly, while there were ships in mothballs with flight decks, one was selected without a flight deck and one was built on it at an additional cost of about \$1 million. Are you aware of that background of Mr. Seymour? I wonder if you think that qualifies him as an expert?

Mr. Ross. I have not read that testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Symington, you had some questions to ask.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask, Mr. Cupps, when did you go to work?

Mr. CUPPS. With the Department?

Senator SYMINGTON. When did you first start working?

Mr. CUPPS. 1936.

Senator SYMINGTON. Doing what?

Mr. CUPPS. With Western Electric.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was your schooling up to that point?

Mr. CUPPS. Just high school, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you could have afforded it, would you have gone along to college?

Mr. CUPPS. I certainly would have.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you could not afford it?

Mr. CUPPS. At that time I couldn't.

Senator SYMINGTON. Were you married?

Mr. CUPPS. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Were you supporting anybody besides yourself?

Mr. CUPPS. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you ever hear of Henry Ford?

Mr. CUPPS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know whether he was an engineering graduate or not?

Mr. CUPPS. I believe he wasn't.

Senator SYMINGTON. He was pretty successful, was he not?

Mr. CUPPS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you ever hear of Thomas Edison?

Mr. CUPPS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know whether he was a graduate or not?

Mr. CUPPS. He wasn't.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you ever hear of Bill Knudsen, the president of General Motors?

Mr. CUPPS. I heard of him.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know whether he was a graduate or not?

Mr. CUPPS. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know he was not, because he told me he went to work at the age of 12.

Mr. CUPPS. I am not ashamed of the record I made.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would not be ashamed of not being a graduate, as long as you are doing the best you can as an American.

Mr. CUPPS. I am not ashamed.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you feel you have a right, regardless of your education, to take the best job you can get in support of yourself and your family?

Mr. CUPPS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And when you could get a job in this engineering division, were you asked to decide theoretical matters or were you asked to decide practical matters?

Mr. CUPPS. I should say it involved some of both, based on my capabilities which have gradually expanded as a result of practical experience I obtained.

Senator SYMINGTON. So you did the best you could under the circumstances?

Mr. CUPPS. I continue to do the best I can.

Senator SYMINGTON. Good luck to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Symington, may I say we have not criticized Mr. Herrick, the chief engineer, who could not pass an engineering course. We do not blame him for taking the job he took. We have found as a result of having that type of chief engineer millions and millions of dollars were wasted. He may be the finest family man in the world, I do not know. I do not criticize this young man for not having an engineering education. I took 2 years of pre-engineering work; I found it too difficult. I shifted to law. I am not ashamed of that. However, I am not chief engineer in any project. And we do not blame you for taking the best job you can get.

I do blame top officials who pick men without engineering backgrounds to do an engineer's job. We are spending millions and

millions and millions and millions of dollars, trying to build up a good Voice program. I think we are entitled to the best engineering, and it would be very economical, I think, to hire better engineers even if we had to pay more money and save some of these millions. I think it should be clear from my questioning that we are not criticizing you for getting the best job you can get. If you can get the job as chief engineer at IIA at a higher salary, I assume you would take it. I sincerely hope you do not get that job. There are many jobs you can do very well. You appear to be a very fine, intelligent young man who can do a lot of jobs.

**Senator SYMINGTON.** Mr. Chairman, my only point was to bring out the fact that one man who had a chance to get an engineering education flunked out, while the other fellow could not get an education because he could not afford it.

**The CHAIRMAN.** I think it is clear we are not criticizing anybody for their education or their lack of education. But when I find a chief engineer who can pass no course except public speaking in charge of millions of dollars of spending, when I find he has mislocated one project which has already cost us millions of dollars, then I am concerned with the engineering qualifications of the other engineers on that job, and that is no criticism of these young men.

**Mr. CUPPS.** I would like to point out, Mr. Chairman, that my position as installation engineer did not involve engineering decisions of the type you are speaking of. But I do have many pertinent facts upon which these decisions may have been based which I would like to bring out to this committee.

**The CHAIRMAN.** The reason you have Mr. Ross with you is that while you do not consider yourself an expert on the sort of thing Mr. Gillett was covering, you do consider Mr. Ross somewhat of an expert on that subject?

**Mr. CUPPS.** Since Mr. Ross is from the engineering office which backstopped my project in Austria, I feel he is in a better position to outline the facts leading up to the decisions that resulted in the change in the antenna system design in Vienna.

**The CHAIRMAN.** I would like to ask Mr. Ross and Mr. Gillett and you to come up to this chart, if you will.

Let me point out to you gentlemen that Mr. Gillett has testified that if you put the tower in Vienna as proposed by the Army, you would get rather excellent coverage up to this line No. 1 [indicating]. Do you have any disagreement on that?

**Mr. CUPPS.** I would like to make a statement at this time without interruption.

**The CHAIRMAN.** May I say that we do not guarantee any witness the right to make any statement without interruption. If there is some point you raise that we would like to question you, or any other witness, about, we will interrupt you.

**Mr. CUPPS.** This map was prepared by Mr. Gillett. It gives no indication of the interference to be expected from stations operating on the same channel, which will materially reduce the coverage as presented by Mr. Gillett.

Our chief source of interference is a station at Timisoara, Rumania, on the same frequency, three-hundred-some-odd miles from Vienna, which seriously will distort the presentation of the pattern of field coverage prepared by Mr. Gillett.

There is another station in Kuopio, Finland, which will further attenuate the signal as prepared by Mr. Gillett.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words you say there are two other stations on the same wavelength?

Mr. CUPPS. There are a minimum of two other stations on the same wavelength and we cannot expect to get this degree of service at the present time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would the chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it not true, Mr. Cupps, that a station with less volume would be relatively more effective because it would not reach out to where there was the interference?

Mr. CUPPS. It then becomes a degree of power and directional antenna efficiency. We are not in a position to determine how much power the station in Timisoara, Rumania, is using, or the type of antenna they are using. Behind the Iron Curtain we cannot get that information. Therefore, it is all conjecture on our part with the information available to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Gillett.

Mr. GILLETT. May I ask, was Timisoara, Rumania, on the air at the time the antenna was cut down? It was not in the air in 1950.

Mr. CUPPS. That is true. Although it was not on the air, the premise on which the station was established was that they would not come on the air if we were on the air first. But they did come on the air, regardless of whether we used it or not.

The CHAIRMAN. That changes the picture somewhat. Mr. Gillett points out that the station at Timisoara, Rumania, was not on the air at the time the station in Vienna went on the air. You say that they agreed not to go on the wavelength if you went on first.

Mr. CUPPS. I did not say that, sir. That was the assumption Mr. Gillett used in deciding to use that frequency.

The CHAIRMAN. What assumption did you follow?

Mr. CUPPS. I followed none, except to build the station as directed.

The CHAIRMAN. When you built that station, what wavelength did you think you were going on?

Mr. CUPPS. I knew what I was going on. I was following the pre-conceived plan of Mr. Gillett with departmental approval.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you were assigned these wavelengths at the Copenhagen agreement?

Mr. CUPPS. I say that Timisoara, Rumania, was assigned 755 kilocycles.

The CHAIRMAN. When did we get that wavelength assigned to us, if at any time?

Mr. CUPPS. The wavelength as such, as used by the American element, was not assigned by the Copenhagen plan. It was used as a military expediency.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, we are using a wavelength that had been previously assigned to Timisoara, Rumania?

Mr. CUPPS. And other stations.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this, if you know anything about it. Do you feel that America has gotten a good deal in the international agreements reached at both Copenhagen and Mexico City as far as the assignment of radio frequencies is concerned?

Mr. CUPPS. I don't think the American interests were considered in the Copenhagen plan which assigned frequencies to Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Did we have a representative there?

Mr. CUPPS. We did.

The CHAIRMAN. We took part in the discussions, did we not?

Mr. CUPPS. I can't answer that. We had someone there as a spectator.

The CHAIRMAN. Our interests were very largely affected at the Copenhagen meeting, were they not?

Mr. CUPPS. I believe they were.

The CHAIRMAN. And also at the Mexico City meeting?

Mr. CUPPS. I am not familiar with that.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you aware of the fact that we had a meeting at both Copenhagen and Mexico City which dealt with the assignment of wavelengths to the various nations in the world?

Mr. CUPPS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who our representative was at either Copenhagen or Mexico City?

Mr. CUPPS. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it surprise you to know that the man who represented us at Mexico City was William T. Stone, the man who was involved in the Amerasia case, the man who reported to Mr. Humelsine, who testified before the Appropriations Committee that he resigned from his State Department job after the loyalty review board took up his case; that Mr. Lewis, who represented us at Copenhagen, was the Charles Lewis who flunked the loyalty test when he and Mr. Kaghan and Mr. Schechter had applied to go with the Voice of America, and they could not pass the loyalty security test under Public Law 402?

Were you surprised to find those men as representatives of America at those meetings when our interests were vitally concerned?

Mr. CUPPS. I had no knowledge of that since my activity did not encompass that field.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not your field?

Mr. CUPPS. I am not qualified in that field.

The CHAIRMAN. But the efficiency of our program was perhaps vitally affected by the assignment to various nations of different wavelengths; is that right?

Mr. ROSS. Yes, sir; there is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I assume you agree that our committee should go into the background of the individuals who represented us or misrepresented us at both Copenhagen and Mexico City?

Mr. ROSS. I see no reason why you should not.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it is a very important matter.

Mr. ROSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent would you disagree with the conclusions arrived at by Mr. Gillett?

Mr. CUPPS. I believe they are not a fair representation of the case.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us in what respects.

Mr. CUPPS. Since they do not reflect the true conditions that would exist with the Copenhagen assignees operating on the frequencies so established by the overall plan.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us assume that you have the two stations you mentioned on the air. Would you take the position that a 450-foot

tower would be as effective and efficient from a listening standpoint as a 900-foot tower? If not, will you try to compare the two?

If you want to have the other engineer consult with you to answer that, go right ahead.

Mr. Ross. I would like to make one very simple statement on that in terms which a layman can understand very easily.

Mr. Gillett stated that a difference in field intensity under the two different conditions might amount to approximately 10 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Gillett?

Mr. GILLETT. I said 20 percent.

Mr. Ross. All right, let us make it 20 percent. In terms of decibels, that represents approximately a difference of 2 decibels to a listener's ear with a receiver.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you are putting that in layman's language?

Mr. Ross. I think it will be layman's language when I finish my statement.

Senator SYMINGTON. I might say that I can understand you myself. I think you are going pretty good.

Mr. Ross. I think it is a fundamental fact regarding the human ear that it is incapable of indicating a change of less than two decibels. I make this statement to show what relation this difference in field intensity in the listener's ear actually is.

Senator SYMINGTON. In confirming what the gentleman has said, I might say that I have made a good many sets with 80 decibels, a good many with 90 decibels, a good many with 100 decibels, and a good many with 110 decibels. I did not have any difficulty when I wanted to make radio sets. I am talking about the auditory band and not the radio band.

Mr. Ross. As a matter of practical demonstration, I think it can be shown very easily that unless you carefully listen it is rather difficult to detect a change in intensity of three decibels, which represents a power change of approximately twice. I think this should place the whole problem in the proper perspective.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have you gentlemen now tell us the difference, in your opinion, in the efficiency and the effectiveness of the 450-foot tower as compared to the 900-foot tower. Mr. Gillett has said that the shifting from the 900-foot to the 450-foot tower, in his opinion, effectively sabotaged any attempt to cover the vital target area. It is a very serious matter. Will you tell us how the efficiency was affected by the change?

Mr. Ross. The statement which I just made gives an index of how much difference it can make to a listener insofar as a signal intensity is concerned.

Furthermore, the original conception, insofar as the engineering office in New York was concerned regarding this, was that it was to be an Austrian network to provide programing for Austrians. The programs transmitted are all in German. As I understand it, IBS transmits approximately 6 $\frac{3}{4}$  hours of program on this network.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that you are broadcasting to the Russians in the German language?

Mr. CUPPS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. The Army originally planned a Voice station which could hit all the vital target area in Russia.

Mr. Ross. I had no knowledge of the original plan.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think they were trying to build a 1,000-foot station to hit Austria?

Mr. ROSS. The information transmitted to us over the signature of Mr. Moffly in the form of a cable indicated to us that it was an Austrian network which was to be built for the purpose of covering Austria.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gillett designed this plant.

Mr. GILLETT. Mr. Moffly was the IIA man in the State Department for Austria.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gillett, this engineer states that he does not know the purpose of the station. When you designed it, did you know the purpose of the station?

Mr. GILLETT. The objectives that I read into the record were those approved by the High Commissioner and the others for the design which I prepared.

Mr. CUPPS. Under the Department of the Army.

Mr. GILLETT. Under the Department of the Army under which the State Department was to carry it out.

The CHAIRMAN. And the objective was to hit the target area in Russia and a target area as large as possible?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes. I might add that Timisoara, Rumania, was not on the air until the fall of 1951 insofar as the Timisoara, Rumania, station is concerned, it was felt that the signal from there was such that the station could not be heard intelligibly out of sight of the towers, a radius of 4 or 5 miles being the limit of its service, and it was believed the only use to be made of it was attempting jamming, and it was one more or less jamming station we had to deal with. It was not proven that this station could render any service to the area.

Mr. CUPPS. I would like to take exception to that. Among the reports made down in embassies of countries close to those targets, there are reports which indicate that Timisoara to some extent dominates the radio frequencies of that area.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand your purpose now is not to broadcast to Russia at all from that station, or you would not be beaming the broadcasts in the German language, is that correct?

Mr. CUPPS. In general I would say yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Originally the Army designed this to broadcast to Russia, that is, the 900-foot tower. Finally the State Department took over and they cut that down to 450 feet, and instead of beaming to Russia you are now beaming that to the German people, is that correct?

Mr. CUPPS. Not completely, because we are beaming it into the satellite countries in which there are areas of German-speaking people.

We did not cut down the 900-foot antenna to 450 feet without some basis in fact for so doing. I would like to expand on that if I may sit down.

The CHAIRMAN. You may sit down.

Mr. GILLETT. Mr. Chairman, the question has been raised that 2 decibels is not audible. Let me point out, first, that the Bell system, which makes the most auditory sets, has found that a half decibel can be heard by an expert and that 1 decibel can be heard by anyone. If 3 decibels does not count, why has the Voice of America spent \$15 million for megawatt transmitters when they could have bought a half-megawatt transmitter for \$500,000?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to answer that?

Mr. Ross. I would like to make a comment.

The CHAIRMAN. You answer that first. Mr. Gillett's question is this: He says the Voice could buy a transmitter for \$500,000, but instead they are buying them for \$2 million. The only difference between the 2 is 3 whatever you call it.

Mr. Ross. Three decibels. The only way I can answer that is to point out that in making power allocations, for example, the Federal Communications Commission in this country has the general practice of issuing licenses which carry power ratings usually at intervals of 6 decibels or higher. This phenomena of which I spoke is one of the basic reasons for it. In my opinion any change in the power of a station which is less than 10 decibels is not a profitable increase in power with a possible exception of that which might apply to primary coverage in the local area where you have noise.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt. I am afraid I do not follow your reasoning.

I understand it is true that the Voice has spent \$2 million for a transmitter.

Mr. GILLETT. One megawatt.

Mr. Ross. That is not correct.

Mr. GILLETT. That is with associated equipment. The transmitter itself costs \$900,000. It would cost approximately half that if you bought half a megawatt, or 500 kilowatts. The difference is 3 decibels.

The CHAIRMAN. The only difference is 3 decibels?

Mr. GILLETT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. How much is the Voice paying for the additional 3 decibels?

Mr. GILLETT. \$450,000 for the transmitter, another \$300,000 for the generators, and probably another \$100,000 to \$200,000 for additional housing for the bigger unit. So they are spending approximately half the total cost of the station for the additional power of 3 decibels, which does not seem to be worth it if it is only 3 decibels.

The Federal Communications Commission, incidentally, in these classes of stations licensed 5 kilowatts on class 1, 10, which is 6 decibels, 25, which is about 4 decibels, and 50 kilowatts, which is 6 decibels. As a regulatory matter they do license about every 6 decibels.

Mr. Ross. I would like to comment on the matter of why we built 1,000-kilowatt transmitters instead of 500-kilowatt transmitters. This argument all depends on what your point of reference is.

I would like to use 100 kilowatts as a point of reference and say I would argue for using a megawatt and obtain a 10-decibel increase in power which is an appreciable increase when you use 100 kilowatts as a point of reference.

I can twist this argument any way you desire by changing my point of reference.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not want you to twist it. We want you to give us the facts. Mr. Gillett has stated that the only difference between one transmitter and the other is the power of 3 decibels. In order to get the power of 3 decibels additional, the Voice is paying \$800,000 or \$900,000 more for transmitters. Is that roughly your testimony?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that true or is that not true?

Mr. Ross. If we use the 500-kilowatt transmitter as a point of reference, that is correct. But I see no reason for that basic assumption. The transmitters currently in use prior to the inception of the use of megawatt power were all in the medium-wave field of 50 kilowatts and 150 kilowatts.

The CHAIRMAN. Can we simplify this into layman's language?

Do we both agree that the only difference between the transmitter that cost \$500,000 and the one that will ultimately cost roughly a million and a half, or a little less than that, is that the million and a half dollar transmitter gives you a power of 3 additional decibels? Is that the only difference?

Mr. Ross. That is correct. I have no engineering dispute with that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, as you say, if the power of 3 additional decibels is unimportant, that you should not change, as you say, until you get 10 additional decibels, why does the Voice waste the additional million and a half dollars to get the 3 additional decibels?

Mr. Ross. I stated before—and I believe Mr. Gillett will go along since he testified you can detect a half-decibel change—that I thought that 2 to 3 decibels provided possibly the first detectable increase in power to a lay listener. I think that is the point where you have got to consider what you are paying for.

The CHAIRMAN. You did tell us, I believe, that you feel that the change was unjustified unless you could get the power of 10 additional decibels?

Mr. Ross. I testified to that in relation to the problem of deciding what transmitter power should be used for a given installation, irrespective of other factors. This is a matter, for example, of installation X. Shall we put a 100-kilowatt transmitter there or a 1,000-kilowatt transmitter there? The difference at the receiving end is 10 decibels.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this. Mr. Gillett has testified that in an area starting about 100 or 150 miles from the transmitter, extending to an area roughly 650 miles from the transmitter, having reduced the transmitter from a 900-foot tower to a 400-foot tower, you have decreased the efficiency of the transmitter to the extent that you lose about 75 percent of your listeners during the night, which starts at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon and extends to about 10 o'clock the next morning in that area. Would you care to comment on that? Do you agree or disagree?

Mr. Ross. I will comment on it to this extent. When we took the original project over, as I stated, our primary problem was to provide an Austrian network for Austria. That is the basis on which we proceeded.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ross, will you answer this question for me? We had a question raised here by Mr. Gillett. Here is what he told us. Now you listen to me. If I am incorrect, you correct me.

He said if you start at about 150 miles from the Vienna station and then you cover an area that runs up to 650 miles, that with the 450-foot tower, as compared to the 900-foot tower, you would lose about 75 percent of your listener audience at night. He described night in that area as running from 3 o'clock in the afternoon until 10 o'clock the next morning; is that correct?

Mr. GILLETT. In the middle of the winter, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree or disagree with that statement?

Mr. Ross. I can't agree or disagree without examining his figures on the vertical patterns of those antennas.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you do not have any idea yourself on that?

Mr. Ross. I would agree that there is a reduction. What the percentage of the reduction is I cannot state at this time. I am not sufficiently experienced to judge. I do not consider myself an expert in the field of antenna design. However, I would recommend to the committee that Mr. Carl E. Smith, the man who did the design work on these antennas, be permitted to testify on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood from Mr. Leahy that you were the man who could dispute the figures of Mr. Gillett, if they were to be disputed. I understand now you can say neither yes nor no to the testimony of Mr. Gillett.

Mr. Ross. I would like to point out in connection with this that I was not the project man on that. I was supervisor of the man who was.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you not the boss of the project engineer?

Mr. Ross. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUPPS. Mr. Chairman, may I interject?

The CHAIRMAN. Can you answer that question?

Mr. CUPPS. I have an engineering statement from the firm of Carl E. Smith, Associates, which was prepared at the request of the State Department justifying the proposed design as formulated by Carl E. Smith. It is not a complete engineering study; it is a statement, a conclusion, which Carl E. Smith, Associates, reached that evaluate the original Gillett design and the antenna design installed by Carl E. Smith, Associates.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that as an exhibit.

Now, if Mr. Gillett is giving us the correct picture, then I think we would all agree that we had completely sabotaged any attempt to hit the principal target area from the Vienna station. If Mr. Gillett is not giving us the facts, we would want some engineers who would tell us what they think the facts are. You tell me you cannot say "Yes" or "No."

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not think he said that, Mr. Chairman. I think he is willing to take that question up as to whether it was completely sabotaged.

Mr. GILLETT. May I interrupt there with one question. Did the figures of Mr. Gillett.

Mr. Ross. I said that—

Mr. CUPPS. I did not answer, Mr. Chairman. You have placed me in a very difficult situation. I am home on leave, I am not prepared to submit an engineering statement before your committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Why were you asked to come here?

Mr. CUPPS. I can't explain it. It is a shock to me, too.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not ask you to come over. You were here, so we wanted to hear you. The Department asked us to hear you. We try to hear every witness the Department invites over.

Let me make it clear. I am not trying to ridicule you for being unable to answer that question. I have had 2 years of engineering and I know something about it, but I would be completely incompetent to answer. You are not being criticized.

Do I understand that you cannot answer that question?

Mr. CUPPS. I would not make a positive answer "Yes" or "No." In my opinion the program has not been sabotaged.

Senator McCLELLAN. Let us use the other word "emasculated."

Mr. CUPPS. I do not like that any better.

Senator McCLELLAN. They mean about the same thing.

Mr. CUPPS. In effect; yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Sabotage, you assume, is by intent whereas it might be emasculated by error in judgment.

Senator SYMINGTON. Personally I will take sabotage.

Mr. CUPPS. I think the engineering changes effected on the Vienna installation were made with sound planning.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they were made with sound planning, but not planning to hit this target area. I agree with the witnesses who say that this could not have been the result of stupidity. I think it was sound planning, but not sound planning for America.

Let me ask you this. I want to have this straight. Mr. Leahy, if this witness cannot answer, I would like to have someone else here if there is anyone in the Department who questions the testimony of Mr. Gillett.

Here is the question. The meat of Mr. Gillett's testimony, as I get it, is that if you take this area, eliminating first the area of 150 miles around Vienna station and take this huge area extending out 650 miles, that the result of cutting the transmitter from 900 feet to 450 feet means that you lose in effect 75 percent of the listening audience in this thickly populated area during the nighttime in the winter, from 3 o'clock in the afternoon until 10 o'clock the next morning.

Do I understand you personally cannot answer whether that is true or not?

Mr. CUPPS. I would not agree with the statement because a more dominant factor is the operation of the Timisoara station rather than the height of the tower.

The CHAIRMAN. What effect would you say the reduction of the height of the tower would have on this vital area?

Mr. CUPPS. I believe the Carl E. Smith Associates are the only competent authority at this time to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you cannot answer that question?

Mr. CUPPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. May I suggest, Mr. Leahy, that we will hear any witnesses you propose, but I would suggest you not embarrass young men who are unqualified to testify to the meat of the testimony that has come before this committee. It is like asking a good cook to come and testify on some veterinarian's project.

Mr. CUPPS. Mr. Chairman, I do have facts leading up to the change of the antenna which I think are pertinent to the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. I will be glad to hear those.

Mr. CUPPS. The State Department sent an engineer, Mr. W. R. Harmon, to Vienna at the request of the Vienna Legation to investigate the feasibility of accepting the technical responsibility for the completion of the Red White Red project as conceived by Mr. Gillett. This engineer endeavored to find all the loose ends and documentation which would support Mr. Gillett's position. I was called into the project—

Mr. GILLETT. May I interrupt there with one question. Did the IIA ever ask me to help in the location of the necessary documentation?

Mr. CUPPS. I am not competent to answer that because it wasn't my business to investigate it. The engineer who was on the site could not find sufficient confirmation of all these phases and aspects in writing from the various agencies to produce a sound case on which I could proceed with construction. Therefore, before I would commit a contractor to erect a 900-foot antenna in a critical area, a Four Power city which has clearly defined air corridors from which aircraft may not deviate without fear of retaliation by Russia, I felt it extremely sound to obtain concurrences again in writing from all interested parties, chiefly civil air authorities of any government with which we were friendly.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get such written consent from the British?

Mr. CUPPS. I could not. Efforts were made through our air attaché in Vienna who processed action, both with our own military people, the French, and the British.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to remind you that the sworn testimony here is that such written consent was received from the British. What would you have to say about that?

Mr. CUPPS. That information was never made available to anyone investigating the matter. If Mr. Gillett has that information still in his possession, I do not understand how it could be available to us in the turnover from Army to State.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you know Colonel Hixon?

Mr. CUPPS. I know him by name.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever have any conversation with Colonel Hixon about this matter?

Mr. CUPPS. To the best of my knowledge, no. It was handled through the air attaché, Mr. Milton Turner. I think Senator Symington knows Mr. Turner.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever consult with Mr. Gillett?

Mr. CUPPS. It was not my prerogative to consult directly with Mr. Gillett. It was done through the New York engineering office.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gillett was over in that area, was he not?

Mr. CUPPS. This was some time after the project had been finalized by departmental instructions to me in Vienna. I would like to go further on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. I am curious to know why Mr. Gillett, who was doing the studying and making the plans, and you, who were also there—you were the construction engineer and Mr. Ross was your boss—never got together. Did not someone introduce you?

Mr. CUPPS. I never knew Mr. Gillett personally until he came to my office in Vienna some time in the fall of 1951. I think by that time the antenna had been erected. Is that correct?

Mr. GILLETT. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cupps and I were not in Vienna together at the time I was in the Army. I was there in 1950 and he was there in 1951. The only time he was there when I was is when I called upon him in November 1951, around Thanksgiving. It was the Thanksgiving week.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any agreement with the Austrian Government as to how this broadcasting station would be operated?

Mr. CUPPS. I am not competent to answer that. It is a policy matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know, Mr. Ross?

Mr. ROSS. No, sir. I may have something here.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not there was an agreement with the Austrian Government?

Mr. ROSS. I have no direct knowledge of it; no.

The CHAIRMAN. It would seem that would be one of the first things you would think of when you go over to erect something as important as this, to find out whether you could broadcast in German, Russian, or whatever language. Do you know whether there was such an agreement?

Mr. CUPPS. That was concurred upon before I got there. I had no reason to doubt that there was not approval.

The CHAIRMAN. Approval to broadcast in what language?

Mr. CUPPS. I am not prepared to answer that.

Mr. ROSS. I would like to state that was also not my responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose responsibility would that be?

Mr. ROSS. I would think it would be the responsibility of the policy desk here in Washington, the position, I believe, which is held by Mr. Walter Roberts at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The question that occurs to me—and this is no criticism of you—is how could you intelligently plan a broadcasting station not knowing what your target area would be? For example, if they would not let you broadcast in Russian from that station, the design of your equipment might be entirely different. Would you not have to know that before you could plan the project?

Mr. ROSS. The basis for our action was direct instructions from the Office of the Chief Engineer which was backed up by a report which was received from the office in Vienna which was signed by Mr. Moffly, the public affairs officer. One of the documents—the entire document, I might say, is classified—which was attached indicated that the purpose of this network was to supply Austrian programs to Austrian listeners. That is the basis on which we furthered the plans and went ahead with the construction.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gillett, do you know when the plan of the Army to build a transmitter to beam material into Russia was changed so that the project became one to beam Austrian programs to the Austrian people? Do you know anything about that?

Mr. GILLETT. It was never changed by the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, that change was made after the State Department took over?

Mr. GILLETT. Definitely. The Army's directive was to put the most signal we could into Vienna and Austria to the eastward and on to the east. I know it was planned not only to broadcast in the German language but to take advantage of the late hours to broadcast in other languages.

The CHAIRMAN. What other broadcasting stations do we have in that area that are being used to beam material into Russia?

Mr. CUPPS. To my knowledge, there are none in that area beaming programs into Russia. The nearest facility would be in Munich. Is that correct?

Mr. GILLETT. I think that is right. And the Munich stations are beamed to the east and north.

Mr. CUPPS. They have a number of beams available. They don't use the same beam all the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gillett, do you know anything about the type of broadcasting facilities we have over there in Munich or any place else which are today being used to beam programs into Russia?

Mr. GILLETT. Not specifically, sir. I have not worked on that problem. It would be interesting, for instance, what height antennas and wavelengths are used and what frequency in Munich now.

Mr. Ross. The entire facility in Munich at this time consists of two 75-kilowatt high-frequency transmitters, two 100-kilowatt high-frequency transmitters, a 300-kilowatt medium-wave transmitter, four 8-kilowatt high-frequency transmitters.

Mr. GILLETT. What frequency does your 300 operate on and what height antennas?

Mr. LEAHY. Is that classified?

Mr. Ross. No; that is not classified information.

Mr. GILLETT. It could not be.

Mr. Ross. The frequency of the medium transmitter is 1,196 kilocycles.

The CHAIRMAN. The question I have in mind is this: When this project was abandoned, the one that the Army had planned, by the State Department, I am curious to know whether some other project has taken its place?

Mr. CUPPS. Not as such, but the antenna originally intended for use in Vienna is at present approximately two-thirds erected. I just came from Germany.

Mr. Ross. It has been erected to a height of 800 feet, I have been informed.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, this 900-foot tower is being used someplace else?

Mr. CUPPS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Mr. CUPPS. In the Munich area.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you have the same target area in mind for that?

Mr. CUPPS. I am not competent to answer that.

Mr. GILLETT. Is it being used in the middle wave band?

Mr. Ross. Long-wave installation.

Mr. GILLETT. It is not a broadcasting station at all.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not follow that.

Mr. GILLETT. There has been historically in Europe a few very low frequencies, around 170-megacycle frequency, used for broadcasting before shortwave came into use and before FM frequency modulation came into use. The 173-megacycle frequency was originally allocated to Moscow in the Copenhagen agreement. That frequency was supposed to be used with 500 kilowatts. The Russians think so little of it and so few sets will pick it up that they are not even operating on 173 kilocycles.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand that is what we are planning?

Mr. GILLETT. That is what the 900-foot tower is to be used for, in that low band.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cupps, do you agree with that, that that low band will not reach any listener audience?

Mr. CUPPS. That is outside of my field of activity. I would not be competent to say it would not reach the listener audience. Mr. Ross would be competent.

Mr. Ross. I would like to comment on that. To begin with, I would like to state that it is not a correct statement to say there are no receivers in the target areas which can receive on the long-wave band. I don't have all the information on receivers. However, there is someone here who does, whom I would like to have testify on that. I do know that all the Russian receivers which we tested in our own laboratory were equipped with long-wave band.

Mr. GILLETT. Do you know whether the Russian station on 173 kilocycles in Moscow is now operating at all or not?

Mr. Ross. I do not have that information. We have a complete study on the long-wave antenna which is available for the committee's inspection.

Mr. GILLETT. Mr. Chairman, the information which I have is classified, but it is incredible to me that in view of what I know of the plans for the station which is using this antenna and is to operate on the long-wave band, that the IIA does not have complete monitoring information and all information on whether the station in Moscow is operating on 173 kilocycles. The reasons for that I cannot give because they are classified, but Mr. Ross knows the reasons and I know the reasons.

Mr. Ross. In reference to that, I would like to state, of course, that I think we have already breached security on this in stating the frequency.

Mr. GILLETT. Nobody has stated any frequency.

Mr. Ross. You mentioned a frequency of 173 kilocycles.

Mr. GILLETT. As the frequency of Moscow. You are the only one that has violated any frequency security.

Mr. Ross. Did you not infer that we were going to use that frequency?

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Do any of you gentlemen have anything further to add to the picture?

Mr. CUPPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. CUPPS. The air attaché, when he queried the British, received a voluminous report carefully evaluating the effect of the 900-foot antenna with respect to air operations at Schewacht airfield. There is a report available in Vienna. It may be available in New York, but I certainly did not come with it. This report indicates that any aircraft passing over the Steinhof site on a standard instrument approach would cross the station at a point 250 feet below the elevation of the top of the 900-foot tower, and in view of the limited width of the corridor—this is supported by fact by the British Air Ministry—if we cut the antenna to 650 feet we would still be at the same elevation as the airplane.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that report?

Mr. CUPPS. I have; not in New York. It is in my office in Vienna.

Mr. GILLETT. If that is true, your 250-foot clearance is only a quarter of what the CAA requires for glide tests here.

Mr. CUPPS. I am not prepared to argue that. I am merely stating facts as submitted by the British Air Ministry as supplied me by the air attaché.

The CHAIRMAN. We will now adjourn until tomorrow morning. I am going to ask Mr. Leahy if he has any witnesses that can testify on this transmitter that is to beam to Russia—

Mr. LEAHY. I believe Mr. Ross would be able to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. He just got through telling me he could not.

Mr. LEAHY. He would have to have an opportunity to check his figures.

Mr. Ross. This is something that would require a great deal of study, probably several weeks or a month's work. I feel we have a competent consultant who is far better qualified than I am, and as a good businessman I would recommend we use Carl E. Smith, one of the foremost authorities on the subject in the country.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say to Mr. Leahy that we will be glad to call any witness he would like us to call on the subject. I think if this witness says it would take a month to make the study, we cannot wait that long.

Mr. LEAHY. But I believe this witness has a chart of a similar nature.

Mr. ROSS. That is contained in the engineering statement which Mr. Cupps referred to.

Mr. LEAHY. That has been introduced in the record, I believe.

Mr. GILLETT. That is solely on daytime coverage.

Mr. CUPPS. That is right.

Mr. GILLETT. It begs the complete issue of the depreciation of service at night by fading.

Mr. CUPPS. I think Mr. Smith will probably offer his statement in support of what he has done.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. CUPPS. He is in Cleveland, Ohio, and will be available, if called, for tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn until 10:30 tomorrow morning. May I say tomorrow morning we are exploring a matter referred to us by the Appropriations Committee, and the chairman of that committee will be present, and I have invited him to take part in any questioning if he cares to. It has to do with the *Vagabond* project and the *Courier* project.

We also have subpoenaed a witness from New York who refused to appear today. He is under subpoena now. He will be put on first. That will not have to do with either the subject we are talking about today or the subject of the *Courier* ships.

Mr. Leahy, if you have an engineer who disagrees with what Mr. Gillett says, who wishes to come here to testify, I will be glad to have him do that. Keep in mind when we are speaking to you about these witnesses we do not consider you as a protagonist for any side of the discussion. It is merely that we would like to have you act as liaison so we do not get merely one side of the picture. If there is someone who can give the other side of the picture, we want to hear him.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 p. m. Thursday, March 12, 1953, the committee was recessed until 10:30 a. m. Friday, March 13, 1953.)







EXHIBIT 55



**EUROPE  
AND THE NEAR EAST**

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